PORT ARTHUR.

Dominion, Volume 1, Issue 75, 21 December 1907, Page 5

PORT ARTHUR.

GENERAL KUROPATKIN AGAINST ITS j ; HE ADVISED ; '. ■ j • HTJT . RUSSIA WAS CONFIDENT.'! ' BT TELECn.lTK—rntss ASSOCIATION"—COPYRIGHT. St... Petersburg, Dc-cember 19. f General Kuropatkin, who was Cpmmander-In-Uinef' of the Russian forces in Manchuria at the commencement' of'the 'Russo-'Japaricse war, but - who.''•Was wiperse.dcd.-Jgtej'f- gave evidence before- the ' court-martial which is at present trying General Stoessel (Kussian Commandant- '.-at I'ort Arthur during 'the siege)' and ctiiehgeneral.-'officers on.. charges involving dishonour or neglect. General KuropatEm said that- the evacuation of Daln'j- sp impaired't.ho'value -of Port Arthur that he. .on' the eve of tho war. urged retrocession of the'Lipo-rtuiig Peninsula'; to China, conditionally 'upon" 'China paying twenty-five. million pounds, and granting Russia certain concessions in Northern Manchuria.' He'■ added that although', the Foreign and Financial Miriistors'c6nburfed, 'tjie scheme, .failed because, of. Russia\s entire confidence that the war would succeea. ;

IN FAVOUR OF A RETIRED BASE.: That Kuropatkin favoured,.temporary rel,ire'ment rather than "a. forward movement, is- indicated by his book on the Russo-,Tapanese war. •Reviewing that '.publication.' a contributor writes, to the "Outlook" as follows j "Kuropatkin.-has been compared, much-, to his disadvantage,with Napoleon. But : the great Corsican was his own chief of the state during most of; his campaigns. Kuropatkin was tied by the- telegra/Dh.-.wire.-to"lSt- Petersburg. His .own plr.n, - which :w.is..submittr>d t.o the Emperor, and was jnarginally., npti;d, 'Just so' by' the Sovereign, .was. fo take up a retired bass,, and' not to. make any forward movement until all preparations, which were t.n bo complete aDrl long in arranging, were finished., The General wished, in fact, to adopt the old Russian policy—that of/Apraxine, of KiitusofE, of Barclay—which consisted iu forcing ;the .enemy to seek onft' out at ■a: 'long line of .toinmuriieation . r 'tp'.'"'attack'. But. owing principally to the Viceroy Aler.eicff's' representations, Kuropatkin was .ordered! -to make a forward movement before hie a'fmy was ready. When this is known, and it-has not been denied.' it. is absurd to say of the late commander-in-chief that 'it. tfas'his, strategic plan, as he conceived and applied it£ that'led him to. defeat- moj-e ; than all the faults of which, he accuses his suhordinatesr'-i—--- : . "Among the things not generally : known;' at all . events out -. of - Russia, "was. -tbiv-neculiar nosition of. Kuropatkin, as. Minister- for War before the campaj.gn. --The •Emperoc._>s:ho lhad selected him principally on' account of: his Asiatic reputation,-where he had bca-.\ Skobeleff's right-hand man,, had the grealret confidence in ;Ku-ropatkin. ;But;a near. ifJat.ive'-of the Sovereign, then entrusted with a. high military command, snmmnded by.a.clique of well-born officers;.-hated the Minister, on!" account of' his simple origin: and his detestation of, jobs. In this clique-was General Sacharoff; who succeeded '-his chief .Jin- -the portfolio.- o'f War.. In it were also Admiral- AJexeieff fwho was nominated Viceroy of .the Far East}, ; Kaul-, bars', and . Grippenberg.. Thus; Kuropatkin on' fekirig iiii supreme command at' Harbin found himself..;direc'tly opposed' by -AJexeieff,' whilst the - commands of'two of the • thiee armies composing his forces were- entrusted to nominees'of that, court party .which did'everything it , could to. deprive liim . of the -confidence' reposed-in- the Emperor." - [ .;