DEFENCE NOTES.

Dominion, Volume 1, Issue 247, 11 July 1908, Page 9

DEFENCE NOTES.

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THE .ATTACK ON WELLINGTON. EASTER -J- 1908. ~ . THE .OFFICIAL'" NARRATIVE.' . . - ■ (Part I;) Tho ■ "General Idea," common . "to both sides—tho "Special Idea" for the Reds (Defenders).— I The Reel Commander's "Appreciation of tho Situation"—Criticism of 'the' Red Commanderls "Appreciation,'^bytile Director of Manoeuvres. GENERAL IDEA. ' •••-.. liifbrniiitiori- -was received at noon: on Friday from fishermen at Rocky.Bay that cruis-' ers had come to .'anchor under Mana Island and were landing troops on tho mainland. . At : s p.mrinformation: was- received by the" C.C. troops-: mobilised-..at' Johnsouville that a (Blue) force (approx. 800) was camped in the vicinity of l'ahautanui, their sliips lying at Mana Island. Despite tho unexpected landing of.. Bluo, and their, advance to their present position, a Red force has been mobilised and is camped in the vicinity of Johiisonville,-so that eight miles -intervene between Blue and'their-prob-able objective'.'"':.." .Special Jgpa (Red). Division Gar. Art. (3 Coy.) "D" Batry. F.A. (J Coy., 2gns.) ' i Coy. Engineers. 1 Regt. M.R: (350) ~ . 2 .Maxims , 3 Battns.'lnfty. (1100) Bearers (15) — Cyclists (13) ' / Signallers (15). Blue has landed a force as per General Idea. With a force as per margin prevent Blue occupying a position whereby he could dominate Wellington and Ngahauranga. fort. ; Prevent march on the City. ■ Note.—Should he not advance, move out and defeat him before he could.be. reinforced or re-embarked. He will probably take the initiative and attack you, concluding that you are. somewhat committed to a'defensive line, though you have tho power to counter attack. _ , Time is everything to Blue. ... APPRECIATION OP THE SITUATION. v;;(BY LIECT-COI. W; G. Dutiiie.) As appreciated by tho O.C. Red Force,-the object: of .the defenders was. to : safeguard Wellington from an attack from'the 'north, pr&vent the advance of Blue and his occupation of the hills dominating Wellington.;and Ngahauranga, a'nd 'defeat him-before he could withdraw; or be. reinforced. The relative strengths, gave about 300 men, in favour, of Red. The distribution of forces was as already, indicated .in the general and special ideas; the. armaments were modern..

Morale.—Any superiority in'the'training of Blue was -coanterbalauced by Reds' knowledge of the country, patriotism, and inspired confidence by_ the occupation of a strong defensive'position near a strong base, with a 'safe..lino :of communication;' ~ .•■'..i. Probable" were not immediately available for,, either, but amplefor Red within 48 hours.: v.lt..was assumed, also, that there was no question of politics involved. .: "i i ! ' ' •..Topography.-rrThe country., was.., hilly, brokejV ridges with narrow, ivalleys Running ■approximately north and south; Redhad-the advantago.of position. • Communications were available :both' forward and laterally by gobd roads and tracks, telegraph, and .telephone, and good signalling stations. Tire question of supply was simple a,nd safe for Red, but difficult for Blue. The' climate was equable. The Situation.—Blue had .to attack'over steep ridges and hilly country or through narrow valleys exposed to frontal oblique and enfilade fire. He could defend from good fire. positious, reinforce any part' of his lino with ease, and institute dangerous counterattacks. Time was everything to Blue who should assume tho initiative. The occupation by Blue of the ridges .dominating Wellington .and Ngahaurauga would interfere most with our plans. Counter-attacks could be made on Blue's right flank, via the Ohariu VaUey Road, and on his left via the Belmont and, Horokiwi Roads. • The Commander ,of ■ the 'enemy having 'been entrusted ; with such a commaud, had to be estimated to be a man of dash and daring; and tho Red Commander, uTappreiiiating tho situation,:reasoned thus: "Should the enemy, remain-where' he';is, we ; must threaten his line of retreat, and gradually envelop him.' His left flank'- is jesting on the sea at Paremata, his left at Paliautanui, and both are vulnerable. Red's'right flank is secure, but the loft is open to attack from Oliariu, which must be guarded against. Should Blue retire, 'wo should come.up with him at tho point of re-embarka-tion. Should he, however, advance, we must harass him with mounted .troops, and. hold him on our lino of resistance; counterattacks, to, bo directed to the flanks. The time available is' three hours, and .in -that time, our cover must bo improved, entrench--' ments must be prepared, obstacles placed, : and rauges taken. "Line of Action.—We will secure our front by the immediate dispatch of mounted troops., and maintain touch with -enemy, hold hurt on ■a ■ specified line ..of resistance, and make provision for the flanks; vigorously counter-, attack' according, to the disposition of 'Blue ' with a view of enveloping 'and defeating him, before ho can be reinforced or. re-em-barked.; ! . .; ■■ THE APPRECIATION CRITICISED (By the Director of Manoeuvres.) The appreciation submitted by the 0.0. Red Force is short arid chiefly repeats the important paragraphs of the special' idea issued. There are some facts and .deductions which might well have. entered into the calculations of a leader which .receive no mention, and other, matter which was certainly at the disposal of this force, which is vory casually touched on. There is nothing to indicate the- importance of the probable disposition of Blue, ' and scant deduction made from specific ' ground (wellknown to Red) ] acceptable to tho . invader as a probable objective. On the other hand, there is a wealth of suggestion'both in the courses open.to the attacker-ahd defender— but the intention leaves little doubt that the idea of, holding an advanced lino, tentatively retiring; retiring, if 'necessary,- on to tho pre-chosen main position,' and by pushing, 'tho right and left extreme flanks forward to endeavour to envelop. the' .'invaders. - ';' ;■ , • ' This : schemo of action cannot be. called ■ aggressive, for, considering the comparative strength of the invaders and defenders, it is questionable if more than passive' resistance ought to be tho metier, of a numerically larger force; with,a definite knowledge' of. tho country in .' which tho: oiioniy ■is' operating ; with \a country rising'in.: its favour aiid reiiiforcomciits certain; while tlio invader" was still an unconsidered "asset in hi;s local knowledge, , limited in his transport asd hampered by his first J.nd most:difficult mjjves. ' Subsequent developments, however, 'disclosed tlie fact that events do not occur as anticipated, and that greater action was evinced 1 than that outlined in the "appreciation. " V