BORODINO, 1812

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1620, 11 December 1912, Page 8

BORODINO, 1812

NAPOLEON'S MARCH ON MOSCOW. SUPERHUMAN" EFFORT. ; [By A.B.] . The present year is the centenary of Napcleon's disastrous march !on Moscow, during which the very heavy general action of.Borodino was fought. The' following interesting article is by a. Wellington resident who has visited the various battlefields lying between the Polish frontier and the historic city of Moscow.

The railway and the main highroad from Warsaw to Moscow debouch together from' the former city upon an extensive plain used for. manoeuvring purposes by the Warsaw garrison, and where in the fateful' year. 190-1, the writer saw immense swarms of Cossacks supported by parks of artillery charging and .recharging backwards and forwards. with extraordinary precision. The roads, side by side, then plunge into the depths of a great forest intersected by a'labyrinth-of wide paths flanked with white stones and used as a cover for the huge, garrison permanently stationed in this turbulent and disaffected neighbourhood.

Emerging from tho forest the country through Central -Russia varies but .little. Vast stretches of inundated country, impassable swamps, and impenetrable forests are the chief characteristics of ■ the plateau that stretches in an unbroken expanse from north to south and east to west. The highroad quickly degenerates into a mere. streak of mud, creeping at times closo' to the railway, and again threading .its way into the far distance through vast solitudes, to be frequently obliterated by. mire and swamp.

The historians of 1812, who are desirous of excusing' the tragic failure of Napoleon's Russian campaign, lay great stress on the difficulties of transport and speak of a storm of unusual violence that swept across the country, reducing it to a vast quagniire just, as the Grand- Army was entering Russia. The huge train,of supplies was immediately disorganised. ' The horses began to fail under the additional strain and perished' in great numbers. The ammunition and supply wagons could not keep pace with the army; food aim forage gave out, with the inevitable result that the soldiers had to resort to pillage and plunder in order to ward oft starvation. The country was' deserted except by the Cossacks .who flitted about, elusive as shadows and incapable of fatigue, destroying bridges and harassing the French on all sides.

Such were the conditions that from the verv beginning foredoomed the campaign to failure and, disaster. Napoleon calculated upon ample forage, but as he advanced in the wake of the retreating Eussians he found the country eaten bare; everything within reach of the French columns was destroyed. The Eussian Army, on its retirement to Moscow, had been accompanied by a wandering nation. The Eussian peasantry, true to their nomadic instincts, had placed all their old and infirm, their women and children on droskies, and being forbidden the use of. the highroad (reserved for the artillery and military wagons), formed frequently a dozen flanking columns; and th 9 order, ingenuity, and facility with which they wended their way through streams and over morasses and ravines that had been thought hitherto, even by the inhabitants themselves, to be impassably has commended itself to the admiration of historians and. as the French bulletins admitted, "not leaving a wheel.to mark any disorder, hurry, or trace of their direction." •

The French advanced'.through. bare and deflate country affording subsistence for neither man nor beast. Sickness and dysentry ravaged the army; thousands of stragglers in pursuit of food were cut oft and yet Napoleon's indomitable ambition caiiK-d him to press onwards towards the impossible realisation of a phantom hope, The Eussians offered' no determined resistance as the .ever-diminishing army crept toward Moscow- (although brushes, and - sometimes very sanguinary engagements, were numerous),,until the French were within eighty miles of the ancient Capital. Then—at Borodino—was fought one of the most;memorable and-bitterly-contested battles in history. The field of Borodino, where the centenary '. was recently celebrated amid scenes of pomp and enthusiasm, is a typically Eussian landscape. The surface is broken, billowy, and uneven; streams, tributaries of the Moskwa, had eaten into the soft subsoil and formed. intersecting ravines; ihe inevitable forest sprawled'in all directions, affording cover and either impeding or facilitating military operations. Slight elevations and a marshy soil afforded scope for the rapid construction of redoubts, commanding in each instance a stretch of plain, in front and giving the artillery an unobstructed and murderous sweep.' On the morning of the battle the sun rose with extraordinary brightness, an omen that inspired Napoleon .with confidence, and although hoarse with, cold, .and unable to speak (having to write, instead of dictate.'his dispatches), he placed himself in a favourable position for tho command of operations. The battle that followed was contested with extraordinary courage and determination on both sides; it was a battle of points, complicated, indecisive, and attended by an almost unprecedentedly high average of losses. Artillery thundered throughout the day with terrible effect; successive charges of cavalry and infantry were interchanged "under torrent 6 of missiles that poured as if dissharged from a bursting thunder-cloud," but neither side quailed under this fiery ordeal. By mid-day the French, had secured no positive advantage nor made any essential progress. Napoleon realised that it was necessary to combine for a concentrated and conclusive effort, and collecting all his disposable forces in one mighty mass, and planting 400 pieces of cannon to cover and support the shock, ordered a general advance. . The collision was terrific, and the confusion became indescribable. The Russians upheld their reputation for tenacity in defence. Victory hung in the .balance until a number of Russian generals and chiefs were wounded and obliged to withdraw. These misfortunes had a demoralising effect on the Russians, who relaxed their resistance when deprived of proper command. Exhaustion prevented the French making further decisive efforts, and had the sagacity of the Russian com-mander-in-chief. Kutusow, been equal to the occasion, Napoleon would probably have been annihilated there and then. But a fatal obsession seized him. Against the urgent entreaties of his Generals, Kutusow decided on a retreat to Moscow, arguing that in another battle the Eussian army might bo sn shattered as to be.rendered incapable of again resuming offensive operations. He trusted to the severity of the approaching winter to destroy Napoleon, and to render his army an cosy prey—hones not to lie disappointed, but "only after the sacred capital itself, Moscow, was laid in dust and ashes.