GREAT GUNS.

Dominion, Volume 1, Issue 53, 26 November 1907, Page 4

GREAT GUNS.

, 4 Admikal Germinet, of the French Navy, Las declared in tlie Paris "Journal" tliat tlie Dreadnought class of battleship is a mistake. V Top much has been sacrificed for the sake of speed, and the 12-in. guns should have been replaced by smaller guns throwing shells with a higher explosive. In support of his criticism he refers to the Russo-Japanese War, to the fact that at its commencement the Japanese used the 12-in. shells, charged only with a small quantity of explosives, with the effect that the results obtained were found to be not worth the expense. Accordingly the Japanese set to work immediately to manufacture shells of high explosive capacity, with which, at the battle of Tsushima, all their ships were furnished. It was to this, he says, their victory was due; the new shells, exploding at the least contact, produced enormous heat, which melted the hardest metals, and produced an immense volume cf deleterious gases, which asphyxiated all who breathed them, and caused widespread demoralisation among the crews. Has Admiral. Germinet's very plain speaking endangered the Anglo-French entente? Not in the least. On the contrary it has been welcomed in British naval circles, and has aroused much interest. The "Daily Mail "says that " from the French naval standpoint the criticisms are absolutely sound, but the Dreadnought was not built for French naval needs." This reads a little abrupt, and unkind, but the smallest reflection will show the truth of the statement. The French Government, with a limited marine Budget, would not dare to spend the enormous price of the Dreadnought on a single ship. On the other hand the Dreadnought exists on the theory of penetrating hostile armour, and, in this connection, under long-range conditions, it is admittedly the most devastating in the world. As to the battle of Tsushima, the " Standard's " naval correspondent points out that the Japanese in that engagement " used some singularly sensitive fuses —so sensitive, indeed, that quite a number of shells burst just outside and occasionally inside the gun muzzles. In a word, they took far greater risks than any other nation has cared to face. The peculiar circumstances of the battle had, perhaps, something to do with this; nothing Bave a complete .victory was of any_ "" - -J '

use. If any defeat were sustained, it might jusi well he annihilation. s Japan framed her.policy on that prin- s ciplc. It is improbable that any other 1 Navy would, take such risks, conse- 1 quently its high explosive shell fire ' would be proportionately less deadly." The same authority refers to the two ] schools of opinion in the British Navy ( as to the class of gun to be used, and < the effects produced thereby. The i older school, he says, " place less re- : liance on armour penetration, and more i on moral effect produced by shell lire, regarding naval warfare as a matter of men rather than of machines." A large school of opinion, however, still believes in the 6-in. gun, and details of new Japanese ships indicate that the victors of Tsushima also share this belief. The idea is to have many such guns. Thus there are the armour penetrating big gun school of tactics and the small gun demoralisation school. It is pointed out that all great ' gun ships of the Dreadnought type are designed to sink the enemy rather than to demoralise him; their efficiency rests upon attack and trusting to armour for defence. On the tfliole, Admiral Germinet is entitled to the thanks of the British Navy for raising a discussion which must result in a considerable amount of good to the service, because, as the " Standard's" . correspondent points out, the inference to be drawn is that " the new type of British warship is an argument against, reduced sea-going fleets and increased nucleus crew squadrons. The Admiralty policy is the antithesis of this," the tendency being " towards shorter service, shorter sea experience, shorter time in which the men are together— as, for instance, in the nucleus crew system, where at the last moment from 40 to 20 per cent, of strangers are brought in to bring up the crew to full strength." , At this distance one scents party politics even in the differ-' enccs existing among naval experts on this vexed question of armament, but at least the outposts of the Empire will be found unanimous in deprecating any Admiralty cheese-paring which is calculated to imperil Britain's supremacy at sea.