PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2474, 29 May 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Sekious possibilities are opened up by the destruction of the battleship Majestic, which has shared the fate of the Triumph in being torpedoed and sunk by a submarine off the Gallipoli Peninsula. The news will not come altogether as a surprise, since the loss of the Triumph had already pointedly demonstrated the oxistcncc of a new forco to bo reckoned with in the Dardanelles campaign, but this second successful exploit of the enemy submarines, following so closely upon the first, is none the less disturbing. Apart from their intrinsic importance, these losses by submarine attack and the 'uncomfortable prospect that the submarines may make further additions to their list of victims, threaten even more serious hindrance to the successful prosecution of the Dardanelles campaign than tho ordinary defences of the Strait. The loss of two British battleships and a French ship, sunk by mines in the attack upon tlie Narrows, was a normal feature in the reduction of a strongly defended Strait, and much the same may bo said of tho loss of the Goliath, sunk by a Turkish torpedo boat. Such losses were to be expected, and it ig probable that they will be added to before the attack is carried to a successful conclusion, but on past experience it is reasonable to hope that losses incurred in this way will not be so semus as to greatly wqaken the attacking force or minimise the fruits of victory. They represent the price deliberately and necessarily paid for an advantage leading up to victory. Losses by submarine attack are in a somewhat different category. They represent a dead loss, as distinct from the losses suffered by the Fleet in obtaining command over an additional section of the Strait, and it is equally to tho point that it is impossible as yet to set any definite limit to what the submarines may be able to accomplish. Two battleships havo been destroyed within a day or two, and the matter is not likely to rest at this point. On the other hand, it would be pessimistic to assume that the submarines are likely to be allowed to pursue an unchecked career of destruction. The contest is not quite so one-sided as the sinking of tho Triumph and Majestic in rapid succession may make it appear.

In itself the loss of the Majestic is less important than that of any one of the other battleships which have been sunk at the Dardanelles, more especially as it was not attended by heavy loss of life. Though her four 12-inch and twelve 6-inch gun 3 mado her a serviceable craft in tho bombardment of fortifications and similar work, she was one of the oldest British battleships and graded at the bottom of the list of those in active commission. She was completed in 1895. Her loss is chiefly significant as emphasising the new menace of submarine attack at tie Dardanelles, and in this connection it should not bo overlooked that available means of protection against submarine attack would naturally be concentrated upon tho newer and more valuable ships in the Allied Fleet, old battleships like tho Majestic being left to face a greater risk. It was mentioned that the Triumph, when she was attacked, was acoompanied by only two destroyers, a number hardly sufficient to soreen a warship against attack by a speedy modern submarine, and it is probaDle that the Majeatio had an equally meagre escort.

Definite information is still lacking as to the character of the attacking submarines, but there is no reason to doubt that they are German craft of a modern and highly efficient tvpe. Against the alternative that tney may be units of the small Austrian flotilla, there is to be set the fact; that Austrian submarines from the beginning of the war have shown little enterprise, and also recent reports that German submarines are cruising in the Mediterranean, Until evidence to the oontrary is produced it will be fairly safe to assume that Germany has sent out a flotilla of submarines to the Dardanelles, and that whatever its strength may be, it consists of boats capable of making tho voyage from their home ports to the Aegean, a distance of nearly 4000 miles. Depots en route may have facilitated a voyage of this length, but it is not absolutely certain that they were necessary. Though the subject is more or less wrapped up in secrecy, incidents are continually coming to light which make it necessary to revise ideas previously held in regard to the capabilities of submarines in the way of long-distance voyaging. One authority, Mr. C. W." DoMVH.tR Fife, credits German submarines of the,1913-14 programme with a surface cruising range of ■1000 miles. Germany lias a strong incentive to detach some of her submarines for service in tho Dardanelles. Had it been merely a matter of helping Turkey, probably not a single German submarine would have passed the Straits of Gibraltar, lr.it. many things hang upon the fate of Turkey in which Germany is very keenly interested. Apart from tho obvious desirability, from, her point r,( virw, >.i{ proWs*. tig tV, Dn-vrlw-oJlcs camuaiKn and keeping consider-

able land and sea forces of the Allies engaged with Turkey, Germany 110 doubt sees iu the obstruction of tho campaign the best means of keeping her interests alive where the still neutral Balkan States are concerned. She is bound to recognise that tho development of tho campaign creates a risk that Bulgaria may throw in her lot with the Entente, and if Bulgaria adopted this course it is wellnigh certain that Rumania and Greece would follow suit. It is therefore strictly reasonable to regard tho submarine campaign at the Dardanelles as designed not only to indict present, loss and damage *011 the Allied Fleet, but also as an effort to impede an anti-German Confederation in the Balkans, and so to influence tho Galician campaign and stave off an invasion of Hungary (by the Russians and Rumanians) from the east.

Information regarding the capabilities of the later German submarines, some of which havo very probably made the long voyage to tho Dardanelles, rests upon more or less doubtful authority, but it has been stated that since tho war began Germany has completed a number of ''super-submersibles" (some reports say as many as 19), with a surface speed of from 20 to 24 knots. If such boats exist, and their other capabilities ato in proportion, they must be nearly, if not quite, equal in attacking and fighting power to the latest British and French submarines. So far as official information goes, 20 knots is about the best surface speed yet attained by a submarine, but it is not unlikely that it has been exceeded in the later boats. Great improvements have been effected also in the periscope—which is at onco the eye and the sight of the submarine—particularly in the attached compass fittings whioh enable a submarine, having once sighted its quarry, to set a oourse upon which it can approach (getting inside a destroyer "screen" if necessary), and ulitmately discharge its torpedo without tho necessity of again showing even the periscope on the surface. Whether or not Germany has sent submarines of the latest type to the Dardanelles, she has a number of very powerful boats at command. The units,of her 1913-14 programme, which have no doubt been considerably improved upon, are of 900 tons submerged displacement, and their surface and submerged speed is 18 knots and 10 knots respectively. Their surface cruising range, as stated, is 4000 miles, and tneir main armament consists of four torpedo tubes. They carry eight large torpedoes.

In the accepted anti-submarine tactics destroyers and other small craft play a leading part in 'screening and protecting their larger consorts, and it is possible that the Italian Fleet may be able to reinforce the resources of the Allies at the Dardanelles in this respect,_ even if its larger units are not available to assist in the bombardment. Ships operating in the Gulf of Saros will derive a measure of protection from pursuing an erratic instead of a regular course, and those stationed inside the Strait will no doubt be protected by mine-fields as well as by small craft. Tho gallant achievements of British submarines which have recently_ made their way through the mine-fields into the Sea of Marmora, show that mines offer an insufficient obstacle to a determined submarine commander, but the combination of mines and a screen of destroyers may provide greater obstacles than the German under-wator craft oan succeed against. At all events they have operated so far in the open sea outside the Strait. Defensive precautions and active destroyer flotillas should not, however, exhaust tho resources of the Allies in dealing with the German submarines. It is to be presumed that the raiders are working from depots, somewhere on the Turkish Aegean or Asiatic coasts, upon which they are dependent for supplies of fuel, torpedoes and other essentials. Torpedoes aro bulky things, and in_ keeping the depots stocked a certain amount of heavy transport will be involved. The torpedoes, at any rate, would have to be carried either by rail or upon good roads. Even assuming that all necessary material to enable the submarines to prosecute their campaign has already been transported to the coast, these considerations regarding transport will afford the Allies a certain amount of guidance in hunting tho raiders to their lair. An active search by aircraft and naval small craft will thus bo something less of a wild-goose chase than it might at first appear. Assuming that the depots wero located af a fortified port or ports, these places would at once become worthy ofsuoh attentions from tho Fleet as have already been paid to Smyrna.

The Anglo-French offensive in Northern France has settled down into a Eteady battering at the German fortified front, an enterprise in which the Allies are still continuously gaining ground. This applicß equally to the British attack north of La. BasEce, and the Fiench attack, concentrated meantime on the approaches to Lens, between La, Bassee and Arras. It would take a long time at the present rate of progress to reduce the whole of the German fortified front from Arras to the frontier of Flanders, but the continued offensive is nono the less a very substantial contribution to the wearing-down process which must bo continued, in ono way or another, until weakness compels the Germans to retreat. _ It is not to be overlooked that on this 25-milo front the opposing armies have their resources fully arrayed. The continued inroads made by the Allies into the German line must on that account be accepted as a definite proof of their superiority in artillery and in every other decisive element of fighting power.

Comparatively little is added today to the Btory of tho Dardanelles campaign, but according to an Athens cablegram the Allies advancing from the south (and progressing by methods of siege-warfare) have covered half the ground between Krithia and Achi Baba. This shows that they have advanced six miles from the too of tho Gallipoli Peninsula, and arc still at some distance from the summit of the Achi Baba ridge, which constitutes the Turkish stronghold. Other messages show that the Australians and New Zealanders have in recent conflicts inllicled even 'heavier losses upon the Turks than earlier reports had indicated.

So far no news lias arrived of any important, engagement upon the Austro-ltalian frontiers The fact that the- Italians have not as yet been attacked from the Tyrol and have advanced unmolested over (he borders of the disputed provinces on the. norMi ond north-canti. trnift, be nr.oapted {us strong praunxnlivQ proof

that tho Austro-Germans intend to stand upon the defensive. It is the habit of tho Germans, at all events, to striko hard and without losing time, when they mean to strike at all. A minor encounter on the Tyrol frontier is reported in an Italian message, and it is mentioned that the approaches to'Valdagno have been occupied. This place lies six miles south of the frontier, so that even if the Italians have struck into the mountains to tho north they are probably not far, if at all, beyond their own territory at this point.

Ik its broad features the situation in Guiieia seems to be unchanged, but it is indicated that there is no slackening in the German assaults upon the .Russians along the San and further south. The absence of any radical development is in itself encouraging, showing as it does that the Russians are still holding the enemy along the line north of Przemysl and on the narrow front between tho fortress and the marshes of the Dniester, on the south. This is an unmistakeable tribute to the fighting powers and tenacity of the Russians, for it is evident that the enemy is still straining every nerve to gain the upper hand and enoircle Pvzeraysl. Tho fashion in which the stubborn Russian line has withstood for days a hurricane of artillery fire and massed assaults augurs well for ultimate victory. On the other hand, the Russian counter-offensive on north and south of the German attacking front does not seem to have been pushed as yet to anv definite point.

References to an attempted German attack in the region of the fortress of Ossowiec, in Poland, opposite the south-eastern extromity of East Prussia, and on the approach to Warsaw from the north, might in other circumstances be taken as indicative of a new German offensive in that region, aimed at Warsaw. A couple of months ago the Germans made'a determined effort to reduce Ossowiec and push on to the south. With the tremendous battle in Galicia on their hands, however, they are hardly likely to essay a renewal of their northern enterprise. It is much more likely that the Russians, with their great resources of men, may take the opportunity to attack the German line at some point in Central or Northern Poland.