The Dominion. SATURDAY, JULY 1, 1911. THE TREATY OF PEACE.

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1168, 1 July 1911, Page 4

The Dominion. SATURDAY, JULY 1, 1911. THE TREATY OF PEACE.

The interesting and important news that tho Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty has been signed was recorded in two cable messages printed yesterday. A Washington dispatch stated that an agreement had been arrived at and might be submitted to Congress at an early date for ratification, and a London telegram recorded the enthusiasm evoked at a Pilgrims' Club dinner by Me. Balfour's announcement that a treaty had been signed. Curiously enough the substance of the treaty, as given in a memorandum issued by the United States Government on May 17, was not communicated to us by tho cable agent, who unfortunately overlooked also the extremely important announcements and criticisms which followed Mis. Knox's memorandum. The _ official announcement began with the .statement that the draft would be submitted to' the French Ambassador, and was intended to be a basis for negotiations for the extension of the scope of arbitration treaties with other nations. Tho most important feature of the 'draft .treaty, its characteristic feature, was' its tacit wiping out of any exceptions to the disputes capable cither of judicial or of arbitral, settlement. - To quote the memorandum:

It is proposed that all differences internationally judicable shall be submitted to The Engue Tribunal, unless, byspecial agreement, some other tribunal is created or selected. It provides 1 that any difference which either country thinks not internationally judicable shall be referred to a commission of inquiry,- with power to inako recommendations for their settlement. This commission shall be made up of nationals of the two Governments who aro members of Tho Hague Court. Should the commission decide that the differences should be submitted to arbitration, their decision shall bo binding, and such arbitration shall bo conducted under tho terms of submission to tho advice of the Senato before, arbitration is resorted to. Even in cases where both countries agreo that tho difference is one susceptible of an arbitral decision, the commission of inquiry shall investigate the difference with a view to recommending a settlement that will preclude the necessity of arbitration. The finding of such commission shall not have tho effect of an arbitral award, and the commission, at tho request of either Government, shall delay its findings for one year to give an opportunity for a diplomatic settlement.

There were hostile criticisms almost at once. In England the Morning- I'ost hastened to declare that the treaty was the fraud it had previously predicted, in that it provided on the face of ifc for nothing like the absolutely "universal" and "unrestricted" settlement that had boon expected. This is in one sense literally true as to fact, but the Post's comment is entirely unwarranted. Its reliance, for example, upon the reference to the United States Senate takes no count of the fact that, as the New York l'ost pointed out, the Senate would not venture _or desire to wreck a settlement "in the face of a passionate public sentiment in favour of peace." In America, strangely enough, the strongest note of discord came from the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, Mr. Roosevelt, who wrote a singular article in the Outlook to establish the theory—for which a great deal can bo said—that America "should be very cautious of- entering into a treaty with any nation, however closely knit to her, the form of which it would be impossible to follow in making treaties with other great civilised and friendly nations." _ He freely admitted, was emphatic indeed, that "it is now impossible that there shall ever be war between the English-speaking peoples." "Between Great Britain and the United States," he said, "it is now safe to have a universal arbitration treaty," because it is unthinkable, "no longer possible," that tho two countries should insult each other in a way that would make arbitration impossible. But, he argued, America should remember that there are other Powers in respect of which this does not hold good, and policy required therefore that America "ought never to bind itself to arbitrate questions respecting its honour, independence, and integrity" :

Either it should bo tacitly understood that the contrnctinc; Powers no inoro agree to surrender their rights on such vital matters than a man in civil life agrees to surrender tho right of selfdefence or else it should lie explicitly staled that, because of the fact that it is now impossible ,for either party (o take any action infrinsinp; the honour, independence, and inloßrity of the other, wo arc willing to arbitrate all questions.

Mn. Roosevelt has been bitterly assailed for writing in this way; but his purpose was probably only to emphasise a point of statecraft likely to be overlooked. His statement of alternatives just quoted implies his

support of the second alternative. It would be a villainous act to encourage the idea that a "universal" treaty should have nullifying reservations pencilled on the back of it, even if the position of the contracting parties be such that the reservations would never become operative. Such a conception of treatymaking would make treaties valueless.. What Mr. Roosevelt wanted, obviously, was a blunt declaration in so many words that even vital issues—issues affecting national honour—would in this case be made arbitral.

But tho treaty is a, great step forward. Its significance is in its implication, that whereas formerly certain questions were considered unfit for arbitral settlement, to-day all questions are to be considered as prima facie arbitrable. In other words, as the New York Fost observes, "where formerly it was assumed that questions are bound to arise on which a pacific agreement is impossible, to-day we are ready to assume the improbability of serious dissension, and in any case to let the future deal with its own tribulations." But why, it may be asked, if war between Britain and America is simply impossible, as Mr. Roosevelt declares, should a treaty be required. Well, the answer is that Mr.. Roosevelt is only right given certain conditions. Given the condition that the rupture is followed by a considerable space for thought, Mr. Roosevelt is right. Here is where the value of the treaty comes in. It provides that breathing -space. It is distinctly "thinkable" that there may flare up a sudden passion and crisis, although considered war is unthinkable. Most people must have seen that a tiny bit of Chauvinistic pressure at the time of the Dogger Bank affair would have precipitated a war between Britain and Russia, which would have been the most insane and wicked war in modern ages. The perfectly extraordinary debate in our own House of Representatives on October 25, 1909—in which Sir Joseph Ward was on tho side of sanity and caution, unlike some of his present colleagues—is proof enough of the readiness of national opinion to rise suddenly to dangerpointy The inclusion of a specific repudiation of war as a means of settling vital issues would hardly have bettered the treaty and would probably have emphasised, by contract, tho reserve that must be maintained between Britain and any other Power. This would have encouraged the idea of an actual alliance between the two Englishspeaking countries, and would havo been injurious to the prospects of the extension of the arbitration principle.