THE LIQUOR LAW.

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1115, 1 May 1911, Page 5

THE LIQUOR LAW.

CONVICTION QUASHED, IMPORTANT LEGAL DECISION. CBy ToJcsrrtph.—Special Correspondent.) Auckland, April 30. Judgment has been, given by Mr. Justice Edwards in the appeal case Daniel Dunn v. William Monson, an appeal against the decision of Mr. Cuttenj S.M., in whicV/appellant (a barman) was convicted of having sold liquor to a prohibited person. • ■• His Honour said that the question for determination in the appeal was under which of'the throe classes of cases uijder the statute law this case , fell. In his opinion it fell within the third class as laid down by the Court of Appeal in the King v. Ewart. This was "tliose in which ulthough' from tho omission from the statute of the word 'knowingly' or wilfully it is not-necessary to aver in tho indictment that the offence charged was knowingly or wilfully committed, or to prove << guilty mind, and the commission of the act'in itself priraa facie imports an offence, yet the person charged may still discharge himself by proving to the satisfaction of the tribunal which tries him that iu fact ho had not a guilty mind." Section 205 created five of the offences which might be created on licensed premises by persons other than licensees. One was the offence of supplying liquor to any prohibited person, the offence charged: in this case, and no person coming within Section 205 could by any means keep himself free from the risk of infringing the-statute if tho construction of tho magistrate was correct. The scope and object of the statute in creating that offence were conclusively shown in Section 215. The intention of the Legislature clearly was, so far as reasonably possible, to prohibit the sale of liquor to prohibited persons. If, • however, that had been absolutely prohibited it would have, entailed intolerable hardships upon licensees. Accordingly, Section 213 was qualified by a proviso exempting the licensee from tho operation .of the section if he, r or. his agent, actually 6elling the liquor, had no reasonable opportunity of'knowing, and did not know, that tho person to whom he told the liquor was a prohibited person. In other words, tho Legislature had, in express terms, brought the offence created by Section 213 within the third class of cases mentioned in Rex v. , Ewart -(quoted above). The scope and object of Section 205 (D) are plainly the same scope and object as those'of Section 213. The object or intention of the Legislature in Section 213 was to prohibit tho supply of liquor -to persons who were prohibited to purchase it without creating unreasonable hardships to innocent persons. Its scope had accordingly been carefully limited to those who could not show themselves to be innocent. There could be no (kubt that the' Same scope and object must bo attributed to Section 205 (D). If the appellant in the case could nol have shown himself innocent the licensee would have come within the ..penalty of Section 213. The innocence of the appellant relieved the licensee of, that penalty. It was absurd to suppose that the intention of the Legislature- was, while relieving the licensed upon proof of the innocence of his agent,, at the same- tirqo to expose that innocent agent to a penalty in reject of the same Act.- The appeal must, therefore, be allowed and the conviction quashed. The prosecution being a police prosecution, :tiere were no costs allowed.