LAW REPORTS.

Dominion, Volume 5, Issue 1314, 18 December 1911, Page 3

LAW REPORTS.

SUPREME COURT. ACTION FOR ALLEGED LIBEL. THE HASTINGS CASH. K<Ecrv«l judgment was delivered by Sir. Jiislicn t'linpiiinn in the Supreme Court on Saturday on the smnnums for inlrrrosiitories in connection with the Hastings cii-e of llonire Inn Simeon v. "Tlio Tribune" Ltd.—an aetian U<v alleged libel. At (lie hparins of tho ruiimons 31 r. E. j>. Bunny npnoare;! for th" |.!nintilV and Mr. A. \V. JLilair tnpre=cntpil the defendant company, who opposed ih«: application in regard to several cf the iutorrcgatqrie?. In Kivin;; judgment his H.mour said: "The action is for libel. It is ac'mitted that the defendant comyany ijul-lisli-cd a paragraph when iho nlaintilt was a candidate) for a seat in I'arhaiuent at the recent general elect iuus, a-s fellows:— "'A flash from a candidate's speech when referring to another candidate: "Tiiis person comes among you clothed with the Government brand. If lie had his deserts ho should have received it before now.'" It was alleged that 'this person' referred to plaintiff, then a candidate in the Government interest, and that 'the latter words had a sinister meaning. The defendjnt denies the reference to the plaintiff, and that the publication had injured him, and this leaves it open to the defendant to contend that the words ara not defamatory. There is no jnMificatiou and neither privilege iior fuir cimment is pleaded. Several of the itlcrrosatories are framed with the object of showing express malice. No. 6 runs: 'Was the said defamatory statement intended to apply to tho plaintiff?' To prove that a particular defamatory statement was intended to apply to the plaintiff is now no longer required of him;, indeed, it is no defence to prove that it was M«t, and could not have been, so intended, provided that the jury find upon proper material that it actually does defame him. . . . I do not doubt that a judgo may still tell the jury that as to damages they are at liberty to consider whether tho libel inadvertently referred to the plaintiff or \yas maliciously planned and published with tho object of injuring nim." Alter quoting certain juithorities, Ms Honour sail that it did not follow that such an interrogatory was proper where privilege is not in issue'. "In the c«se where a question' of qualified privilege' aroso the plaintiff's cas-s might depend on extrinsic circumstances of malice and, a. new issue would thus bo raised. The quantum of damages as distinguished from the legal measure of damages did not rt'.ise a distinct issue. Continuing, Mr Justice Chapman said: "I have read with great pare the judgment of Mr. Justice Cooper .n J'all v. the 'New Zealand Times' Company. A great deal of what the learned judge there says is strengthened by the efiect of the judgment of the House of Lords in Ilulton v. .Tones. I think I hat -tho 'first test put by Mr. 'Justice- Cooper p.|.plies here: 'The proper function of ii-terroga-tories i? to obtain from tho facts ii-ieiro-gated admissions of fact, which it is necessary for the "arty interrogating .to nrove in order to establish his <.j.-:e.' His Honour proceeds to show when s.ich interrogatories are allowed and «len tl c-y are not. It is plain that the tf.-st is lot whether the answers will assist the plaintiff, but whether they are lic-e.-ssary. I do not deny that in many cases interrogatories directed to the question of damages may bo allowed, but the general rule is that an allegation of damage.is not issuable matter, and the amount of damage certainly is not. That interrogatory will, therefore, be. disallowed. Others seem to proceed upon the- assumption that the malice of shareholders in the defendant company may. be invoked; that is, of course, extravagant." His Honour allowed interrogatories 1, 2, and 8, referring to the publication of tho statement, the proprietor and publisher, and the number of copies circulated with tho statement. The remainder were disallowed. . An order was given accordingly, with costs, c£2 2s.