NAVAL SITUATION.

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 988, 1 December 1910, Page 5

NAVAL SITUATION.

SPEECH BY MR. BALFOUR*. OUR NARROW MARGIN OP, SUPERIORITY. A NEW PROCRAMME WANTEtt On October 9 Mr. A/J.''Balfour for-. ; mally opened the new premises of thff ' Imperial Union Club uy'St. Vincent Street, Glasgow. Tito right; honour- ... ablo gentleman took advantage of. the'opportunity to make an important pronouncement on the naval situation. H« said: 1935 arid 1910. ; I cannot better introduce my topja' '";■■■ than by asking you'to compare . the: ".:■ naval position of this country in. the -: year 1910 with tho naval position of '■.''■'. this country in 1905. But five years' : '' separate" the two dates; 'and yet Iveh- '>''■ ture to .say that in no ether five, ten,' • v r twenty-years in our history'has there : i been, so great a change .in our naval '. V position, or one so ominous as that . which has taken place during the last .' sixty months. I do not think any meWV .-: ber of the Government would say, i[ >. : the question was put to him directly,' '-■ that any comparison could bo drawn between our relative' strength among : other naval Powers in 1905 and our : • relative strength among naval Powerr : 1™ +w L d °x not anyvmaii -could-■•'■;-say that the two things were compar/ :- abe; (Hear hear.) We are in a differ* -!:. ent world. It is not merely that there: : has been a small change in degree, there has been a change in degree so - great that it amounts to a phange ol ' ■■ Kind, and we can no longer, 'and ought no longer, to think of ourselves as iai >' the position of senior maritimo suprem- ' ■- acy whioh wo enjoyed beyond "question' ' 1only five years ago. (Cheers.).- Nobody; • : pretends of course/that the two-Power standard has cither been preserved, or '-'■■'■ even approximately preserved,'at the ; v: present time.. We have almost ceased! v! . to.talk of the tvro : Power - standards- '- | "hen we talk of it at all, we talk of< ' > it with explanations and '.qualifications,- ' safeguarding m this direction and ■ diminishing in that direction/ until what - vias, after all, only,a formula .intended! - tor as.it were, to maie clear to thai ' ordinary man in the "street the sort-ofi thing we were aiming a t, has lost its''"-'--whole object. It »no longer clear, "it -F . is no longer direct, it no longer appeals ' ■ as a plain and manifest ideal 'to ;-be^--' ESwm * either \^ h0 Government, - ' responsible for our affairs, or indeed to ■'■■■■ tho general public at: krge- (Hea , ..: .- m™+ according'to' the Govern.:: - ; ment calculation our superiority over ' - the next greatest naval Power-not two' - nava Powers, but-the next nava Power—our superiority in Dread-' '■'■' noughts m the year 1913 will be only tour. Ido not believe-the margin of -■ ' '■:■: British-strength has ever- in our hit : - W^lV h< ! J, l St ]lundred ' V more .

Accident of War. •" U™Z' I think ,tWs. myself to be a most lamentable and dangerous position of affairs, : I cannot belfove thateither the fe~t <?>• part of the public nJucii has .given, serious• attention to it can view the-present situation without.serious misgiving, and'alarm. And' +l,!!t y + i S ° qUl i° of any ideal that tins or that Power has a deliberate motion of making wariiponus. That? 1 ivas.not tho view of the Governments, ■KJliclx hrst formulated ah'dHhen carried! out the principle of the two-Power! standard; that was not the view of our forefathers. They were not always" supJ nosing that this or that Power meant' ma r?r, ffar "P oli - What they' said was: 'War is a most' disastrous thing even for the successful belligerent, still more for the unsuccessful belligerent.'" (Laughter.) Nevertheless, wars takeplnce, and they take place very, of torn —perhaps more often than not—without, that long and deliberate and criminal design of any statesman or bodv of statesmen. Against'these historical accidents we have to preserve ourselves. (Cheers.) "And wo will insist," so said pur forefathers, "on* a large margin ofi strength to enable us to deal with themi should they come." And" it is'in'that spirit that I am asking you to consider, the question. (Cheers.) -It is sot.be-, cause I love : war; for. .1 hate it. It'., is not because any British .statesman-' loves war. I believe that there are many doctrines common to both, parties in the State, but no. doctrine, is sofirmly held, I believe, by statesmen of j all parties, as that nothing can befall! us, no misfortune is worse to the'" British Empire than a successful war, unless it be an unsuccessful war..

An 111-Provisioned Fortress. I think it was the Secretary for War who compared these islands to a for-' tress. It is a fortress, and I thinka very strong fortress, but a .very illprovisioned one. (Hear, hear.) We pend, and the Empire, depends; not merely upon the immunity of our shores from invasion, but upon the immunity of those great trading routes from successful attack by our opponents. If' they get command of the trade routes;' what would the rest matter? We aro more helpless by far than tho natvihs on the Continent, because we have no neutral ports by which our food supplies' and raw' materials could penetrate' to thoso whose very' existence _ depends upon imported food and upon imported raw material. My noble. friend, Lord; Charles Beresford, lias expressed publicly his views {hat there has been a very -imperfect protection at present l possible to our trade routes. He ia probably, undoubtedly the ablest prao. tical sailor who has had high command ; of modern battleships who in our experience has sat in the House, of Com- - mons.- (Cheers.), ' And. ho speaks, as I cannot pretend.to speak, 'with the a'uthority of ono who has really dealt practically with' tho problems which Parliament and the country have got to'solve; But without going into matters on which I feel unqualified to express an opinion, I believe I am qualified to ex-: press an opinion with which every sailor would agree, - that without supremacy in capital ships it is hopeless to supV pose that you -will be -,ablo to - give ade-'; quate protection by any system what-, ever to those great trade routes on which wo and our Empire alike depend. (Cheers.) ■ And, therefore, even from that point of view do not let us for ;qne moment suppose that, however successful wo may bo' in making a military invasion of those islands a practical impossibility, we have dono anything whatover for national or Imperial preservation, or safety, unless wo have gono far further than that, and have soon both by the numbers of. our ships and by their organisation that those great arteries of our life aro kep£,secure against.hostile attack. (Cheers.) The Remedy. That, then; being the position, a pos* tion which, I-repeat, is new in our experience, ' the position, namely, that not only are we not. superior or equal to the two greatest Powers, but a'position in which wo are not equal to a combination of one of tho greatest Powers and, a relatively very small naval Power, and which, even as regards tho greatest naval Power, our superiority might easily be neutralised or imperilled bv those, accidents against which no skill, no forethought, no organisation canwholly preserve us-if that be our position ; then I ask how is it to ho remedied? This inferiority, this comparative equal-, itv this possible inferiority, must be cured, completely, wholly, immediately, ■ 'and at all hazards. (Loud cheers.^'