ALL-DREADNOUGHT POLICY.

Dominion, Volume 2, Issue 506, 13 May 1909, Page 8

ALL-DREADNOUGHT POLICY.

AN INDICTMENT. r OTHKR TYPES NOT YET OBSOLETE »«^fc3S&S3*i S&SaSTSi l iXT"'"" »' noW U th * Ca '¥ tbo Dreadnought poacy. it, as the has been tnM nothing any longer, counts, 'except.. Dread-^ can S conW^°ff, n0 f m f? l . U,ati T of statistics can, conceal the fact, that ; tho' two-Power standard -m Dreadnoughts. has, gone, bv tho board, already. No oie, however, who has tho most .elementary.knowledge of the principles ha, 3 WGr iiIbei1 be i' e^M i tllat " the Dreadnought has made all other, types obsolete." At the ? tl ? e ' ll is clear, that we cannot permit our most powerfuj rival to'outbuild us m tho nowest type of big _ ships; and'therefore the country _ demands the laying down •of eight battleships, .now.. We cannot .afford to tike any, 'risks,; t J., ,:;. .', That point being defined wo may proceed BrlHA r n° Ur iTOW cant -« What -a the British Dreadnought .type of vessel, when said?,-She is a. 1 gigantic experimental ship, ooncernmg whoso value, there is a profound; difference of opinion .among naval officars, and: she is' inferior to 'the'"ships of the same class constructed by "foreign 'Powers, yes^els/^ 0 :" the {"earlier United Carmans riot Dreadnoughts. ■ v It has constantly been asserted that all nations are, imitating the Dreadnought. That is not true. - The definition of the Dreada 1^ !l !p r T\ B ij p of hi ? h s P« cd armed with a powerful battery of big guns air of' T£T-. definition applies to none TT -riof 0 shlps ' osrcpt those of'- the United States, quoted. : Tho "so-called" f t or ®i? n are not Dreadnoughts ' shi™ ar ° sloww than tho Bntish ships, they have a more powerful armament, they are more heavily armoured, and. thov carry, in-, additon, ■ a tremendous secondary armament. In other words, having started an enormously expensive .competition in rna-

torial excellence, we aro beaten at the start. That is the direct result of tho Dreadnought policy. ' The Dreadnought policy was invented by Sir: John Fisher. _ It consisted in reversing the traditional British policy, whioh consisted in pfeserving ,a, safo numeral margin of superiority in all types of vessel, and permitting the foreigner to make experiments. When ho had finished his ■ experiment, we wore able to profit by his mistakes. . Destitute of DocKs. • i The: Admiralty choso to pursue a course exactly contrary. This ruinous policy* has been pursued with a reckless disregard of all other requirements.. The new ships aro being launched ono after tho other, destitute of docking accommodation, of cruisers, of destroyers, of stores, and of men. Older ships aro cast away. And if tho plea that the Dreadnought mado all other battleships obsolete were sound, her construction was an act of insanity. For tlio sake of one ship, to throw away forty vessels fit to moot ajiy fleet in the world—is that not madness? For observe: our ships are not built, to fight our own battleships, but the battleships of foreign Powers. But did tho foreign Powers proceed (liko Great Britain) to lay up their older ships P Not they. Germany is spending £200,000 a ship on .reconstructing- a wholo class of older battleship?, comparable with our Royal Soy.

eraigns, which are laid np, and the Majesties, which are also being withdrawn. The Dreadnought policy alone supplies a sufficient reason' for Holding an inquiry into the present naval administration. Cerman Big ships. The following table illustrates the position in what are termed Dreadnoughts as between Britain and Germany:— Germany. ■ Great Mr. Mr. Britain. M'Kcnna'a Balfour's 1910. estimate.' estimate. January ... 9 2. 2 March , 9 '4 .• ■ 6 , April ... 10 4 5 August ... 10 . 8 8 October 10 9 9 December ... 10 9 13 ' 1911. January ... 11 9 13 February ... 12 9 * 13 - April ... 12 11 13 July ... 14 11 . 17 August ... 14 13 17 November ... 16 13 17 1912. i April ... 20 13 21 ' October ... 20 .17 21 Cruisers. The deficiency in unarmonred cruisers of medium tonnage, adequate armament and high' speed, has not been admitted in words by the Admiraltysince these vessels were described in the Memorandum of 1904 as of "inferior fighting 'efficiency, or even a

■source of, weakness and anxiety to the Admiral, . and eighty of them, including smaller craft, were struck off the active list. But their loss hassinco proved so powerful' an anxiety to the Admiral," that 30 per cont. have, been restored to the . active list, .and sis were laid down last:year, and six are projected this year. But bo little money was voted, that the six laid down la3t year are v ? r ? ~ a dvanoed, and can hardly be completed for two years. v The proportion of medium oruisers required ;for any giveh battle squadron is a' strategical question—two to each battleship is:an approximation.- Apart from the battle fleets, the British Empire requires many squadrons of onasers. for, patrol purposes and tor .the protection of commerce.. The distri- 1 bution of these vessels under the new schome ?Au reo S amsatlon k as not been announced. policy was introduced in 1904, St John Fisher put out the eyes of the ,et. no also threw away material to the value of several million pounds sterling, all orwhich, and more, will nave to b'a replaced. A few salient facts will illustrate the existing condition of affairs. Germany has to-day seven medium cruisers on her foreien stations, eight with her High Sea' Fleet, and 27 m use : in her home waters as tenders or in reserve. Altogether she'has in round numbers. 40- available . medium and small WW* '? , watorß - -Great Britain has 30. In 1901 she had 45. Destroyers. The position with regard to destroyers is M'of.tiw W class a proportion of which— sf, 25 per cent.—

are, or ought to be,, under repair. We have three or. lour of the latest typo finished. Say. 40 in all, fit for work in the North Sea. .. . ■ Th First Lord recently ' declared in the House of Commons that he did not know what was meant by "work in the North Sea and in that state of innocence he was able to state, that we. had 127 which "can watch. the Germas ogresses into tho North Sea.. The real position is as follows.— Germany, with her 78 destroyors built for North Sea work, and hor 47 torpedo-boats, can work from her basos at Kiel, Wilhelmsbaven, and Heligoland in case of war. If wo are to command the North. Sea, the German egresses for torpedo craft must bo, watched by British destroyers, in the proportion of three to one German —a destroyer, on watch, t one coming for relief, oho going back: to harbour.. None of the vessels'-built anterior to the River class has either sufficient coal (or oil) endurance, or adequate accommodation for the .ffioers. They were all built for cross-Channel work, for which they are eminently fitted. No one knows why tho new coastal" destroyers, which are really tor-pedo-boats, >ere built, or why they wore equipped to burn oil fuel. ' Thero are 34 River class destroyers completed; ono Swift, class, 28 "ocean-going," oil-fuel, built and building; 20. "ocean-going" projected for; 1903-9 programme. The rest, so far as the North Sea it concerned, may be

disregarded. Our immense] deficiency, as oompared with the destroyer force of Germany, is duo to the lack at the Admiralty of any definite strategic basis for their shipbuilding programmes. Nucleus Crews. In emphasising the need of tho ships being distributed in tho t best possible manner, fully equipped, and in instant readiness for war,' tho _ critics of Admiral Sir John Fishers policy are attacking firstly tho distribution of tho homo floots (which is tho subject of one of tho diagrams printed abovo, indicating tho superiority of tho German High Sea Fleet); tliey ,are also attacking tho system of nuclcus crews introduced by Sir John Fisher, under which ships aro manned by about two-fifths of a full complement. Tho supporters of tho,system claimed that it is economical—which is admitted—and that ltkeops tho snips "instantly ready for sea," which.latter contention is strenuously denied. Its opponents concede that the nucleus crew system is a good method for maintaining a fleet lii TOserve,'for such a fleet is not counted upon as an "ever-ready" force; but to pretend that tho principle is an efficient substitute for full commission is deemed.absurd. A stealthy process of deterioration insensibly sets in when'great machinery is idle, and the human machinery is not exempt from it; such a fleet can never be deemed to be in "instant readiness."