OUR FORTIFIED PORTS.

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1063, 28 February 1911, Page 3

OUR FORTIFIED PORTS.

,; AN "ALL BIG-GUN" THEORY. SHOULD WE INCREASE OUR ARMAMENT? A NEGATIVE ANSWER. . Mujor E. G. Davidson, whom the 'Wellington officers will remember p.s a visitor to the brigade field operations at Oringi, Danneviike,.-during Easter, 190!), is now attached to the Frontier Delimitation Commission between Peru and Bolivia, in South America. During tho conrse of a vmird and intending career, Major Davidson lias fpjii feveral years' service in the Vnited States Coast Artillery, some eight years in the British service, which period includes an appointment as Staff Officer in tho Transvaal Military Forces. Ho hnssomething lo say on the subject of tho' Australian and New Zealand coastal defences, ■ "Fortifications Useless." "When passing through Australia and New Zealand," he says, "I had the opportunity of making notes on tho guns cf tho harbour defences, and. also of noting how those harbours would lend themselves to being strongly fortified. Both countries are busily engaged at present in reorganising their land forces, and Australia is starting a navy, but tho political, horizon should make them .' perfect their harbour fortifications also. Taken to-day, on tho basis of the modern battleship, those fortifications are useless. This is a sweeping statement. We have quite recently fortified' Dorset Point, which commands the seaward entrance to Port Nicholson, and armed the works with two Mark VII 6-inch' B.L. guns. An> there adequate? Major Davidson evidently does not think so, and gives his reasons. " ' '■ "As tho 'Dreadnought" evolved a newtype of battleship, by which all other types of ship arc practically obsolete, so it is with our laud fortifications," he says. "In the United States the new U-inch gun for land defences is more powerful than the 12-inch. In Japan and ■ Germany thev have n much improved 12inch gun. All the new forts in Germany and Japan an> in reality 'Dreadnought, or 'ail big-gun" forts, with tho exception of a few.smaller guns to guard against torpedo-boat attacks, etc. American forts are much tho same. The future problem of coastal defence in Australia nnd Now Zealand is in reality tho all-big-gun scheme. Based on this theory, and that for the next eight or ten years at least tho all-big-gun typo of ship will prevail, the question arises: :'How do tho harbour* defences of Australia and New Zealand stand at tho present ;noment?' As nothing. A single foreign battleship of the 'Drc-.idnought' type could stand off. and blow all our coastal cities to atoms. .."A Prophecy." "It is an almost universal opinion," continues Major Davidson, "that within the next six or eight years .the great nation's of tho earth will be locked in- a, life-and-deatli struggle. England will bo undoubtedly pushed to tho utmost to hold her own. We (I am a New Zcalunder by birth); far sway in the Southern Pacific, will-have to depend-entirely on ourselves. In tho Northern Pacific, but not drawn into the confict, is one of the finest fighting races in tho world, with n. powerful navy, waiting like a bird of prey for spoil. Even now tint same country has her eye on Australia, and every fortification, and its strength, is known. That moment will be tho opportunity to strike, and if Australia and New Zealand are not prepared, they aro doomed. Let ,usi. before it is too late, aid nature in making somo of our 'loadins ■'• ports among tho strongest forts in the world. The scheme is simple and if carried put in a practical manner not expensive. Strong , harbour fortifications combined with a small efficient navy, will make any nation hesitate to attack us. Taken 'at once, .wo have atnplo time to > prepare. , '

Let Military Art Aid Nature. , \ "Who could wish,"' lie. says, "for any-thing-finer than the-harbours of -Melbourne, Sydney, Wellington) or 'Auckland for fortilic-ations? Let us, for example, compart Sydney, and the manner in which it could bp made impregnable,.with Port Monroe, ori of the strongest forts in America. -There is,no comparison of.tho natural-advantages'of the two places. At Port Jlonroo the old fort is built on a lon- point running from Phoebus. Tho new works aro built ajong a mile or so of low sr.ndy spit. --Along-.this, in pairs aro mounted' huge disappearing 12-fncli and some 13-inch guns, nud also'some 12-inch mortars. Man has made this place, without any aid from Nature, one of tho world's strongest forts. These guns, mounted on low ground as they are, have a range of -12 or 15 miles, and command .Chesapeake Bay. Sydney,'at the present moment,' is defended by sonio 4.7 and a few guus of a larger'calbre. Wellington is worse off still. -These guns, at the very utmost, have an-effective range of only 'a few miles. They are useless against oven , modern cruisers, so why waste money in mounting.many more of tticm? The type of ship we must be prepared to beat in tho futiiro will bo. "n "'super-Dread-nought,' whose tyno of dim will allow her to, attack from a distance of at kast 12 miles—a , grey blot. ' Of what use , will our light guns be to protect our-shipping, our. homes; our dockyards, and our Navy seeking,shelter wthin the port?

. . An Impregnablo Sydney. , ' .' "Nature' has. made Sydney ono of tho securest natural ports in the , world," Major Davidson paints out. "Suppose," ho says, ,"wo hart .mounted on. eacliMiead four 12-inch disappearing guns of tho most modern type. Tho North Head is at ■ the present moment tho weak spot about Sydney, nnd always will be, until it is strongly' fortified. Behind these four 12-incli guns on either side, and well masked on one ct the many snitablo points, suppose wo ha:l two more 12-inch guns; further back again, but; a little to ono side, a pair oi 14-inch guns. On each Head mount'a stMiidnry battery for use against torpedo-boats, etc. Behind each • head-let us sunnoso we had a battery of four 12-inch mortars, whose plunging firo no armoured dock can withstand.' Each separato pair of batteries would bo con'netted Wth n fire-control- station on either Head. There is no need for the inner 12-inch or 14-inch; batteries to over.; look tho sea, as the offico commanding nt tho fire-control station nt tho Heads gives ratine, - etc., by simply pressing n faw electric buttons. Imagine an enemy's fleet 12 miles olf tho Heads, and opening firo on Sydney. Tho four 12-inch "guns" on either Head , would reply, and as soon as: tho, rengo was found the officer commanding from his fire-control station , would.flash'back his orders to his inner' and' masked batteries.' Immediately we should have .four'more 12-inch and four morn-.14-inch.-guns raining a (jonverginV firo on the enemy. ■ Tho demoralising effect of : this l fire' frqm these masked, batteries at the rear upon the enemy can bo imagined,'. Then woiild:. come '.the high plunging fire from' the mortars. With'two secondary batteries in the inner harbour' trained,men tohandlo guns.'nnd a good' torpedo corps, ■ Sydney would' bo impregnable/, ; ; -•, . • • ■ .-■■*■:' : ; And Wellington -Alia.. ;..' "Wellington, in New . Zealand, forms another example of a port that i could very easily bo made impregnable.' For example, let us 6uppow* we had a pair of 12-inch «uns mounted on tho hills on cither side of the city, and'a further pair masked behind.it. An enemy's fleet would have to converge, to. a certain extent when approachini? to bombard the city. The height of the Kims' would reully Rive them a plunging fire, and it would.be very hard for (liein to bo hit in return. No fleet ran stand for lons being hit. and not jiottini: a chance to hit back. As'with Sydney and Wellington, jo with Fiemantle, Melbourne, and Auckland. -■'••••

The Question of Cost. ,; ,: -- : -' '•■' "It may I»'(•onsiileied that the initial cost of this scheme would bo enormous, but, spread over a few years, it would not bo so.. It. takes a year, or , so to inake 12-inch Runs, and dnrimj that timo \ustralia' nnd New Zealand could bo training their cnsineors, their artillery. and EcttinT ready Iliesmi nositious. 'l think everyone ireoßinses Hint we mus,t depend upon, mil?elves duriiij tho nerd eroat ,w.u- iiv c;i?e of aTtack. Therefore it -behoves Hie Commonwealth not'only to xet her small-arm factory working, but a bie-eun' factory as well.. By this means she and >"ew'Zealand can replace all war losses.' both on land and sea. The juo.

blem has to be fnccd: ■• why delay it? A'lways over our national independence, until we aro prepared, hovers Hint grim, relentless 'sbapo in tho north. Now vtc have time; soon we shall liot havo it. By following our a schenio like (his, and meeting (he position in.a iiaiionnl spirit. we Fhall be able to retain and build "ji Hie glorious countries we have inherited.

IS MAJOR DAVIDSON RIGHT? A CRITIC SAYS "NO." Major Davidson's siisßOstion that a warship could inllict serious damage upon Wellington without IreiiWiiis to cuter tho harbaur.- lins been raided before, hupcrficinlly speaking, we have been assured by nn officer who is liiflUi.v tfiinliUecl to speak- with authority on Hie subject, it i« rather an alnrmiiuj'on'e, but is not ontitled to very H'Hoiis consideration, though it i.< a view which receives confideiablo attentiun from tlio ' innn in tho street." ■.■■•'.' . ", . . . . ... ~' Even- supposing a Dreadnought did Jie out of raiige aiid shell tho town or harbour at either of theso places (a most improbable contingency), probably very lit Ho harm would bo done, nijcl m> aci'vantage would,be gained by tlio enemy, unless tho bombardment wero vgl owed up by a landing in force. If would be very difficult to locnto tho shipping in thwo -extensive harbours, and even 1 located, it .could be moved. He flio.uKJ jinvo lots of warning before anything of this kind.could happen, and could take precautions. -. ; Prepare for a Landing. The danger we have to'fear is a landing, and to provide against that wo must havo: a well-trained, well-armed, mobile force, ready to pounce nt onco on nny forco that lands or-'attempts to land. That is our first and creat requirement. Without a good mobile field force tho best fixed defences in tho world aro useless, sinco they could always bo turned and taken in rear by a forco landed elsewhere along the const. Jf wo succeed in getting, in-New Zealand at. any rate, a really effective,inobilo army that can be rapidly mobilised and concentrated, wo shall not havo much/ to fear from anything but an invasion in greatly superior force, coast defences or no coast defence.?. .M«jor. Dpvidson-lays undue stress on the importance, of-fixed coast defences as compared'with tho far greater importance of nn efficient field army. Coast defences of tho cxtont.no suggested are n luxury— especially-to countries situated geographically and financially as are New Zealand nnd Australia—whereas, field..armies nro essential. Jlis tho possossion of unlimited means. It is not fair to compare tho need of Australia and New Zealand as regards defence with the needs of tho Uni/od. States and Germany, whero tho conditions aro entirely different. If the harbours of Sydney and Auckland, which are etrategctically the two most important ports'in-'Australasia, aro provided" with fixed defences sufficient to mako i\ raid by small craft impossible, or vory hazardous, that is enough for tho present. It is a pernicious, though rather popular doctrine to .pour--money- into fixed defences to tho neglect of the field troops. As tho rango and power of guns increase, this is becoming more', and moro true, and Continental nations are' recognising the fact. The field army must ba tho first .consideration, the- coast defences aro merely an auxiliary.