NEW ZEALAND'S NAVAL POLICY.

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1750, 15 May 1913, Page 4

NEW ZEALAND'S NAVAL POLICY.

The most, definite information that has yet reached us from overseas concerning tho result of Mr. James Allen's conferences with the Admiralty on the subjcct of Naval Defence as affecting New Zealand appears to bo that • which, wc publish this morning from "Vancouver, Mit. Allen, it will be seen, declined to outline the proposals which lie intended to placc before the New Zealand Government on his return; but he appears, nevertheless, to have dropped a hint as to the line upon which New Zealand may be asked to make a beginning. The idea apparently is the formation of a mosquito fleet —that is to say, a small fleet of small vessels to be stationed in New Zealand and to be built and maintained by the people of the Dominion; The information on this point is by no means definite, and, it may be merely a speculative guess on the part of the cable correspondent; but, taken in conjunction with Me. Allen's published utterances, it would not be at all surprising to find that it is fairly close to the mark. AVe made some extracts recently from an interesting article in the Hound Table dealing with the Naval question as affecting tho Overseas Dominimis, and there arc some further points bearing directly on New Zealand's position which are particularly deserving of attention at the present juncture. It is fairly M'cll known now that the llound Tabic is an ably-conducted _ quarterly review, which confines itself to questions immediately affecting the Empire, and its future policy, and is entirely free from any suggestion of party bias. Some of its articles are very fine indeed, and the information conveyed and the views expressed arc valuable and plainly deserve \vcighty consideration. The article on ''Policy and Mca Powor," to which we have already directed attention, discusses, amongst other things, the relative merits of the policies of local Navies and monetary contributions to the British Navy. In May of last year, it is pointed out, Mit. Winston Cuckchill, First Lord of tho Admiralty, expressed the view that whereas during the past ten years the main development of Naval policy had beeii in the direction of concentrating' the British licet in decisive waters, that is to say, the North Sea, the main developments of the next ten years would be tho. growth of effective Naval forces in tho great Dominions oversea. "Then," he continued, "we shall be able lo make what I think will be found to be the true division of labour between the Mother Country and her daughter States: that we should maintain a sea supremacy against all comers at the decisive point, and that they should guard and patrol all the rest of the British Empire.'"' This, of course, would mean local, llccts, and the moment the question of local fleets is raised the question of control inevitably obtrudes itself. The opinion is held in some quarters that once the Overseas Dominions embark on a policy of local Navies that unity of control which is essential if full advantage is to be made of the vessels available will be gone. The writer in the Round Tabic, while ho does not commit himself to this view, plainly sees serious disadvantages in local fleets under local control, particularly emphasising the possibilities of conflict with the principles of strategy. Moreover, he argues that there is no certainty that the Admiralty could rely on such fleets in time of war; and points out the further disadvantages that local Navies take a long time lo reach any pitch of usefulness or strength. "It is not," he says, "a question of building ships but of (raining men," and finally it is pointed out that the British Navy can ill spare at the present time the officers aud men that would bo required to take charge of any war vessels the Overseas Dominions might build.

These arguments all carry some weight, but those relating to the time which it would take to bring a lucal ileet up to any degree of strength, and the shortage of officers and men available from the British Navy, arc least convincing. The local Navy idea really involves the duty of providing the men to man the vessels, and this is one of the most important of the arguments in favour of the policy. That this is recognised by the writer of the article under discussion is made plain when he directs his attention to the advantages of local Navies. It is difficult, ho remarks, to sec how else the interests of the Dominions iu their own ships can be excited. To sign a chcqno will never satisfy their patriotism. Simply to give money or ships wholly controlled by n Government which in no way represents them is odious to their self-respect. 'J'hev must feel something of tlio pride of ownership; their ships must bo manned by their , own countrymen. A local Navy alono satisfies their self-governing instinct. How, for instance, can tho Naval instinct of the people of New Zealand bo kept alive by n ship stationed in the. North Sea, mul manned by Englishmen. . . .If tho plan [of Canada] is adopted by tho Canadian Parliament, tho Canadian ships will be not onlv stationed in the .North Son, but will bo manned and paid for by Groat Uritain. There is a danger, therefore that they may bo felt to be not really Canadian ships, and that lliey may fail to arouse any enthusiasm anions Canadians for their own Navy. They aro not helping to build up any distinct Canadian Ileet unit. There is a danger, fno, (hat the plan of stationing Dominion ships in the North Sea may in the long run tend rather to relieve the Brit-i-di"taxpayer of his burden than to add io tho clVoclive strength of the Empire. 'The problem, therefore, appears to be to propound a policy which, while providing unily of control of the whole of the fleets, will still nourish the growth of Naval sentiment, in the Overseas Dominions. So far as New Zealand is rnncerried, (hero should lie mi ililuenHy in solving this .problem. If, as is suggested, the local Heel, policy is in harmony will: the Admiralty's views, no one is likely to question the nilvisableness of placing the control of the vessels ,m such a footing as will enable (lie Admiralty lo make llie best use of litem at iiuy time of threatened trouble.