The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 1909. STATE OF THE NAVY.

Dominion, Volume 2, Issue 493, 28 April 1909, Page 6

The Dominion. WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 1909. STATE OF THE NAVY.

The appointment of a sub-committee of the Cabinet to inquire into jjthe disposition arid qrgariisation\ of tie Home fleets willgo some way to satisfy those 'critics of the naval administration who have been clamouring for a long time past 'for an impartial inquiry into; the whole condition of -the Navy. They may not, indeed, be disposed to grant the/ adjective "impartial" to an inquiry by five members of the Cabinet, which cannot escape responsibility for the Government's policy in regard to the. Navy, but as thb severest critics of that'policy have, freely acknowledged the good intentions of the governmental authorities,; and have condemned them solely for-following too implicitly the counsels of the First Sea Lord, they may bo' willing to waive this objection. The question whether Dreadnoughts, should bo built in greater number, or whether, as Lord Charles Bereseord suggests, the advantages of Dreadnoughts may riot tend to be overostimatod, is only one aspect of the naval problem as it is being considered at Home. The entire disposition and management of the Navy, under Sir John Fisher's policy are.condemned by some of the leading English; papers with im-: pressive earnestness and arguments of apparont woight. One of the.most persistent , critics of the present system is the/Standard, which, though, politically opposed to the Government, claims that it has nover doalt with "this subject as a

party matter, nor considered it with political bias. For months past this paper has been emphasising what it declares to 3e dangerous shortcomings of the system, ind the admissions made by Me. M'Kenna, First Lord of the Admiralty, in thb recent historical debate must, considerably have strengthened its cause. In jawing that there was no need to fea,r the jxtra expense of maintaining large numbers of now and improved battleships, because as these vessels came into commission an equivalent-number of older ressels would bo "passed out in order to keep down-the expense of- personnel," Mr. M'Kenna confessed a policy which lias had.the deepest condemnation of the Standard. "Men cost more than ships" has'been the First Sea Lord's motto, and with the object of economy he has systematically limited the personnel of the Navy, while increasing its material strength. "Men count for more than ships" is the opposing creed, and the first 3omplaint made against the Navy is that it is undermanned.' In 1904 wholo squadrons of ships were thrown away, so that more bluejackets should not be'needed, ind the services of 2000 men and officers were dispensed with. In 1906 more ships were laid up with the same object, and a further,reduction of 1000 men followed. During the ensuing,year, the Naval Estimates are understood to say, another squadron of ships is to be declared "obsolescent," the personnel still standing at the same; figure. , •-..-' This policy of constantly discarding ships, to avoid-ihe expense of added personnel, is strongly denounced by critics of the Navy as neutralising, to a large extent, the advantage gained when new vessels are added . to >..the fleet. The nucleus crew system, another economic scheme which Sir John .Fisher introduced, is condemned strongly . by ,the Standard- Under this system the men serve a- whole commission in harbour, and : except for an occasional brief cruise they spend the chief part of their timo ok shore. . There are said to be at the pre : sent time 14,000 of these "land mariners." The effect of this policy is said to have been, shown during a recent .cruise of the Home Fleet, when fourteen battleships and , ' cruisers out .of twenty-five weri stated, to be half-manned or less than half-manned. As regards the distribution of the Navy, there have been loud complaints at the system of "deputing the duties of an.active fleet to a reserve fleet, and of keeping, that reserve fleet in harbour and split into three divisions, two oi which have/only nucleus crewß," instead of having one complete and powerful fleet. It is stated that under the latest distribution, just resolved,upon, the force in Home waters still further.' weakened in respect of "battleships, The net;result of changes is said to, be a reduction of strength at sea,. and strength which is not at' sea, but' is laid up in "Special Reservej". is declared to be not strength, but weakness. "The effective strength of a Navy," says the Standard, "resides in its. active, sea-going fleets.; Ships in harbour without crews arc not effective; ships half -manned ■are not effective;' and ships groupod in separate squadrons under separate commands are not effective. Wo : are, therefore, entitled to say that under the existing organisation of the fleet, it is not effoctive; arid alBO ( as that organisation, according to the First Lord's statement, is to be perpetuated under ''ttid new scheme of redistribution, that there seems : no prospect of its being made effective." ; The policy of; Sin; John*.Fishee;'. which is, now on its trial, has been followed by two Cabinets and four successive First Lords. .When the late. Sir Henry Camp-bell-Bannerman was urged, to institute an impartial inquiry into the whole subject of Admiralty administration .and organisation he refused to do so on the ground that, if it wero granted, the First Sea Lord would immediately.resign. It is probably with the object of preventing that contingency that the present inquiry is to be made by a sub-committee of Cabinet, ,and not by an independent Commis.The wisdom of the policy of the First Sea Lord is incapable of being decided by lay minds on the authority oi Opposition journals, however well informed, arid it is noticeable that the Liberal Pres3 for the most part views the situation with a good deal more equanimity.'. It is a matter which can only be decided by expert testimony, and naval ex-perts-are especially prone to differ. II is impossible to know, a 150,.. to what extent the policy of.the First Sea Lord has been affected by the financial considers tio'ns of the Government.' The finding; of the sub-committee will bo oagerlj awaited. .. , , '■ .