The Dominion. MONDAY, JULY 17, 1911. THE BRITISH CRISIS.
9 . We arc given in a cable message to-day some definito news concerning the future of the Parliament Bill. Of the de-1 bate on the report stage wc are told nothing save that Lord New-J ton's irrelevant amendment has been withdrawn, that Lord Morley asserted that the Lords had made the Bill "just the Bill they liked," and that Lord Lansdowne observed that even if the amendments were inserted the Bill would still be a dangerous measure. This is not very helpful, but it is at anyrate something _to know just when tho third reading debate will take place and when the Commons will consider the amendments. For the present, the position is that the Peers have defied the Government's attempt to establish singleChamber government, and that Mr. 'Asquith has not yet declared war. There is, indeed, a singular contrast between Mr. Asquith's patience and waiting tactics this time and his liaste in rushing to the country last year without waiting for the Lords to do anything to the Bill. War may still be averted, of course. Having waited for the Peers to make their amendments, Mr. Asquith is pretty certain to continue this policy, and will in all probability consider the amendments according to the normal rules. The normal thing is to disagree with the amendments, and set up a series of conferences between managers for the two Houses. There is thus just as much room as ever for a reconsideration of the possibilities of that compromise which the famous conference of last year failed to find. Whereas, however, that conference was composed of two Peers and six members of the Commons, two of whom were Unionist leaders, the Commons "managers" must this time be all Liberals.
The absence of any spirit of compromise from the discussions in the House of Lords is no good augury for the prospects of compromise in any future negotiations. Should both sides stand firm to the last, only one of two things can happen: there will be another general election or a wholesale creation of Liberal Peers. Of tho two alternatives, the second appears to be the one that will least damage the nation's real interests. Should Mr. Asquith, cither through failure to obtain guarantees from the King, or for tactical reasons pure and simple, go to the country, the prospect of success for the Unionists on a failing register may be small. The Government would probably return to power, and would bring the Parliament Hill in again. The Peers would in that event feel obliged to agree to it. There is a possibility, on the other hand, that the Government might be defeated, or so seriously weakened as to be unable to take a high hand, by the revolt of the anti-Home -Rule section of British Liberal opinion. At the election of last year Home Rule was not directly before the nation, but it would he a prime issue in any election now. It must bo remembered also that Tariff Reform is no longer a reason for moderate men to fear a Unionist success, since Mil. Balfour has pledged himself to submit the issue to a referendum. That pledge is the real secret of much of the Unionist press's advice to the Peers to accept the Bill. The ardent Tariff Reformer of the section that places Tariff Reform above everything else may well say to himself: "The Unionists' turn will come, and with the power given to them by the Parliament Bill will be able to establish Tariff Reform whatever the country may think
As to the theory of the BUI, the debates in the House of Lords only served to complete the proof of the unwisdom of the measure. \Ye noted recently the sophistries into which Lord Morlgy was driven. All his colleagues in the gilded Chamber were in the same case. Lord llaldake, for example, essayed to deal with Lord Salisbury's point—"a very good point," he said. The argument was that under the Parliament 1 Bill there might arise a situation such as arose in 1902 when the Education Bill was passed two years after the "Khaki" election although the country had not pronounced upon it. Lord Haldane admitted the force of this contention : "These are illustrations of what might happen. I admit that—and they may happen more usually under a written than under an unwritten Constitution." What, then, was his reply? Simply this: "Still, as a rule, they do not amount to anything serious. 1 ' And in like manner he evaded other leading points against the Bili. He urged, in another passage, that the Bill merely "put into printed language what has been hitherto the practice and usage of the Constitution." _ But it is just the absence of the printed language that makes the Constitution good and efficient, and that makes impossible those bad tyrannies that a temporary majority would practise if it received a printed permit to go ahead. Equally specious was the plea that under the Bill the House of Lords could for half (the latter half) of any Parliament delay measures until the country pronounces upon them at a general election. But, as the Times pointed out, "if that is tolerable and proper for half of every Parliament, there can he no very sound Constitutional reason why during the whole of every Parliament the country should not have the same opportunity—not necessarily by a general election—of declaring its will upon matters of Constitutional importance." But the question is unhappily no longer one for settlement by appeals to reason. | Mr. Redmond is in the way.
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Bibliographic details
Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1181, 17 July 1911, Page 4
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937The Dominion. MONDAY, JULY 17, 1911. THE BRITISH CRISIS. Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1181, 17 July 1911, Page 4
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