DEFENCE NOTES.

Dominion, Volume 1, Issue 253, 18 July 1908, Page 14

DEFENCE NOTES.

(BY Echbloh.) THE ATTACK ON WELLINGTON. EASTER — 1908, THE OFFICIAL NARRATIVE. (Part II.) " . • THE BLUE FORCE. , ■ SPECIAL IDEA. ■ '■ i Tho Blue Commander was given "a force • consisting of? — . • "D", Batry. ; F.A.;(J Coy., 2gns.) ■ 1 Coy: Engineers 1 Itegt. SOt. (250) : 2 Maxim Guns , 2 Battns. Infty. (650) Bearers (10) Cyclists (10) Signallers (10). His orders were:— With a force as above occupy a posii tion dominating Wellington and Ngahau- ' rariga, so that terms or surrender may be accepted before noon on the 20th inst., and before Red can be. heavily reinforced.. Cruis- , ers will co-operate with your field force, and i destroy, the-shipping and the docks. Red force- about 1200 in strength is mobilised at Johnsonvillo between you and Wellington.; He will probably defend the important points and content himself with counter attack. 'APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION. Topography.—The country of operations oonsists'of a series of ridges running N-.E. ; and S.S.W. The height of these, ridges , varies as much as from. 300 to 1500 feet, ! and from rolling downs asoend to high pinnacles or knolls covered with bush. Between ' these ridges iwhich may roughly, be said to , be four in number are narrow valleys, { arid, generally following the -streams, are', roads , or tracks. -The largest valley is in the cen- ; tre through 1 which .Tuns the . main road and railway.: ' ■ . _ -~ Lateral communication —is rather deficient, • being only by'tracks. . The only complete lateral. communication is/ the road from Makara to -Ohariu, while the JohnsonvilleNgahauranga roads are in Red's possession. Tho lateraU tracks are open for infantry or horse, but-rarely for carts. The country • affords many positions advantageous to Red. The road from Ngahauranga to Makara ,affords them the best.of lateral communication' from sea to sea (eight miles), and gives them, access to each of, the perpendicular valleys and- roads. The railway: from' the base cto. i.'Wellington affords supplies. Any .of the peaks marked: on the map (submitted) afford strong positions for defence and observation, and at "the same time the low scrub screens from observation of ? attack. -From these peaks or : saddles, tho valley.- and roads' are commanded. The lower ground and rolling downs are generally cleared and in grass,- thus affording fur- ' ther advantage to defence. The ■ solitary advantage to Blue, is that along the creeks and up. some of-the-valleys therejis - good cover au.the way up to.peaks or:'sad-' • dies, :and-attack can in such cases approach unmolested .or protected from fire. Communication by. signal for Red'from peak to peak can easily be,maintained, and also lateral touch: between a. line of . defensive positions. Positions.r-Red has strong defensive .-.posi- •' tions,': but owing to the. extent, of his front (about• seven miles)'concentration to. meet surprise attack, or an-attack in.force will be' • difficult and perilous. Red has good field. of ■ view arid vantage , ground, on its right flank but its left 'faces: hills and rough country,' - which 5 will requiro strong scouting. : , :. Lines of Communication.—For Red; : the entire outpost line from Makara.to. Ngahauranga is in telegraphic communication with a 'post' office at the junction of the Makara Road, one.at one at the junc- ■ 'tion .of the.'Ohariu. Valley''Road with the ; • Jlakara Road, foifrfmile's' from Johnsonvillej ' ■ and one at'Ngabaiiranga... All'these are se-' cure from interference from 'Blue. Three good roads -lead from Wellington'to 'Johnsonville.'(five:miles), while the railway-line to ■Wellington' is secure for, Red. For Blue, 'railway arid telegraph -communication' has been-cut, communication from the advance lino to Paremata or;Titahi Bay can easily be maintained, 1 the roads- are good, and-froin either ■ of .these places communication w 'th vesseis is easy :'arid. safe; from Colonial Knob, ■ Helio Station ■ we .can communicate .with ■ ships. ■ . Supply and Transport.—Supply and .transport for Red is excellent' in all. respects,. ■ '' as many'carts as.!are necessary,, of 'all .descriptions, '.obtainable from the' For Blue.it is difficult, as all ammunition and supplies must-be landed with the forces;, supplies can, however, ,b.o augmented largely -in tho distict. Thero are three shops at Porirua, meat and: horse-feed, and wood is plentiful.) Transport will have to be seized, but with some troublo this ican be accom-' plished. : ' Climatic : Conditions'.—lnclement weathor. prevailing is much'in favour 6f Red. . Course open-' to'v. Red.—Wellington Harbour,- being well-defended by forts; Red (at Johnsonville) will/probably content himself with, - taking up a strong': defensive position to prevent Blue's approach: on Wellington,' and with obstructing and harassing Blue's ' . advance until " reinforced from other parts ' of the Island by a sufficient force to effect' Blue's capture. As Red'S-front will occupy. ;. .about seven miles,, it'is'not probable that ho will weaken any.-portion of this for the purpose of making an attack in force upon Bluo unless a discovery of Blue's disposition and intentions 1 warrant him in doing so. Course;' Open to Blue. —Red's, object will •{ bo to defend'and:'igain_ time for reinforce-, inenti. Blue should obviate this by as .bold ; and sudden' Attack as possible, first,: all points of vantage within • striking distance'.'; The initiative is' with Blue, : as Red cannot safely advance in force from any point in his line of defence: Counter irieasures need not be considered) if Red remains,where ho is, Blue's attack should be . ' by surprise in force at Red's weakest point. Red's right flank rests on Wellington Harbour and his left on the ocean. If Red should retire, Bluo will dominate Wellington; if Red should advance; Bluo should encourage him to do so as Red would lose the natural. 1 advantage of tho position,.jwhich'woukLthen:, ' bo with Blue. Tho time'available for effects ing Blue's object'is four or five days, and, thorofore, preparations should be made for whole force to move, at short l notice, in the direction of Porirua, and the land'to tho seaward thereof, in order to secure communication with tho fleet. Right flank of Bluo is\ secure, and can'be extended seaward by tho occupation of .Colonial (Knob. , The left flank requires protection,.- but any' : attack' 'oil it by Red would have to bo in force, and would be -too hazardous, by reason of the > consequent weakening of tho line of defence and tho possibility of being cut off. ' ; I Proposed Plan of Operations.—lt is pro- -." posed to: push out a mounted screen as rap- . idly as possible, to get in touch with Red, drive' in his outpost line, and occupy vantage points as near Red's line of defence as possible/ holding tho same until occupied by tho infantry. - Then by feint, attacks, to ' drive home main attack as suddenly as possible. ; . -- ( V " . REMARKS ON BLUE .APPRECIATION. . (Bt thx Director of Manoeuvres.) Tho topography of the area has been carefully gone into, but the deductions arrivod . at do not, always coincide with recognised facts as disadvantages in war. For example, the presence of scrub 'leading up ! to salient positions (from the attackers' side) is hardly valued at its true: worth, and many valuable physical features are in this way discounted or altogether passed by. Blue indicates, In face of tho general idea, that Red will be content to "sit tight," and wait for .reinforcement, forgetting, tho maxim of one, of the greatest masters, that " couriterstroke is ' the soul of the defence." This,-moreover, could not bo a fair assumption—considering the physical features in favour of Red already referred to. Troops with entrenchments might have been expected to develop their striking power, in tho surety of falling back on their prepared positions, in the case of nny severe check on these advanced.troops. The men set free for independent action by the presence of these entrenchments, added to the'fact that Reds were numerically

stronger, does not lend colour to this assumption, .while the roads in tho vicinity of Johnsonville and Norths gave all favour to the deployment of troops on any threatened line of advance. Blue, knowing the country to he quickly rising against nim, outlines the proper course of bold and enterprising action, and if the proposed measures as outlined are general more than specific, ono could imagine that "surprising," "misleading," and " mystifying," .were in their plans, realising the power of. manoeuvring that lay with them embodied in the phrase 1 " manoeuvring-■ the antidote to entrenchments.": Feint and holding attacks are outlined, whilo a distinctly sound idea is indicated for the securing, as a "pivot of manoeuvre," ground on tho right of the Blue positjon, strong from its .land side, , and. holding direct communications with their transport, ships. These courses, together with tho plan of operations, outline • a scheme, which, to be successful, would make imperative a pressure right along the line occupied by the defenders. . This, if carried out in its entirety, is always a very expensive mode of warfare (as instanced in the Russo-Japanese war, whore unlimited troops were available), but here , with the very limited numbers available at his disposal,. Blue could not include this idea in the zone of practicability. The courses outlined,. while having much resource them, are focussed to no definite schemo, and err chiefly on the side of variety; while a clear-cut definite scheme, .well conceived and carried out, would succeed, hesitancy between numbers of plans must fail. : It is right to state that many departures happened from: the' course of action as outlined by the appreciation, and the subsequent movements of troops gave no clue or connection with the, prearranged'..scheme of tho leaders as outlined. Generally speaking, tho plan of action indicates an. advance on tho main position, testing the strength at different 'places, and suddenly attacking at the /.weakest spot., These cannot •bo treated as very,sound tactics under the-existing conditions:— | First—"With the: roads all favouring deploymerits, and favourable to Red's reinforcement;at different places. , . . .'.Second—With /numerical., inferiority, it scorned iU advised Hi try. k> . press along thisextended 'line; .any .committal to. anything • but an incisively sudden and successful en-gagement-should'have been shunned. In spite of these, criticisms, much of a valuable , nature is in this appreciation, and the . result of subsequent movements showed that fresh .developments, wero quickly met by newly devised . showing, remarkable resource in their application. •