MILITARY NOTES.

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 996, 10 December 1910, Page 3

MILITARY NOTES.

■ . . [Edited By Echelon.]. ; THE COMMISSARIAT IN MANOEUVRES. POINTS FOR SQUADRON TRAINING. Captain the Hon. R. G. A. Hamilton, late 3rd Hussars, who has spoilt-some time ill China overlooking the regenerated army of the country,.is reported as saying that vtba discipline was perfect, the armament modern, and the , men quick and intelligent. He feared to guess the numerical strength of the Celestial forces, but it seemed to liini that it might bo expressed in million's— tb-mo'rrow iji llio Pacific is.pregnant' With big problem:).

A high Japanese Army Medical Officer, declared not lung ago that the average infantryman would rather'die of thirst' than drink any water not first boiled. This was perhaps rather a figurative statement, but there can ha no doubt that lUc Japanese ~ regimental ,"drill' in iwater-boijing ettablishcs a valuable h:ibif of precaution. .Throughout .the HuesuJapanese war the Japanese soldier consistently boiled, his water either in his own -aluminium water-boHlo (.which -is constructed so as : .to stand .up, not to.lio on the side like the-British uiodel). or in the .ordinary cooking pots v;hicU * hold almost 100 litres and-.o.ve jacketed, so' as to prevent waste of heat. Portable boil.ersj again, were used', having eoncentric ■corrugated heat-conductors fitted in their interiors -arid .si spiral'of piping rouiid the ioutlet,- through which' cold water was imn.de to flow to cool the water which.left the boiler. These methods have- aow become a regular part of each regiment's .ordinary - routine training, and the men are instructed in the providing of fuel, which, must ottUer bo procured, on ■the field or carried with the force.- ~,

The hundredth-anniversary of tlie forjmafioit'of the Prussian Kriegsakadomio or' ■titafi College was celebrated on October. 15 ;last. ;Thc college is eituated in-Berlin, and the instructional* staff'consists" of" 22 'military officers and a similar number of 'civilian professors and instructors. .Many of the officers hold important staff appointments in the German Army, and their position enables them to teach with /.utkority and - experience. ■ The course' ■lasts three years, Bad deserving officers ,are financially assisted' 'to enter tho 'academy by grants froni'army funds. The. sole.means of entrance is by. competitive examination, which is open to all branches of the GGrman army. The average •number of candidates who join annually is 130. Students are only appointed for one year at a time, although- the full lasts three years. At the'end of each yearV an examination is. held, and unsuccessful studcnts : are weeded out. ■The syllabus of studies ranges'from military history to foreign-languages, and numbers about thirtj" subjects. * English, French, Russian, and Japanese are the principal languages studied. Clauewitz and Moltke, whose names are famous in military history, were direciovs of the college, and among tho students ■were Manteuffel,. .Bluniehthal, Steinmetz, Roon, and the great'Holtkei '

■ Lieut.-General Sir Charles Douglas in a 'memorandum-on the subject of tho recent territorial army 'manoeuvres' -in England-, (southern command), says that "tho 'chief failure . during manoeuvres lias o.bcen in administrative rather .than in. tactical ■ training, and this, failure-is entirely due to tho' troops being - placed -in .strange circumstances, where the comfort and. supply of tho men depend to a great extent upon the initiative of regimental officers and upon their own efforts and .knowledge. During the manoeuvre's,". he states—and .his criticisms-may be read -with profit by New Zealand officers—"many- men wortfar more comfortable in bivouac and far moro badly., fed: than-there' was any occasion for.vloThc regulation's-deseribo. "hoivbivouacs can be shelter and .rest obtained,'but very few officers'-or men appeared to bo ■ capable of applying the tcacM'ng. In the' same manner ample supplies were ready on' the ground, but there was great delay" on the part of the troops in drawing theso supplies, and still greater"'delay', in. cooking, thefcod.::/. The dinners and breakfasts when cooked were frequently so , unpalatable tiiat could not eat them, "or" tho'dinncrs. were only ready for. consumption after . the .men, who were very tired at-the close of a long day's work, had gone to sleep s.u'p,l>erless. It is essential for success that in every military organisation each part should be. doing its own work and ho cue part doing tho work'of .another part.'lt is the duty of the. Staff to. ensure that tho supply columns fill-up the regimental supply wagons when tho latter are empty, and that these wagons have ..opportunities of reaching the men: Tne responsibility for drawing the supplies,' cooking them,.and issuing-the dinners to the men is purely regimental work, and the more the Static interfere in such work the less efficient will be the troops. On one occasion a battalion ivas left'on outpost duty; that battalion got.little or nothing to eat, but no one could bo blamed for this except the battalion itself.' The officer commanding the battalion and tho company officers should, have made inquiries as to the locality of the regimental supply, wagons, they should have prepared cookiug fires, sent guides to bring up tho wagons, and ensured that the men were provided -with a geed meal." - T

■ Mounted infantrymen in New Zealand will no doubt, in. the light of their own experiences on manoeuvres, read with interest what Major-General E. H. H. Allenby, director of. the recent cavalry manoeuvres in England, has to say ou what he observed .during three davs' re-, connaissance nnd tactical operations. I have culled from'his report certain points which appear to me-to.hare some local application, and which may bs regarded as both suggestive and profitable. Among other things he says:— ■■-.'■

"Some errors in minor tactics were noted which must be carefully' corrected in squadron, training, ,I'atrols were, seen riding in a group along enclosed roads. In such a formation a whole group 'is liable to be ambushed.- The only method to obviate the.danger of this-.is to have single men riding at 100 to 200 yards aisva'iice in front of the patroj.but Keeping each other- in view. ' A- sentry was found holding his horse in the middle of the road ■ with his .rifle in the 'bucket The man should have had his rifle loaded and ready to shoot, and his horse skouh; have been with the party in 'rear. . '; ; Referring to the operations as a• whole, a' certain Jack of energy, of resolution, unci 'of' quickness seems to have characterisedthem. A want of energy, mentally, was also noticed among commanders, -in not making a thorougii and careful tactical reconnaissance-of all ground, and.of a.ny hostile force in their neighbourhood.' This failure may party bo ascribed-to ignorance of tactical; principles, but it is also duo to mental inertia. .In any examination' paper,' most of -the officers concerned would have at. once sent.out the necessary patrols. In the field they sent out absolutely none.' As soon , as any ■bodies of troops find .'themselves-in the presence of thc ; enemy or as-.scon as any position has been occupied, whether an enemy has been driven from-it or. not, it is an axiom that must' be borne in mind, that all the ground to the front and flanks is reconnoitred. What is behind that, wood or that-hill? Is that farm-held or not?' Such are the'questions every commander must at once ask himself, and then at- o'neo set about to obtain an answer by sending small .patrols, even' if it is only a corporal and two men, to every such locality. • The Question of tho proper provision of security both on the movo and at thelinlt has been remarked on before, and it is disappointing to see among all ranks how greatly it is neglected and its principles misunderstood. When on themov-j advance guards. aud flank guards must cover their riiaixT'bo'dy. ; •.' .' In the occupation of any position temporarily or otherwise, advanced guards aud (lank guards- must seize the tactical points, such.as farjns, copses, even gorse bushes, •rather than lie down at a fixed distance in front .of their horses with 'no. otherconsideration than of maintaining alignment.: Cavalry, when dismounted, must not throw themselves down" in" open ground; They must seize all the cover in the vicinity, and leave tho open ground to bo protected by'tho cross fire from their various-po'ints. ' A "few cavalry sol:diers lying down in ;open ground'have

not sufficient fire power to stop any'reso.lute body-ridinj.over-,them..- -flier must :; .Bain cover and .support from' the : grojirid.- , lhe neglect of this principle of seizing and holding tactical points to cover any '. position of readiness h~ns'b'ci'n "very - no- "■ ticeable during the operations, of the •'■■ last .week. Brigades and half divisions : ■ have been constantly noticed in some massed formation,.with the woods;-farms" and other tactical points surrounding thdir. position unoccupied; whereas -.it " : was absolutely-necessary, in order to en- '." sure any security, that.. these "points. "- should be held by troops or squadrons, - reinforced very ollon by .a maxim " or two. Inis.provides the. cpiimander-with .' a suflicient zone of manoeuvre,.and .coa--sequent liberty of movement; This mat.' : ter of security is of the utmost import- ; anc»; it is the ever-present 'question'oa ; ' service, and officers must learn to pay much moro attention to it. ."-. . Smail bodies of treops aro often seen ' sitting halted on their horses for a 'considerable -.' time in the middle of fields, or, on ex- ■■'■'- posed hill sides. -Squadron training \. should teach them-two invariable rules, •'-• namely, that.men should never-remain ■ mounted when 'thorp;is no object in'do- -.- ing so, and/that , cover.should always , be: - ':■' caken .when-it is available and'does not"' mtenere with observation." . Y. ~.'•:• -: ( Trio following extract- from thfl' ■ Memorandum by the Cinr.dian Mini* ; ters cor.csrr.ing Defence" cf August 1302. - already. - referred '.o, : . states fullv.. -the. po icy which then commended, itself' , not ? ii.' , 3° c - o ™ rnra ™t o" Canada, buife" ■ to the Dominion' at large:. "In: conclusion, tho Mmist-ers repeat tha't, while tbfl taiKidian Government are obliged .to dij. ' '■■ sent from '.he , measures propotad- '(ifl '02),. they fully appreciate' the. ; oblation of the.Doiuimo'u.'to- mo.ke «xp°nds. ture for .the. purpecos of defence in. W*. ■■■ 110 A c i tt w j'te. increasing population and''' wealth, of the oonhtrj: They, are wil!iri». ■'■- that .thess expenditures sfiould "be ' so'WMcted as to. relievo, the -taxpayer-of. ': tb-3 Mo-oher-Country of some of-the'bur-dens which ho' uow.bears; and they, have' the strongest dciire. to carrv'out their: ■ ec.enco schemes in with'' the'--'-Imperial :autliorities and under the ad-' vies of experienced .Imperial: officers; so fr.r as this .is consistent, with ths pfiii- V ciple of local.self-gove'rnmeni.whick has ■■■ proved,so ;ff a factor-in the-promotion■•;, of Imperial unity." ■■.-. ■-~-■--.. Eecent statistics . show 'that the-.pro." : portion of typhoid'-ca'ses.- in' inoculated.soldiers is- nov/ one-third of that : of the ' non-inoculated, - and the: death-rate onesixth, so" that inoculation :has effected' a "■' reduction, of 66 per cent. Jin typhoid "cases.'' . The.-annual .course of musketry at pre-' ■•' sent arranged for ■ tho Regular■' infantry ' and cavalry will, it 'is: understood;-■ con-" "• tain some important-alterations,, especi- , .ally in regard to .the-form one class .. of target next year. 'A new.tairget-is-now-" being experimented with at the Hythe : School of Musketry... ',-_■...'•• ': ■.