THE PEERS AND THE VETO BILL.

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1084, 24 March 1911, Page 5

THE PEERS AND THE VETO BILL.

"Tho Times" last month gave prominence to the following letter on "The Constitutional Question," signed "Privy Councillor," which put weightily the reasons why the Lords should not reject tho Yoto Bill when passed by the new 'House'-of' Commons, or should be overridden by a special creation of Peers if they do "It seems probable that- within the next fow weeks the Parliament Bill will be passed by the House of Commons. It i 3 difficult to'conceivo that the House of Lords, which has in recent years again and again declared its readiness to accept measures, even though it disapproves them, which come to it after a special reference to the judgment of the people, should so far depart from the fundamental principles of its policy as to reject the Bill on its second presentation. But, to judge from recent speeches, it seems that some at least of the leading members of the Conservative party would have the House- of Lords adopt that, course,' and one or 'two have asserted that, if it did so, a special creation of Peers to override thq present majority in that Houso would be unconstitutional.

The Weight of Authority. "On _ this point the whole weight of authority is the other way. And sinco it is of importance that men should not form conclusions on this grave matter without taking into account the opinions of constitutional historians and jurists, I would ask leave-to quote four relevant passages from writers of acknowledged weight. They clearly show that when the House of Lords rejects a Bill of fundamental importance passed by the Commons after endorsement by the people, a special creation of Peers is the ono method which is prescribed by the Constitution for ending the conflict." • The first quotation given by the writer is from Professor Djcey's "Introduction to tho Study of the Law of the Constitution" (n. i'hi; the second is from Bagelot's "English Constitution" (p. 08); the third from Lecky's "History of England in the Eighteenth Century" (Vol. I, p. 185); and the fourth from Erskine May's "Constitutional History of England." All are to the effect the creation of new Peers to swamp a hostile 'House of Lords is a perfectly legitimate measure in case of urgency. The passage cited from Erskine May (Vol. I, p. 314) runs:— "It must not be forgotten that, although Parliament is said to be dissolved, a dissolution extends, in fact, no further than to tho Commons. The Peers are not affected by it, no change can take place in tho constitution of their body; except as to a small number of Scotch representatative Peers. So far, therefore, as tho House of Lords is concerned, a creation of Peers by the Crown on extraordinary occasions, is tho only equivalent which the Constitution has" provided for tliu change and renovation of the House of Commons by a dissolution. In no other way can the onir.ions of the House of Lords bo brought into harmony with those of the people. . . . Statesmen of all parties would condemn such a measure, oxcept in cases of grave and perilous necessity; but should the emergency be such as to demand it, it cannot be pronounced unconstitutional."

Is thß Crisis Perilous? The. writer concludes"Whether the present. House of Commons does or does not represent tho mind of the nation with rospect to tho Parliament Bill may bo a subject for discussion. Whether the crisis which is invited so light-heartedly bv tho friends of tho House of Lords would bo perilous or not may be a matter of opinion. But if it be held that, after a general election fought mainly on that is«ue, the House of Commons must bo taken to represent the mind of tho nation with respect to tho Parliament Bill, and if it be held that the rejection of the Bill by the Lords would crcato a situation of profound gravity, then, on the further question whether a creation of Peers would or would not be the constitutional means of resolving tho deadlock, there can bo no doubt or room for argument."