DEFENCE NOTES.

Dominion, Volume 1, Issue 259, 25 July 1908, Page 9

DEFENCE NOTES.

-0 — (Br Echelon.) THE ATTACK ON WELLINGTON. EASTER' 1908. THE OFFICIAL NARRATIVE. PART 111. THE MANOEUVRES REVIEWED, .. • (By Licut.-Colonci A. Bauchop, C.M.G.) Before starting the narrative of- events which filled the days and nights occupied by the manoeuvres. I should like to'touch on tho internal conditions under which-these moyoments woro carried out; Tho Staff (the mainspring of action) on both sides, was composed of officers who had .given much time to perfecting themselves in this specific work; they wero also all volunteer officers, who for tho first time were trusted implicitly in' the placing and fighting of their units. • Tho opinions as outlined in their "appreciations'," and the- operation orders (tho means by which they wore gomg to give effect to 'those opinions) were theirs, and it is no fulsome matter of . words to say that, neither required, nor ivere offered, with any" apologies. Ihe operations, as carried out, might have been the product of a trained Staff: they certainly wero the results of much thought and consideration by shrewd men.- ' Norwas this all. Tho machinery to administer this small army had to bo called into.being, and that it included ■ men ', of recognised enthusiasm for the work, gathered from everywhere, from- Wellington to Poverty Bay on one coast, and to New Plymouth on 1 tho other. - That no .such representative staff had before been-seeii in any tactical operations in this district was rather interesting, and that the'machine put together in-this haphazard way was effective from the start there is little rd-ason, to doubt. Schools of Instruction. After all, it was tho system). which, allotted these tasks and gave everyono a clear' idea of his special work in the . scheme, that made this heterogenous staff a success.; It took years ; in .the American Civil: War before each army was reliably served with staff officers, although they .had flourishing military.; schools in their country. proT to .tho-outbreak, and I. here, wish'to say that even in this small. manoeuvre of four days wo saw the .direct ;result' of our, own local, schools ,of instruction,, and it as rather interesting to -note that .no officer., held a high staff command who had not been at our school or in close touch with it. Theso manoeuvres would have been impossible but for tho work of our initial schools in _ tho '• district. Many things , almost seemingly extraneous . to' war had ■to enter into tho calculations of tho leaders, and that they were able to meet all' developments has already been said; that overwhelming odds never depressed thom is certain, and that ; whilo they were not'unmindful of tho advice- that "war should, only bo undertaken with forces proportioned to tho obstacles to bp overcome," both leaders must also have leaned to the ,other ■ good piece of advice: "A successful army is—as-it is led." Foreword.. From .tho comparisons of strengths "of the opposing forces, it .will ..be seen that the usual;jporceiitage of men required for an at-, tack ~6n, position, 'or.work:' df' tho' sort. outlined, ; hardly niot'-the preconceived, ideas'! of relative .proportion. That, the Red Force, had many advantages cannot bo doubted, but' that Bluo realised that " manoeuvre was the antidote to entrenchment" was also shown in his first dispositions. It will also bo seen from tho following narrative that tho task sot the O.C. Invaders was no light one. In addition- to' landing a .force numerically inferior for tho task of raiding a city protected by..troops who knew".the territory,, and who might be expected to have some prepared de-. fences in chosen places,;.and while personal leadership of this'field force was'undertaken by him, he had a two-fold venture, for lie directed, that an attack should be launched by. his warships at ; the forts which defended the', harbour, to bo simultaneous with; aiid part of,- his advance, in tho .field. That, this cooperation was well- conceived • will beseen from the report of the Director at tho Forts. HOSTILITIES "COMMENCE. • . - By staff arrangements .hostilities, commenced at s;p.m. on April ,17, and, by "thattime both sides wero to'.he prepared to mako the first mov_e. ._- This first moyo made .by both sides, within fourteen .miles of an enemy, was strangely conceived and carriedout. Ouefforco issued orders to movo off at--4 p.m., in the faco of tho General Idea, which said 5 p.m.,-'while both wholly,discarded,the caution necessary in'regard to reconuaisancoj" and .evidently!; under the ' incentive' veritly worded orders,'''pushi<id;' on" with •' 'tho; most abandoned disregard of the rules. That' ono force, in its orders,, used the;expression. " proceed with all speed," and the other, " proceed with tho utmost possiblo speed," to the-troops seutout to obtain contact with the enemy, cannot explain this undue and hazardous movement —mounted troops trotted mile after mile along tho main road. By this action much of the manoeuvre area was lost, and ground on which much instructive, and valuable training might have been gained was rendered of no effect.Undua precipitation. , By this precipitation the Blue mounted troops, although checked and penalised by the umpires, still held forward positions, and at 10 p.m. the lted Force had established somo advanced mounted troops at the southern end of Tapa Flat, while a body of infantry supported- them ■ at tho junction of tho 'i'akapau and Porirua Roads. Tho advanced -line of resistance had been occupied by the main body, of: infantry at-9 '. p.m., while on tho west of tho position, with headquarters at the schoolhouse on the Ohariu Valley" 'Road,- a composite force was; in operation, thereby holding tile'left flank' of' the Red Force,.'while.the landing at' Ohariu Bay was guarded by. cyclists. The' right flank of this lino . was also ■ protected by a force of mounted men, operating near the harbour, whilo tho higher: ground near M'Gee was held by an output lino established by tho column working on this flank, j The Situation at 10 p.m., April 17. By 10 p.m. on April 17 tho Red Force had. occupied an advanced line, running east and west,. about 3i miles in advance. of their mairi position. . Well-equipped.: signalling station had also been • established, but, owing to staff arrangements, ; woro not so effective as could have been 'wished; the compactness of tho position was impaired by tho isolation of the right flank, which defeet wa.s remedied by mounted orderlies. The O.C. Red Force thus found that at 10 p.m. his troops had met with no opposition to speak of; that his'pre-arranged-posi-tions had been occupied, and, that - his . force (with'the lapse in the signalling establislinierit already mentioned)," although" occupying a. front of five miles, was in close touch with him, and his flanks, well and securely placed. Ho had the satisfaction of knowing that the* first move, at least, had not made his mission more difficult.

Bluo in tho. meantime had not been idle,' and by 9.30 p.m.,. with an improvised-trans T port and tired animals,. liad covored seven and a half miles, and the camp equipment, proceded by their fighting troops, pulled up at their chanco camping place, a quarter of a milo north from tho township of Porirua. That the troops had travelled all the previous night witli much disadvantage in their, transport, and little rest had been possible in the short day, seemed to have nad little cffcct on tho movements of;their main body, and their infantry -marched into ■ camp' with a light heart., Nor had' their aclvanced mounted men all the best'fortune, for though checked and'retarded by the umpires, they had established themselves at' 8.30 p.m. at Duncan, ou the main road, with a compact mounted force' within' two milos of the position of tho advanced troops of the enemy." Blue had then detached tha bulk of his mounted men, and formed them into small, commands for independent work on tho flanks; it is interesting to note here that each loader effectively curried out his mission, ffa-ba-Coafinued.) ..J