BERESINA, 1812.

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1608, 27 November 1912, Page 8

BERESINA, 1812.

CENTENARY OF GREAT EVENT. NAI'OLKOiN'S TURNING POINT. ' [By A.B.] Tho following interesting articlo in by a Wellington resident who patecd over and inupcctcd. Napoleon's battle-fields in Ittißsla of 1612. To-day is tho ccntenary of tho military operation known an "the Jleresina," In which tho cuhnuiii/-. ting disaster ovortook Napoleon's army during tho celebrated retreat from. Moscow.

Tho Turkish rotroat from Lulo Burgas has been compared to tho Frcnch rotroat from Moscow in 1812, just ono hundred years ago, but'tho comparison is in nearly every respoct unfair to tho French. Turkish retreats throughout tho present war cannot bo described as other than routs and debacles—flights in which very occasional and. very ineffective rearguard actions wore attempted; and cowardice, tho massacro and maltreatment of defenceless villagers, and a desperate desiro to got beyond rango of tho Bulgarians' fire, being tho only objects in mind.

Napoleon's retreat through Russia, iu spite of its overwhelming lossea, was conducted with skill and'bravery and under conditions without parallel in tho annals of warfaro. Tho greatest military gonius in history presided up till a certain point ovtfr this grand tragic drama, and with him were associated marshals of tho typo of Ney, known in history as "tho bravest of tho bravo." Only at the Beresina did the retreat degenerate into panic and utter confusion, and tho passage of this swollen and icy river was the climax to the misfortunes of tho disastrous Russian campaign.

Napoleon crossed the Niemen into Russia at the head of 400,000 inen, of which number nearly one-half were lost on tho march to Moscow, including 40,000 at the Battle of Borodino. Moscow was evacuated on October 18, the Beresina was reached by the advance guard on November 25, and "at the Beresina," says Chambray, "terminated the history of that Grand Army which had made Europe tremble; it ceased to exist as a military body."

Tho river, was reached with 31,000 infantry and 5050 cavalry, and. its passage not only presented the greatest obstacle to the retreat, but-should have been negotiated with the utmost 'speed—and here Napoleon's sovereign judgment for ■ once 'fatally erred. Winter was rapidly approaching; swarms of' Cossacks, described by Thiers as "indefatigable .savages," encompassed the retreating army ;' the Russians with ample artillery kept up a steady and murderous pursuit,, and the numbers of the French- were diminishing daily at an appalling rate.. When the writer traversed the line of the retreat in the " spring of 1904—the Moscow-Warsaw railway running almost parallel—the country presented the same aspect as in 1812. The ground throughout Russia is practically a dead flat, with patches of forests sprawling in all directions, with numerous intersecting rivers and tributaries. Long lank grass pastured innumerable herds of. cattle and semi-wild horses, feeding very often up to their knees in • water. ; •. The Beresina at this point runs through a deep wood, its banks lined with marshes and its bed composed of deep; soft mud. For the'passage of wagons and artillery it presented an almost insuperable obstacle. Napoleon sent Marshal Oudiriot ahead to select fords , and to construct bridges—the pontoon train having been previously abandoned for lack of horses. .When these orders were given the river ivas.from three and a-half: to five feet in depth, and eighty yards wide. An intervening thaw increased its depth to six' feet and its width to 110 yards. The sappers and engineers set to work with courage and energy, l and„pf the 400-f.emr.-l 'ployed, vrorJciiig' up. to tfieir, necks'- in ice- ' cold water, but a mere handful survived. Two rough bridges were constructed for infantry and artillery respectively, and the passage commenced' on the night of November -2G." The bridges. repeatedly broke down, and on the.27th and 28th littlo progress was '.made. ■ The Russians meanwhile were arriving in great numbers, and swarmed on both the right and left banks of the , river. A cordon of. cannon surrounded the • French, and Sir Robert Wilson, who ac-, companied the Russian army, thus describes the scene: 'General Diebitch. having established a battery of twelve guns against the right flank of the French, the shot plunging among the mass gathered round the bridges caused a frightful scene-'of-terror,-struggle, and carnage. Overset carriages blocked up the bridges; horses in herds without riders 1 flew wildly about, bearing down all in their way; large numbers perished," while another historian employs the" following graphic language:— "There was a confused mass of men, horses, and vehicles,-1000 yards long by 201) yards wide along the river bank. Many of those who got on to the bridges were* pushed off into the water and drowned; every Horse that, fell, struck by a K\issian "shot or slipping on the frozen soil, caused the fall'of many more, till the whole space in front of the bridges was covered , with- a mass of broken vehicles and. bodies of men and, horses, through which 110 passage was possible. Late in the evening, when the action had ceased, the engineers, assisted by an artillery detachment, had to make a regular cutting through this hideous obstacle." All directing control was lost; the .wildest disorder and violence prevailed, - despair made savages of those who had strength enough to contend, and yet it is chronicled that ,the French, undaunted, continued their resistance and made repeated sallies against the. enemy in the face of overwhelmingly superior artillery and -musketry fire. On the evening of the 28th. Napoleon gave orders for the bridges to be destroyed. The flames burst forth,-and with them '■ a wailing shriek of anguish and despair. Some sprang on to the fiery platform and were, engulfed or consumed; some dashed into the river and, crushed by massive blocks of ice. rolled down the stream calling in vain for succour. . The Cossacks darted down on their prey, and thousands were cut off from nil liope. Many lost their lives in tho ungovernable melee, but there was no general massacre." : The fact that Napoleon's army was not annihilated at-the Beresina has been attributed by various writers to errors of disposition and execution. The Russians were in ignorance of Napoleon's plans: the bridges were built before they. knew. Napoleon also, delegated to others tho selection of the sites of the bridges and the superintendence of their construction when the general safety depended on the operations being .executed with a promptitude and order that only Napoleon's own presence could ensure. The remnants that survived the passage of the Beresina —7000 infantry and 2000 cavalry—fell prey to fierce cold (said to have reached SOdeg. below zero, Fahrenheit), fatigue, and sickness, and became no longer a military force but a mere fugitive rabbis. The cold waged war with what'has been described as "exterminating velocity." and the destruction of life became frightfully rapid. Sir Robert. Wilson sums up the conclusion "f. the retreat, in the following words: "On December 14 the central' body of that mirrhty armament of. 400.000 men which had crossed the Niemen under the immediate orders of Napoleon upon June 24, rot six months before, to achieve the reduction of the Russian power and continue for ages the domination of France over, Europe, mustered under arms only a force of 400 infantrv and GOO cavalry,' every other portion of this army being represented by a handful of officers hivl non-commissioned officers farming escort to Hie that had not been captured or buried." , The year IRI2 furnished one of the most Mowing end imp»WslinWo clmn'-»rs in military The Balkan W<\r affords n.o parallel. Turkish retreats hive bon with se n r""lv f"i oxcenHon disgraceful or"'"es of bloodshed. pii«ic.- and nias.snere W'fr'i no 'murderous p'ipmte to ronton' l v-ifh. retreating in wild disorder thr"""'! their own country, and flnost within gunshot ,of their own capital.