PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2533, 6 August 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Some of the more recent cablegrams go far to justify an opinion that the Russian retreat in Poland and the Baltic Provinces—though it oontinues—will not f necessarily have as bad and hampering an effcct upon tho future operations of Russia and her Allies as upon those of the Germans who arc compelling it. It is best to set aside fancy stories ringing tho changes upon theories that the Grand Duke Nicholas has' contracted his lines in Poland merely in order to lure his enemies on, and that ho presently stagger them with a surprise coup which will undo all tHat thoy have accomplished. Also there arc no valid grounds for entertaining the prediction that Warsaw may bo saved at tho eleventh hour. Qn ju'cseufc indications the

city is doomed to fall into the hands of tho Germans for a' time unless the operations in progress undergo some at present totally unexpected transformation. It is impossible to seriously question tho fact that the Russians have retired through; Galicia and Poland under heavy pressure and mainly because they were unable to face the artillery superiority which the Germans were able to bring against them. * « * * This being so the hope that tho enormously extended struggle, from the Baltic Provinces to Bukowina, may yet have an outcome, satisfactory to Russia and her Allies docs not rest upon any expectation that the Grand Duke Nicholas may bo able to spring a surprise upon his antagonists, but upon an assumption that the resources at his command, as they are now in visible operation, may suffice to produce such an outcome. This estimate of the position receives a good deal of support from a number of the messages which have been mentioned, some of them published as late nows yesterday and others supplementing them to-day. There is no need to recapitulate these messages here, but they emphasiso a nurm>er of points which deserve to be kept in mind. One is that the great German enveloping movement is being hampered and opposed by transport difficulties which become greater with each mile of additional advance, another is that tho vigour of the Russian resistance is making the German enterprise costly in a degree that probably was not foreseen, and a third—emphasised in the fuller details now made public concerning General von Bulow's operations in the Baltic Provinces —is that the nature of the communications in the invaded territory makes it very difficult for the Germans to develop their offensive upon a properly concerted plan so as to obtain the best return for a given expenditure of- force. * * * * The most convincing evidence that the Germans are conducting their great attack upon the Russians at inordinate cost and are meeting much greater difficulties than they had anticipated is that their rate of progress —in spite of ah undisputed artillery superiority—is extremely slow. This does not mean that they are not likely to succeed in their immediate object of capturing Warsaw and the Vistula line, but it may easily mean that thoy are purchasing this advantago at a cost far greater than it is worth. Tho burden of the news in hand is that some definite progress has been made in the enveloping movement, but this same news, together with what is known of the state of communications in Poland, makes it likely that the Russians may continue their retreat to a new defensive line in good order. At a number of points in their line of march the Germans are called upon to advance ahead of railways, and even when their route lies along railways these have no doubt been made unserviceable by the Russians. In such circumstances it is a matter of extreme difficulty to mass heavy guns in attack and keep "them supplied with ammunition, and it is almost invariably upon such' a concentration of artillery that the Germans depend for the successful prosecution of their invasion. The remarks of a German newspaper, the Golor/nc Gazette (which has set itself to explain the tardy progress of the German movement on Warsaw), strongly suggest that these difficulties of transport arc already being very Severely felt, and are greatly aggravated by the vigour and determination with which the Russians are fighting as they gradually retire further into their own territory.

Already the slow development of the German Eastern offensive seems to set a definite, limitation upon the extent of territory which the Russians can be compelled to concede before they are able to make .a fresh stand.' There is not much use speculating upon a question which will be decided before many weeks have passed, but all the visible facts point to the necessity of Germany restricting her present efforts in the Eastern theatre as soon as possible. No very definite particulars are available of the cost to Germany of this great effort to reduce the Russians to impotence, but the wastage in both men and material must already have been enormous, and the drain is.still far from being stopped. An Italian message gives an estimate, allegedly of German origin, that in two months from May 1 the Germans lost 270,000 men on the Russian front. This is quite possibly within the mark, and if it is anywhere near it a staggering reduction in military strength is involved whioh cannot but have its effect upon tho war as a whole. Mr. Balfour is quoted to-day as saying that despite all his painstaking ability there is no miscalculation the enemy has not made except regarding the value of ammunition and great guns. Made as it is by a trained thinker, accustomed to weigh his words, this is a bold statement. Whether it is accepted without question or not there is increasing reason to believe that Germany has made a disastrous miscalculation where her present giga.ntic campaign in the Eastern theatre is concerned.

The position is best visualised by instituting some sort of rough balance between the enormous and continuous cost of the campaign and the situation likely to exist when it has attained its maximum cffect. It cannot be taken for gi anted that the Russian. armies will reach their now line unbroken,' though there is good hope of it, but it is difficult to conceive any possible disaster inflicted upon the Russians that would repay Germany for the magnitude and cost of her present efforts. A normal outcome of the developments now maturing in the Eastern theatre will bo the establishment of the Russian armies upon a new defensive line which Germany will be unable to profitably attack on account of transport difficulties. On the other hand, mastery of Warsaw and the Vistula line, which seem to he within her grasp, will afford her a guarantee meantime against a Russian invasion of her rich south-eastern province of Silesia, which has been the grand objective of the Russian armies since tho war began.

But if Russia is debarred meantime from iuvading Silesia she is certainly not likely to be condemned to even temporary inactivity by reason of the enforced retreat in Poland. Assuming that after some further weeks of tho present warfare (which is probably quite as costly to the Germans as to the Russians) her armies arc enabled to stand fast on a defensive line a- hundred miles or more cast'of Warsaw, she will be in an excellent position not only to procced with the arming and munitioning which will ultimately give her an ascendancy ovov tho Germans, but to jju'rsuc au ag-

gressive campaign in a new direction. Matters taking this turn, Germany will have constructed a costly barrier, which will be costly to maintain, against a Russian westward invasion, but there is no present prospect of her being able to similarly block Russian enterprise in Bukowina, which affords a gateway into Hungary at the south-east-ern corner of the fighting area. Russia may or may not contemplate a renewed invasion of Hungary when the German drive in progress has run its course, but at all events her armies, ejected from Lemberg, retain a foothold in Eastern Galicia and on the eastern fringo of Bukowina, and they arc in immediate touch with the Rumanian frontiers. The situation as it stands may be summed up by saying that the great Austro-German drive, impressive as it is, dees not seem likely to reduce the existing margin of fighting strength in favour of the Allies; it is likely to make the German eastern frontiers sccure from attack for a time, but it is also likely to leave Russia in a position lending itself to .continued enterprise and aggression in a new quarter and to exercise a powerful influence upon developments in the Balkans. * * * ,*

The last-named factor is probably the most important of all. As the war develops it becomes more and more evident that the turning point for Russia must be looked for, not in the operations on her. main battleline, but in the attack upon the Dardanelles, which is intended to afford her the sea-gateway for lack of which she is now hampered and restricted. _ A great deal has been said in criticism of the Dardanelles campaign, and it has even been questioned whether it does not represent an unwise dissipation of force. Such a view could only bo based upon a complete failure to realise the position in which Russia is placed and it takes no acoount of the necessity for the utmost possible measure of co-operation between the Powers allied against Germany. Russia's need of military equipment and munitions is known, and it is highly probable that her necessities can be supplied much more rapidly by her Allies than by development of her own war industries, though that development is now going on apace. Archangel and Vladivostock, with their single lines of railway .into the interior, are at best poor avenues of supply, and they are closed by ico in winter. With the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus open, Russia will be able to import such a volume of supplies through Odessa, a port in touch with a fine railway system, as will soon build up tho fighting strength of her armies and enable Her to open anew the question of invading Germany L-firough Poland.

It would not be overstating the facts to say that the Dardanelles campaign is being fought almost wholly on Russia's account and for the sake of the Allied interests which will bo served by the strengthening of her armies. Wonderful work has been done by the Allied forces, in which the Australians and New Zealanders are included,' in gaining a foothold on the Gallipoli Peninsula", but it is quite plain that the reduction of the Dardanelles, by frontal attack, alone, will take a long time to accomplish. _ No one will doubt it who reads the interesting dispatch in whioh Mr. Ashmead Bartlett de-to-day, the conditions under whioh the' colonial 'forces are fighting. The position reached in the campaign and Russia's crying need for supplies point equally to the desirability of a Russian attack upon Constantinople which in all likelihood would lead, to an early collapse in the Turkish resistance. The Allied invasiou has apparently drawn a great part of the Turkish army, and probably the bulk of the available mobile artillery, into the Gallipoli Peninsula, and on all grounds an effective stroke by Russia should present no very serious difficulties. The completion of a modern Dreadnought has given her a command of the Black Sea modified only by. what enemy submarines may be able to accomplish. In -effect, she has an open road into Turkey, and it is highly probable that she will' ere long make use of it. •

Reports in hand from the fighting areas tell of no very sensational development in the Western theatre, on the Italian frontiers, or at the Dardanelles'. 'In regard to the latter campaign, however, there is an interesting statement that an Italian officer has arrived at British Headquarters to concert measures of military and,naval co-operation against the Turks. Italy is not yet at war with Turkey, but has lately been at issue with that country over the treatment of Italians resident within its borders. It is quit© possible that Italy contemplates taking the field in Asia Minor, and if she did her action would r.o doubt have a stimulating cffcct upon Greece, which covets Smyrna and an adjacent area, largely peopled by Greeks. **' * »

As to the struggle for Warsaw, it is proceeding under the conditions touched upon, and the Germans have made some headway. The area rf heaviest fighting for the time being appears to bo the long line of the Narew front _ north of Warsaw. Fighting here in some places thirty miles arid less in advance of their own frontier, the Germans arc in some- respects less troubled by problems of transport than on most scctions_ of the Eastern frcnt, but the Russians are making the most of marsh and forest country in stubbornly opposing the attempt to cut the railway connecting Warsaw with Fctrograd. They admit, however, being dislodged from a thirty-mile, section of the River Narew, between the fortresses of T.cmza and Ostroleka. It is claimed bv the enemy that they arc in tough with the outer defences of'both Warsaw and Ivangorod, but 110 very material change seems to have occurred on the two wings of the enveloping movement—in the Baltic Piovintcs and in Southern Poland. * * * * It is, indeed, stated in a Berlin rressage that General von Bulow is again advancing in the Baltic Provinces towards the Petrograd-War-saw railway, but informative accounts lately supplied indicate that the Germans in this area are in difficulties, arising largely from iho fact that railway communications are lacking, while "Jig transport of men and supplies by sea—as_ was demonstrated a day oy two ago in the destruction by a British submarine of a transport full of German soldiers —is precarious, and beset with perils. The Germans arb in possession of tho Russian port of Libau, cn the Baltic coast, from which a line runs ; nland to the main railway at which they arc aiming, but unless they can make use of soa transport—and the Allied submarines apparently forbid it—the railway from .WW Boast if. of ljttlo i_Mi, No line,

available to the Gem ens runs north from East Prussia into the Baltic Provinces, so that Genep.;!L von Bulow's invasion of this area seems to be mure or less at a standstill.