The Dominion. SATURDAY, AUGUST 22, 1908. A NAVAL CRISIS.

Dominion, Volume 1, Issue 282, 22 August 1908, Page 4

The Dominion. SATURDAY, AUGUST 22, 1908. A NAVAL CRISIS.

The English newspapers bring full particulars of tho British " naval crisis " that suddenly arose in tho first week of July. The great space that was devoted to the affair, tho extreme gravity of the Press criticisms, and tho oxcitement that prevailed in Parliament, as well as out of it, are all in their way very instructive. For a considerable' time past the Navy and everything connectcd with it have occupied a large portion of men's thoughts in Great Britain, and the indications almost point to a final overshadowing of every other issue by a dark cloud of naval nervousness. The July " crisis" arose very suddenly and very violently. Mit. Arthur Lee, who was at the Admiralty as a member of tho Balfour Government, wrote to tho ■,Times on July 6 calling attention to the notorious jiwA&tonce of Btrained relations bo-

twecn certain officers serving in the highest and most responsible positions in His Majesty's Navy." He declared that Lord Charles Beresford, Commander-in-Chief of tho Channel Squadron, was not on speaking terms with Sir John Fisher, the First Sea Lord, and he appealed to the Admiralty to end a " grave scandal " which was sapping the foundations of discipline throughout the service, and which was pregnant with infinite peril to the nation. Tho ill-feeling between Lord Charles Beresford and the First Sea Lord has long been a scandal, and Mr. Lee's letter was accepted as a proper ventilation of an intolerable state of affairs. Lord Charles is a seaman of tho old school, one who is said to hold that the nation was made for the Navy, and not tho Navy for the nation—what wo might call a Naval Tory. Sir John, Fisher, on the other hand, is very modern in his ideas, bent on applying business methods to the Navy, fond of efficiency and indifferent to pomp. His methods have been exhibited in the reorganisation of tho Fleets, the reduction of stores, and the famous " scrapping" policy, to which 150 ships have succumbed. Involving radical changes in tho old system, his policy quickly incurred the hostility of the old school, headed by Lord Charles Beresford, whose main grievance is what ho considers tho inadequate strength of the Channel Fleet." Sir John Fisher, however, was loyally supported by the Balfour Government, and is still supported by the present Cabinet. On the day following the publication of Mr. Lee's letter, tho Times printed an account of a serious incident that occurred during the manoeuvres of the Channel Fleet. Lord Charles Beresford had signalled to the Good Hope and the Argyll, sailing abeam 1200 yards apart, to turn inwards. The Argyll turned as ordered, but the Good Hope, commanded by Sir Percy Scott, -whose famous quarrel with tho Commander-in-Chief over the " paint ship " signal somo months ago created a great stir, turned to starboard instead of to port as "ordered. Had the order been obeyed, there would have been a collision. It appears that the Com-mander-in-Chief subsequently approved Sir Percy Scott's action, which, for a technical reason, was not actually an act of disobedience.

But the storm broke before all the facts were mado known. The Times, in' a strong leader, condemned tho continuance of disunion in tho Navy, and declared that if Lord Charles Beresford were at loggerheads with'the Board of Admiralty or any member of it, he was ipso facto in tho wrong. He was equally in the wrong if he were not on speaking terms with Sir Percy Scott. It was the duty of tho Government, if tho alleged dissensions with which the country was ringing existed, to apply a " drastic remedy without the least regard for individual and porsonal susceptibilities. In other words, the Commander-in-Chief of tho Channel Fleet must be confronted with the historic alternative, se soumettre ou se demettre." Finally, Lord Charles was warned that he might suffer the fatoi of the late' 1 Sir Redvers Buller. It was freely rumoured that Lord Charles Beresford would be forced to resign, and it was rumoured also that hahad sent an ultimatum to the Admiralty stating that with an inadequate Fleet he could not guarantee the safety of Great Britain. In the House a series of questions were put to the. Government, and the Prime Minister roplied that tho Government had no knowledge, apart from unverified rumours, of the dissensions alleged. If it wore shown that undesirable conditions existed the Government would act promptly. Ho added—and this was interpreted as a strong hint to the Admiral and a reply to his alleged " ultimatum " —that the direction of naval policy lay wholly with, the Government, and that naval officers should not discuss that policy, but loyally obey their superiors. On tho following day tho matter was again under discussion, but the Govern-, ment, although bombarded with questions respecting the "dissensions" and the Good Hope-Argyll incident, refused to add to Mr. Asquith's statement. In tho storm of excited Press comment, it appeared to be generally agreed that no Admiral could criticise, by -words or by attitudo, the policy of the Admiralty, and .that in the last resort Lord Charles Beresford would retire.

What was a.very significant feature of the affair was the instantaneous arrival of criticism at boiling point. The Navy is always under fire, of course, and an " incident" will naturally cause some excitement, but that is hardly sufficient to explain the unanimous outburst of extreme feeling in the whole Press. It is impossible to resist the conclusion that the British public, or at any rate the British Press, is suffering severely from " nerves." This is not a wholesome sign. Tho feud between the " Big Navy " .and " Little Navy" people is a reasonable enough thing, and a not unwelcome indication of the acute interest and violent convictions that make for naval efficiency. But it is another thing when the whole British Press only awaits a signal to grow hysterical over tho- feeling amongst high naval officers, and to forget that the Government has the will- and ample power to correct any pernicious personal feuds. In all the excitement over the " demoralisation and disaster " threatened by the Commander-in-Chief's hostility to Sir John Fisher, nobody appears to have suggested that in the event of war all the personal feeling would shrink out of sight in the presence of the great issue. Lord Charles Beresford refused to shake hands with the First Sea Lord at a recent levee, it is true, but tho Navy did not thereby lose its virtue as the custodian of the nation's safety. That the prominence given by the Press to the crisis was evidence of a kind of hysteria has been made clear by later evidences that the trouble was greatly exaggerated. Almost before the echoes had died away, Mb. M'Kenna was able to obtain cheers from the House with a statement that the "dissensions" had not been proved to tho Admiralty and that there was already a more satisfactory state of things. At the end of July he again relieved tho House with a statement that exposed the absurdity of the excitement that grow out of the Argyll-Good. Hope incident. Tho Admiralty, - ho said, considered that tho Commander-in-Chief's signal was not dangerous, but that Sir Percy Scott was justified in not carrying it out, and that Loud Charles Beresford had so informed him at the time. The sudden flaring up of tha British Press may turn out to have been in tho long run beneficial, as, whoa u- ohimnoy catches firs, tho result in a clean iluo.