OTTOMAN ARMY.

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1634, 28 December 1912, Page 8

OTTOMAN ARMY.

CAUSES OF ITS 00LLAP3E. UNCOffIPIiIOTIiU IiBFOHMH. The following nrticlo by Colonel lleinl'ieli Itittep ran Hcliw«ri, of tho Austrullunmnnn Onernl ritalV. appeared in the London "Daily Telegraph" of November U':-

Suddenly and unexpectedly the prido of tho Turkish Empire is cast down; belief in Uio invincible prowess of tho evervietorious 'Turkish, army has for ever vanished, ilow this litis Ijeeu brought about, and lmw it has been possible in Kiieh an amazingly short timo lo bring an t'liipiro (o nun is tho question to which the entire world socks an answer, and upon which 1 will endeavour lo throw j-oiiio light.

farticularly during tho last few yearn, 60 full of political mid military complications, opportunities Imvo boon given for admiring tlio eminent military and diploliiaito talents of tho Turkish people. "Not tho Turkish army," tho unliuppy Urnvo commander of Plovlyo iB reported to have said, "but tho Turkish policy has suffered defeat.'" Much truth lioa in this confession, and w>ith a slight correction it may bo ncoeptod. It was not tho Turkish soldier, but Turkish policy which caused a disordered and ncglcoted army to bo oonquered. ' Ono must go far bnok ■to reckon up tho mistakes that have led to this great debticlo. A good army needs good officers and good soldiers, and theso tho Turkish army always possessed, both in its soldiery and in its officers' corps; but tho great internal disagreements, tho political differences, tho many small discrepancies iii regiments suddenly thrown together, liavo left tho Turkish soldiers tlead and defeated upon tho battlefield.

Officors and Politics. Tho Younk Turk system, carried from Parliament to tho army, worked-far from well. ■ First, degeneracy was uoticeablo in bffieors' corps at Constantinople and Salonika, and constant transference assisted in. making tho officers, both of tlio Turkish and Asiatic armies, join in the "va banquo" game of political intrigue, for wlich they care inoro than for their troops. In this way, regardless of. military ability, many officers, through tho accident of birth, political connections, or wealth, filled high posts.

. Meanwhile tho military education .of the officers was less and less regarded. l?or example, in 1907-1908 thirty-nine officers were ordered to Germany and six to France, while 272 wero-sent at their own cost to different countries. Owing to tho great number of non-commissioned officers, mostly without education, tho inlluence of the officers trained abroad was but small, and the foreign instructors, mostly German officers, could do but little against tliti opposition which they met with in the garrisons. It even occasionally happened that a German instructor was told that strict discipline, as maintained'' by "unbeliever's," was ' unwelcome to the Mohammedan soldier.

Dislike of Reforms. Much of tho blame for the late defeats may be laid at tho door of this dislike of Western culture and reform, work. So long as the Koran exists tho. Turk will refuse both to lay asido his fez .and to oonform to.rel'orul work. -When travelling West he regard? with polite appreciation all the advances, made in technical work and civilisation, never failing to praise them. Returning-home, ho is again, a Hohampiedan, considering it impossible to bridge tho gulf that separate him i'rom the unbeliever. ..It is true that lie orders aeroplanes. . and electrical, searchlights, erects stations for .wireless telegtfiphy and pays the price asked, but ho then places everything in tho magazine, as if glad to be rid of a tiresome, obstinate salesman now that ho has been forced to purchase. The military, magazines are actually full of the technical novelties that-. are so much.:.wanted in. Adrianoplo and forgotten to be brought out.

That the chief German instructors, such as Goltz Pasha, liiihof Pasha, arid others failed in a short time to accomplish tho great miracle of military i regeneration must be clear, to,everyone acquainted with the -Turk. In 1910 the first military exerj. rises took place, and the first military school was established in 1909, also an infantry shooting-school' and a shootingground near Constantinople, but not until 1911 was an artillery ground for practice firing laid out. General conscription became law in 1909, -but, -owing to inner political reasons, discipline, until lately, was extremely lax. With conscription began the enrolling of non-Mussulmans in tho army, but special laws govdrned tho treatment of tho Mohammedan, and more than 25 per cent, of tho Christians were not allowed in any body of troops. Army and tho Sultan. , With this , new departure: the relation of tho army-to the Sultan became changed. He is now, for tho army, • only tho Goneralissiriio, no longer the Caliph. Tho twenty years of military service included three years in tho active army (Nizam), six years in the reserves (Ichtiat), nine years in the militia (Redif), two years in tho Landsturm, a general levy (Mustafiz). Under the title of exemption claimed by many, numbers of men could at once be enrolled in tho Redifs, perhaps for tho reason that. the. men and military education of the Nibam regiments wcro mostly uniform, the men boing nearly all Mohammedans, and tho officers Young Turks. The contrary is the case among the Redifs and Ichtiats, which have a much inferior organisation and diversified corps. All the Mohammedans and non-Mohani-medans liable to servico have tho right, after three months' sorvico to redeem I themselves from further' service by. the' payniefit- of JiTBO. In a religious war. all Mohammedans up to 70 years of ago can be called out for sorvico. The peaco strength in the Nizam troops- consists of about 10,000 officers, 230,000. men, 1500 guns, and 32,000 horses; while the war strength, which is scarcoly ever reached, owing' to the wearisome mannor of mobilisation, comprehends for a European battlefield 610,000 mon and 24,000 officers; that is, about 460,000 rifles, 21,000 artillerists, 1018 guns, and 137 maohine-guns. In tho present war this strength was by no means reached. The mobilisation of the Ottoman's forces has always required "a long time, owing to tho irregular distribution (ex-territorial dislocation) of the troops in the Empire, and, above all, tho imperfect means of communication aud tho want of governing officials.

Non-Moslem Elements. The military ability of the infantry varies. The Nizam's show good shooting and training, but much inferior shooting is seen among tho Rodifs aud Ichtiats. On tho whole the military material is good; above all, tho Anatolians from Asia Minor are excellent soldiers, but, since political reasons forced tho Turkish military authorities to enrol non-Mohammedan Albanians and Macedonians, even Turkish Bulgarians, the uniformity and excellent training has much deteriorated. Want of men caused the Anatolian troops to servo in this war, and they wero distributed among tho European regiments. The artillery material is not nnifonn, and, although, again, modern ouick-firing Krupp guns were purchased, tho needful exact training for such a precise arm was wanting. This absneco of practical'training had sad effect when fighting with welltrained Bulgarians ocourred. An exact calculation shows that not even 50,000 Turks had had proper military training. No wonder that only about 30 por cent of tho men could properly handlo tho guns. At the present time the Turkish army has three systems; for field firing. The new chief of the General Staff. Izzet Pasha, was about fully to reorganise the army, and intended to divide the entire army into Redif and Nizam corps. According to this organisation, each corps consists of three divisions, each division containing eleven battalions, three squadrons, and six batteries. The brigade was abandoned, the battalion in war time consisting of 800 to 1000 arms. Also tho appointment of army inspectors and tho presumptive army comnmnders is tho work of Izzet Pasha. His intention was to make new regulations for 1, the infantry—a simple imitation of the German rules. Tho cavalry is formed on the Austrian model, as also tho servico rules. The first, respecting discipline, is a Aiopy of the Austrian regulations.

Lack of Proper Training. In this reorganisation numerous corps ami division commanders, with insufficient military qunlifloatioiuj, but occupying Keh uoats tixowch, political iaflusac^jMa.

obliged to (Jrfu.'oml lo the runk of colonel or liiiutpNiinl-fiiloiicl in ililToront MlPnieilte, Tliut lliis 1 ihk «• " lo on ' life Turkish nrmy would Imvo been ncoompunicil b,v the licst results, had tho talented orgimi.'irr foiim! timo and quiet to comulelo llio Work, iip|>n«rs lo ho ocrtnim tTufort 11 (intfly, tln'so _ noccssnry (iiinlilk'ntioiiß hitvo Ijren lately linpossiblo, SrorMy hull Uio now era dawned under the Vo'unjf Turk than domestic cuiillicts nrrpsled llio intended dovclopiiiplend of organisation and building nil, lh« Turkish army hiid lo undertako(\.\hnils(iii|; (ftiwillu fights with rebellious. Ifilii'S in tlio Vvuiimi and Albania.' y oll ' tiiiiual ucildaniiorio service was tho task' <il' (he Turkish nrmy, whieh ttn» Jiovcr able lo ohjoy tlio 'imcussnry military trainini' thai: onlv pciicd'ul limo.s can nllew. 'Furl-hw, before tho" new troop discipline could become part of themselves the> old lMitriai'ciinl discipline was iiiiderminod. so that the oiipniv, excellently schooled, found llio Turkish army entirely unprewired and unlit, and could suddenly causo ih downfall and defeat. It was unprepared, as the mobilisation had scarcely Willi; unfit, because tho greater part, of Uio men could riot handle the new war material. As lately reported, many soldiers were found with disfigured faces, os tliev did not understand the breech-action of their Mauser rifles, which they handled for the first timo. Besides this, the circumstanco of fighting in the enemy s country was against thom. As tho lurkish Bulgarian ivns ail enemy m his own country, treachery, espion'agc, and the irritating inJluenco of this foreipn element assisted in making victory easier for* the real enemy.

Incapable Administration. The Turkish uoldicr, as'wo see him hero ns a trcfugeo in Austria, does not appear by his altitude to be guilty of; the misfortunes in'the Ottoman Umpire. How little can the bnst .soldiers .be blamed when an insufficient -adHunistratioii cannot • provide for tho ncccssary reinforcemcnt.9 and complements. The grossest cases of insufficient assistance aro reported..,.that, under such circunistance's, )iO;-soldier stood^-in the place to which ho belonged, that, tho most essential commissariat supplies failed is comprehensible. In evory modern army these preparations nro aM all times so far ill readiness that only a short order, as it were tho touch of an electric bell, is needed to place the entire complicated machine of an army, in perfect readiness for an active advance towards tho aim it has in view. These preparations undergo yearly control to accord with any possible changed communication or local condition. How far was Turkey from such an. ideal state when alarmed by war and when many regiments- had to take the field with half or even a third of their war strength! It can no longer bo cause for wonder that -the badly-trained, badly-led, hungry Turkish soldier was overcome by . the modern, excellently-trained, brilliantly-commanded Bulgtir army..-