TOWARDS A TRUCE.

Dominion, Volume 3, Issue 778, 30 March 1910, Page 5

TOWARDS A TRUCE.

SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN MODERN THOUGHT. NEW SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY. In an interesting review in the London "Daily News" on "Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy," by Emile Bourtroux (Professor of Modern Philosophy at the University of Paris), Mr. R. A. Bray states:— "Science and religion art alike necessary to a life, human in the fullest sense of the word. Science is concerned with things without which man cannot live, religion with things without which mail would not care to live"; such is ij final conclusion which M. Boutroux, draws from his survey of a hundred battlefields spread over more than two thousand years.' The book deserved translation if only for its lucid and impartial examination' of. the writings of jthe protagonists on either side. As will be gathered from his conclusions, the author belongs to that school of philosophy of which the best-known representatives are Henri Bergson, Hoffding, and William James. All alike, though each has his distinctive attitude towards the problem, agree that reality is'richer than any abstract statement of its laws, that any theory of knowledge which ignores the most imperious needs of the heart, and is content to satisfy only the demands of the intellect, stands self-condemned and may itself be safely ignored.

In, early days, and, indeed, down to the Renaissance period, the limits of the conflict between religion and science were ill-defined. But with the coming of the Renaissance "the positive Science of Naturo emerged." It produced , definite results, intelligible to all. "Thenceforward, the idea of a science active and no longer merely contemplative —faith in the possibility of a man's rule over Nature —was'irresistible." Ii disagreement arose between science and religion the advantage was now all on tho side of science.- The need for reconciliation was urgent. . A division of territory seemed the simplest solution. Science was concerned with the body and things material, religion with the soul and things spiritual. The work of the two lay in'parallel planes where, as there were 'no. points of intersection, there could be ho occasions of discord. But peace was -not to be won on such terms. Religion had always played an active part in the affairs of the world, and would not consent to relax its efforts, while science would not admit that there was any sphere of knowledge to which its methods did not apply.

Materialist Tendencies. More drastic methods of solution became necessary. The nineteenth century marked the climax of' scientific ascendancy. Its final triumph seemed assured; religion might linger .a little longer m a few remote districts, but' had received its death-blow from the irresistible onslaught of materialism. Decent interment and the provision ,of some substitute were the only problems that need trouble the philosophy of science. Augiiste Comte drew up his scheme of positive knowledge, and recognising-, the demands: of sentiment tried .'to breatho into it a kind of religious atmosphere, wjiich came from nowhere, and which Mi Boutroux regards, a little cruelly perhaps,',as' a kind of effluvium bred of an unpleasant love episode that occurred in the later years of the philosopher's career., Herbert Spencer composed the synthetic philosopher, and likewise, recognising the demands of sentiment,strove to provide " for them in the re-, mote regions of the unknowable that lay outside the shores of 'the unknown.. But, as .-the-- author points out,, the unknowable - did not' submit readily to Buch treatment. It. persisted in invading'the territory-of the known, and, contrary to' all the rules of the synthetic game, became visible, useful, and even intelligible. Even the philosopher himself admitted the fact, and in his later years, haunted by the ghosts of the religions he believed he had slain, thought kindlier of their creeds and could almost bring himself to wish that they might prova to be true. The psychologists took up the problem, and found in religious emotions only an example of aberrant, neural irritation. ,The sociologists followed, and saw in religious ceremonies nothing but' interesting survivals of superstitions, useful indeed in the childhood of humanity, but an obstacle to nrogress now' that the years of manhooj had come.

' Disenchantment. In-tile nineteenth century, therefore, in spite of; a few unfortunate lapses from the true faith oil the part of the philosophers of science, the tide of materialism seemed ' destined to sweep away the remnants of religious faith.. But as soon as men had had breathingspace to examine 1 the results of science, disappointment began and complaints arose. Huxley's charming picture of science as Cinderella dreaming by the fireside dreams of the wonders about' to come has remained unfinished. She has indeed been transported to the palace, but her sojourn there has been brief and unsuccessful. Her complexion always a little sallow,: has. not stood the high lights; while her- voice, always a trifle shrill, has become harsh and. insistent. The prince soon wearied' of her domineering ail's, and sent her back to the kitchen! ' There, ministering to the needs of man, she is doing admirable work, but never again mil she be enshrined in the temple of man's ideals. The author trace 3 in detail the process of this disenchantment. He shows next how the religious spirit. and the scientific spirit have much in common; they both draw for their inspiration on sources which lie outside the boundaries of exact knowledge. "Faith, representation, of an'ideal, and enthusiasm—these are. the three conditions of human action." Without them science cannot take a single step; with them she. has achieved her amazing control over the forces of nature.' Now, if- we assume that faith, representation of an ideal, and enthusiasm are merely subjective affections, science as well as religion is founded on an unsubstantial and unintelligle dream., 'When the fact is reaJised both must suffer shipwreck. The assumption must therefore be rejected, and we may suppose that behind science and religion lies some' objective element. It is the function of religion to make like worth living by insisting on this objective element. Only when life has been. proved to be worth living can Scionce defend her work of showing how life can also be made possible. Then "from their two principles will spring a form of life, over ampler, richer, deeper, freer, as well as "more, beautiful and moro intelligible."