The Dominion. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1907. BRITAIN'S GREATEST NEED.

Dominion, Volume 1, Issue 77, 24 December 1907, Page 6

The Dominion. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1907. BRITAIN'S GREATEST NEED.

The Swiss Army system has been .so much before'the public lately as a model upon which Great Britain, not to mention her over-sea dependencies, can, with advantage, reconstruct their deierice forces, and has been so generally championed as the one thing desirable to that' end, that it is surprising to find a writer who treats the subject from an entirely different standpoint—strikes, in fact, a new note altogether in connection with the matThis writer is Mr. Harold Cox, M.P., who per medium of the "Nineteenth Century and After," ventures to suggest that the whole interest of the Swiss military system to most Englishmen Hes in the broad question whether the Swiss system is applicable to English needs. IJe then proceeds to explain the system thoroughly, and also its reason for ■ existence, namely, the defence of the Swiss frontiers during strife among her. neighbours - against either intentional or accidental violation. _ It is only upon some occasion of this kind that Switzerland will be called upon to fight. But, he asks, what is Britain's task? She "is an island Power, the centre of a wideworld Empire," having no guarantee of independence or safety, but, on the contrary, ever in danger.of a coalition of Powers against her. She must have ships to guard her commerce, and regular soldiers to garrison her over-sea possessions, and does she, he queries, in addition to these, require a large home army? The usual reply is in the affirmative, and people generally accept it, without a murmur, as final and conclusive. But Mr. Cox points out that such an army can only be. necessary in case of invasion, and that invasion is as impossible now as it has always been so long as Britain's Navy dominates the seas in such force that no possible coalition of other navies could vanquish it. Should it be vanquished, < the supremacy at sea lost, there would be no need of invasion; the enemy could simply stand off and starve Great Britain into submission by preventing the incoming of necessary food supplies. The incidental raid, he allows, might take place with the view of inflicting serious temporary damage upon thenaval arspnals or upon London, but this is nO reason for the maintenance of a huge militia force at great cost, since the utmost number of mon admitted by experts to constitute such a possible raid would not exceed 10,000. It is true these would be picked men, and therefore they would require to be faced by regular troops, not by partially • trained militia, a matter which, if the War Office and tlio Admiralty are doing their duty, is simply a question of the proper garrisoning of the vital points. But with

an adequate navy, urges Mr. Cox, no nation is going to risk the lives of these 10,000 raiding troops in an attempt to gain a temporary footing on British shores, and the danger is that, while the British riation is concentrating its attention and resources on building up this big home militia force, the Navy is going to be neglected. _ Summed up the position is: The Navy, not a national militia, is the best security against invasion, and the Navy must be sufficient for the task; no national militia is required to guard the arsenals, or prevent a march on London, since both were better accomplished by' small forces of welltrained regulars; so the whole, case for a national militia breaks down. Now, the cost of the Swiss system as applied to Great Britain, according to Colonel Delme-Radclift'c, British military attache to Switzerland, would be £19,500,000 a year, producing, if required, 4,000,000 armed men. The annual cost of a Dreadnought in commission is, approximately, £250,000 a year,'or, say, £300,000. Thus, Mr. Cox points out, with £19,500,000 a year, 65 Dreadnoughts could be maintained in commission, all charges paid, and a constant succession of new ships, as the older ones passed out of date,be provided. And he asks: "Can anyone doubt for a; moment tliat. 65 Dreadnoughts in full commission would add immensely more to the offensive and defensive strength of Great Britain than 4,00Q t ,000 militia men. raised for home, defence?" As to the subsidiary arguments in favour of the Swiss system, the beneficial effect on the physique of the nation, and, also, that it would bring home to every man the moral obligation, of defending his co_untry ; Mr. Cox has it that both are misleading. Rifle shooting is far inferior as a physical exercise to the games that English lads play without any compulsion; the latter argument is a mistake founded on the assumption that' universal militarj r service means fighting. The real national service which all owe to their country is the honourable fulfilment of the "daily round, the common task," by giving honest work- in return for the pay received, by cheerfully discharging obligations to family and neighbours, and loyally paying taxes legally imposed. "When," adds Mjv Cox, "this conception of civic duty has become part of the life of the people," there -will' be "no reason lo fear for our country's future, even though most of us may still be awkward in handling a rifle." There is a good deal 'of force in Mr. Cox's presentment of the case for a strong navy as against an enormous home militia not: likely to be ever required for active service; but that is not to say that, whether, it is the case of Great Britain or her dependencies, these countries will nofr'be the better for having their young men trained to habits of discipline, and the steady life which is inseparable from good rifle shooting, even adopted as a national pastime. Granted, also, 'the civic duty as put by Mr. Cox is excellent in theory; until the people are' sufficiently advanced to,carry it out in its entirety there can be little harin v iiv instilling into them the national duty of being prepared to ■• defend ; their country when their country eallsJ ~;