THE INITIAL FRENCH ERROR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2448, 29 April 1915, Page 7

THE INITIAL FRENCH ERROR

NEW LIGHT ON THE WAR'S FIRST STAGE

THE CAMPAIGN IN LORRAINE

(."Manchester Guardian" and "Daily Telegraph" War Scrvice.) During tho days of tho retreat from Mons, the question was continually being asked, "Whero is tho bulk of tbe Frenoh army?" "Why have they .not been sent to the north ?" It was y„Trpcctly well known when the Germans violated the neutrality of Belgium that they intended to invade Franco by tho unfortified nor thorn frontier. Since those oi'itioal days the veil has in part been lifted, and we have been allowed to visit ground in Lorraine over which the finest of the French armies were engaged in a desperate struggle for existence during the whole of this period when the British Army was retreating from Mons Until after the conclusion of the battle of the Marne. Now we know for certain that the bulk of the French armies ready to take the field at the beginning of the war were concentrated on the frontiers of Alsace and Lorraine, and i that a vigorous offensive was begun m the opening days of the war which led to a French invasion of the lost provinces. A French corps actually ocoupied Mulhou'se and was received with the utmost enthusiasm by the inhabitants. But this movement was premature. The reserve divisions were not yet mobilised, and this corps, isolated and unsupported, was obliged to retire across the frontier and to ■ fall back under. the guns of the fortress of Belfort.

The Main Attach on Lorraine. The main French movement was directed not against the Germans in Alsace, but against the troops in Lorraine. It is with the fortunes and misfortunes of General Castelnau s. army concentrated round Nancy and Lunevilie that I deal in this description of the campaign.. The pick of the French army corps were concentrated under Castelnau's command. His array i coaBisted of five army corps—the 9th, 11th, 15th, 16th, and 20th, with some reserve divisions and the 2nd Independent Cavalry Division. It would seem as if the French campaign in Lorraine was started with no definite strategical objective _ in. mind, except to obtain some great initial success in the lost provinces which would rouse the latter to intense enthusiasm for the French cause. On certain points there is now no manner of doubt —viz., the French entirely miscalculated the strength of the armies which the Germans could throw into the North of France whilst keeping at the same time a sufficient strength in Lorraine to defeat any attempt at a French invasion ; also', at this early stage, the French Generals were all for attack, and had not grasped the great lesson of the war—that the attainment of victory by an attacking force is almost impossible under modern conditions unless you have an enormous superiority in numbers and an open flank against which you can utilise your superiority. Had these two facts been understood as they are now understood, there can be little doubt but that the French would never have attempted the invasion of Alsace and Lorraine. They would have acted strictly on the defence along the line of their strategical frontier represented by Belfort-Epinal-Toul-Verdun, with a sufficient force to hold the Trouee de Mirecourt, that open stretch of unfortified but extremely difficult country between Epinal and Toul, which is the only road for an invasion of French territory along the eastern frontier through which a large army can pass without first investing the frontier fortresses. They would then have had their army free to meet the menace from the north, and a decisive battle would probably have been fought on the line of the Meuse and the Sambre, instead of on the Marne. But the preliminary mistake having been made, no further purpose is served by harping on it.

The French Initiative. When General Castelnau commenced his forward movement towards the Seille on August 14—tho day mobilisation was completed—he does, not seem to have obtained any real and reliable information as to the position and strength of the German armies. Lorraine, is a very difficult country for the handling and the deployment of large armies. It is hilly and deu6ely woodod. It does not seem likely that General Castelnau assumed the offensive with tlie strategic object of reaching the Rhino and invading Germany. It would appear as if his object was to carry the fight to the enomy's soil and thus save French Lorraine from invasion, and also, perhaps, to arouse an insurrection amongst the French population of tho lost province. This historic battleground, over which both armies were about to contend for the next four weeks, abounds with istrong natural positions which can be rendered almost impregnable by the assistance of the spade, and at the end of this period both armies were to Jearn by bitter experience that their original ambitious plana of campaign were to be brought to naught. However, it would appear as if the French mobilisation in Lorraine was finished two days before the. Germans were reday to strike, and that the initiative in the first place thus passed from the Crown Prince of Bavaria into the hands of General Castelnau. The success of his offensive up to August 17 encouraged a further advance, and on August 18 General Castelnau divided his army into two main groups, the right wing advancing towards Saarburg—eividenltly with the intention of masking any attempt at a sortie from Strasburg—whilst the left wing, stronger in numbers, pushed on towards Chateau Salin and Mohange. The position between Chateau Salin and Mohange is an ideal one for defence, and was held in force by the main Bavarian armies, supported by an immense mass of heavy artillery brought out from Metz.

A Trap Carefully Prepared by tho Cermans. Nevertheless on August 19 the French made some progress and established their batt-lei'ront, but on the 20th, when they attempted to carry this line forward, they were repulsed with terrible losses. The French artillery, although it inflicted tremendous losses ou tho enemy's infantry, could make no impression on tho heavy field batteries placed in commanding positions. There can be no doubt that tho French had fallen into a trap carefully prepared for them. The right wing, which had pushed on towards Sarreburg, was also hold up and defeated. The men were everywhere exhausted by the heat and long marches; There was therefore no alternative but to retreat if a disaster was to be avoided. To the 20th Corps was assigned the role of acting as rearguard. This corps, perhaps the finest in the French Army, sacrificcd 'itself to savo the others. It covered the rotreat by holding on to its jx>sitions, but sulfercd enormous losses, amounting, it is said, to '20,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners. [t also suffered a great loss of artillery, but this mattered but little as the guns wore immediately replaced. On August. 21 tho dermaiis nllowcd t,'he French no rest. They pressed forward vigorously and drove back the exhausted corps to that, splendid position known as the Grand Couronne do

all costs he must hold tho Grand Coil* forine and prevent the Germans from entering Nancy—otherwise his army would be driven back into Toul anil would run the risk of being invested if the enemy forced the Trouee do Mirecourt. Now wc come to tho second of the grand errors made during this campaign. Just as tho French had thought that on August 18 they had utterly defeated the Germans, so on August 212 the German commander suffered from a similar misapprehension that he had utterly, routed tho French armies and that for the time being they might bo oonsidered.a negligible quantity. On th s same day, August 22, tho Germans entered Lunevilie and pushed westwards towards the Moselle. General Castelnau's army was now strictly on the defensive.

An Achievement That Saved France. On August 23 and 24 General Joffre evidently became seriously alarmed at tho progress of the Bavarian army towards the Moselle. He told Castelnau that at all costs he must hold the Grand Couronne against a frontal at- ■ tack, and that at tho same time he must endeavour by every means in his power to stop the enemy's advance towards the Moselle. Castelnau replied that lie and his army had sworn that not a single German soldier should ever set foot on tho Grand Couronne. This promise they kept, and their achievement saved France and made the victory of the Marne possible. August 25 was the critical day of the oampaign for both the French and German armies.' The Germans, considering themselves victorious, were pushing forward, had crossed the Meurthe and Montagne, and their advanced posts were within a few miles of the Moselle. The Bavarian Crown Prince and his staff early on August 25 undoubtedly considered that their plans had succeeded and that only a continuation of their vigorous offensive was required to drive tho Fronch armies back on Toul. But General Castelnau now had the truer knowledge of the strength and disposition of the enemy and fully realised the risk which tho Germans were taking in separating their armies ' by a flank march across his front.

The French Counter-Stroke. A great opportunity had arrived, and ho did not let it slip. His army was conccntrated whilst the Germans were divided by a long stretch of difficult country. Every mile they moved further towards the Moselle increased tlie danger. Therefore, on August 25, the French commander issued orders for his counter-stroke. Along his whole front, both north and south of Nancy, orders were given for a general attack against the depleted forces in front of bis position, which, however, were thought sufficient by the Bavarian commander to check any advance of the French after the reverse suffered before Chateau Salins and Mohange. The French troops advanced to the attack with the utmost vigour. In the immediate front of the Grand Couronne thev descended into the valley of the Seille, penetrated the forest of Champenoux, and drove the Germans right tack—but not without desperate fighting—across the Seille into their own territory. By the night of August 25 General Castelnau's strategic objective had been achioved. He had checked the enemy's advance towards the Moselle. The French corps which, advancing from the Grand Couronne on the 25th, had driven the Germans right back across the Seille, were still Full of fight and anxious to continue their victorious advance towards Chateau Salins-Mohange, the scene of the reverse of August 20.

General JofTre's Decision. Castelnau consulted Jofl're, who decided that a further advance was too risky, taking into consideration the Critical state of the operations on the Marne. General Joffre was, in fact, perfectly satisfied with the mccesees already gained in checking the German advance towards the Marne. He ordered Castelnau to withdraw his troops from the Seille and the Forest of Champenoux, and to fall back once again on the impregnable Grand Couronne. South of Nano.y he was to establish his new line, and to endeavour to hold it at all costs. This deoision was probably the v/isest. There was now little danger, unless the Germans were able to bring up immense reinforcements, of any further attempt to pierce the Trouee de Mirocourt, and the French generalissimo could now oontinue his operations on the Marne without any further menace to his right (lank. General Castelnau therefore carried out his instructions, and the battle was broken off for three days, both armies being thoroughly exhausted by their exertions and having suffered enormous losses.

On September 1 commenced the second half of this titanic struggle, which lasted almost ivithout cessation until September 12. Throughout tho whole of this period the Germans were attacking, whilst the French remained strictly on tho defence, except when it became locally necessary 'to deliver a counterattack to rccover a lost position. When, on September 11, tho Germans were about to retreat, the French advanced and'retook the village of Oliampenoux, but at very heavy cost. • It was days before they succeeded in clearing the whole forest, and finally drove the enemy back across the Seille.—E. Ash-mead-Bartletfc.