The Dominion. MONDAY, MARCH 24, 1913. WILL PRANCE WAIT?

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1705, 24 March 1913, Page 6

The Dominion. MONDAY, MARCH 24, 1913. WILL PRANCE WAIT?

~ Is history _being repeated in regard to the, relations between France and Germany ? Careful observers of: re-* cent utterances and happenings in both countries will :not fail to discover several significant parallels With what took place during the period which immediately preceded tho Francq-Gcrman war of 1870-71. At the present time_ the Cologne Gazette, doubtless inspired from the Wilholmstrasse, seeking to justify tho Germany Army Bill on the ground that danger threatens • the Fatherland from France, says that never hjvft the rcvanchc idea shown itself eo undisguisedly, and it is certain that Germany will have to cross swords with France. Bismarck, for years before France declared war against Prussia, announced almost openly that the conflict was inevitable. And, then, as now, France was the aggressor—so Bismarck pietended. In tho Deutsche Emiclschau Professor Richard Fester has narrated some of Bismarck's designs for the bringing about of the war. He planned and schemed incessantly, and more than two years before the outbreak of hostilities was able to predict the opening of the war. In January, 18G8, he said to Carl Sckurz: "This war with Franco will come, and it will be forced on us by tho Emperor of th 6 French. On some pretext or other he will begin a conflict with us. ... In my opinion, the crisis will occur in about two years. Naturally, we must be prepared, and, indeed, we are prepared." The spirit that animated Bismarck continues to animate the Kaiser's Ministers. If it does not influence the Kaiser himself its display by Ministers indubitably commands his approbation. £hc reply of the Temps, that an arrogant Germany is no longer confronted by an isolated France and an isolated Russia, and that, if there have been threats,' they have been made by Germany, depicts the'present position of France in a sentence. It is a statement which undoubtedly expresses the opinion of France. Within eight years Germany has on three occasions assumed a warlike attitude towards Franco. A reccnt writer in the Fortnightly Review pointed out the outcome of Gei'v

many's bluster* in the following words:

"Tangier, 1905; Casablanca, 1908) Agitlivee crucial Franco-German, especially three crucial French, times and places. Germany intended them to bo crucial for France, and they all were; but_ they wero not crucial for France at all in tho way Germany intended them Id be. Tho .first time and place meant much for Germany; but not half as much as their consequences, the second meant much for France; and perhaps tho third meant yet more. Tangier, 1905, cost Franco dear, but Casablanca, 1908, was worth the prico, and Agadir, 1911, proves (hat Casablanca, 1908, is beginning to pay." Germany, in. short, has of late blundered with respect to France. A writer m the Mound Table, a publication which is assuredly well informed and strictly equitable, admits that the German bureaucracy is inclined to no gentle ways. "It has been immersed in Bismarck's tradition, and the Chancellor's advisors aro largely admirals and generals, who are familiar with the notion cf war, and with whom war is the natural instrument of policy." This judicial exponent of German ways arrives at the conclusion: "They (tho Germans) think so well of themselves that their ambitions have been inconsistent with the rights and liberty of other people, and their manner of pursuing, these ambitious has been such as to provoke apprehension, resentment, and opposition throughout the world."

The possibility, indeed the likelihood, of war between France and Germany has become a familiar theme during recent years. More than twelve months ago Germany's official plan of campaign against France „was unfolded in tho Fort: nightly Eevieiu by one obviously well informed and familiar with the countries—Belgium and Holland— and the routes by which the German Mrps d'armce was to be thrown into France. The writer sets out with the following perfectly explicit statemeilt: "French opinion has shown immense riestraint in face of the Agadir provocation, but there is a limit to the forbearance the French people will display under Gei'maii bullying, and the Berlin Government, knowing, this'-as well as we do, is satisfied that, if and when war suits their plans, they' can have it by one further turn of the screw, making the position intolerable for a great and high-spirited nation." But, will Franco remain quiescent until it suits Germany's plan' to suddenly, and .without warning, attack, investing France's line of border fortifications, aild pouring her troops well into France. The German mot d'ordre will be to invade France without a formal declaration of war,, and, at all costs, get well established on French soil, west of the line of Vosges, so as to fight a decisive battle somewhere in the neighbourhood of Rheilns pr Chalons. France, according to the plan, must ba seriously damaged within three weeks, so that Germany may be victor in the first round before England and Russia have entered the field. With plans such as these flatinted in the face of tho world, together , with recent rumours ,f.i'om Italy, the T chips's scornful rejoinder tp one of the German Press Bureau's organs will iio doubt meet with "considerable and widespread sympathy. _ France can rely upon obtaining assistance from Russia. The Franco-Russian Treaty includes that either comes to the assistance of the other with the wholo of its military and naval forces in case of the ally being, attacked. _ ; Tho all-important question to 'consider at the present time'clearly is: Will Franco be agreeable to wait quietly until it suits Germany's convenience to'attack her?