The New Zealand Constitution.

Clutha Leader, Volume I, Issue 22, 10 December 1874, Page 6

The New Zealand Constitution.

Under the head " Sir George Grey and the Colonial Policy" a lengthened communication has been published, in which Sir George combats the attacks lately made upon himself, and from which we make the following extracts :

THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

When the draft Constitution reached England every alteration made in it, with the exception, perhaps, of the addition of the Province of Taranaki to the five provinces 1 had proposed, was in alteration and restriction of the liberal concessions I had proposed. For these alterations I am not responsible I am also in no way responsible for the nominated Upper House iv this colony It was arranged between Lord Grey and myself that Parliament should be advised to create an elected Upper Hoxxsej the whole balance of the Constitution depended upon its being- an elected body and upon the manner of its election. It was Sir John Pakington who, at the time the Constitution reached England, had just become Colonial Minister, who, acting upon the advice of some persons in England, changed the proposed elected Upper House into a nominated one, simply informing me that he need not enter into the particulars of the reasons for this change. This circumstance made a painful impression upon my mind. I thought it wrong that one man, a subject like ourselves, should be able thus arbitrarily to deal with the liberties of a young nation, and to inflict, without reason or explanation, a great evil upon New Zealand. Such frequent misrepresentations have been made regarding* the mode in which the Constitution was introduced into this country that it appears not to be admitted here that some unfair means were used to secure that the action of the Provincial Governments should be felt before that of the General Assembly ; but in truth the whole Constitution, and every clause of it was drawn on the supposition that this must necessarily be the case, as is shown by the fact that by the Constitution, as drafted and sent Home the General Assembly could not even exist until the Provincial Governments were in full operation, inasmuch as the Upper House of that Assembly was to be elected by the Provincial Councils. The members of the Provincial Councils also residing at no great distance from the capital town of each province, the Superintendents could easily call their Provincial Councils together. I did nothing in introducing* the Constitution but what my duty required me to do. I religiously fulfilled the requirements of the law. The closest scrutiny was made by hostile people into ever step I had taken. This scrutiny was made in the House of Parliament in Great Britain — twice in the House of Commons, once in the House of Lords. The result was a unanimous admission in each case that 1 fairly and impartially performed my duty. The very member of the House of Commons who first brought accusations against me, and who moved for inquiry into my conduct, admitted that he had entirely changed his opinions."

PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION.

I see general statements that provincialism is a hateful thing and the Colonial Ministers are determined " to sweep it away 5 but none of them have the courage to state that what they intend to sweep away is the right of selfgoverment in the fullest and most effective form, or the fullest, or in the very least in .as full a form as the world has ever yet seen — a form of government which has helped to no disloyality, to ', no discontent, to no want or suffering, j to no disturbance, and no expense, to no great personal expenditure from *

public funds — a form of government under which the people are trained to consider closely aod nigh to themselves the framing of* the laws under which they are to live, and « which concern their own well-being and that of their fellow-citizens and families. This form pf government is now to be destroyed by a Government in which the people are most imperfectly represented, and which, from having- at the present moment, millions, of borrowed money at its command in such an irresponsible manner regarding* its disposal— l believe unexampled, and certainly unconstitutional—has the power of exercising* temporarily a dangerous influence both within and without the walls of the General Assembly. The slightest consideration of the small number of men amongst whom these immense sums of borrowed money are in. so short time to be spent will give a measure of what this influence must be, which is again greatly increased by the number of contractors and their agents now in the colony, who undoubtedly possess, and have attempted to exercise, an influence over public affairs. I think that every man who loves his country will from these causes alone object to such a moment being chosen as a fitting one in which to destroy all of really representative Government which exists here. This leads me on to apply what I fear will be considered strong language to the

CONSTITUTION OF THB GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

but which at the present crisis, when it proposes to destroy all really representative institutions in this country, it is right to use, because I think it will be admitted that such language fittingly describes an Upper House nominated for life. Have we not then here an Upper House which either is in part composed of persons whom the Minister of the day think or may have thought it necessary to obtrude upon the colony without its people being in any way consulted ? Is it not too probable that the independant members of that House may at any moment be suddenly overpowered by the creatui*es of the Executive Government placed in the Upper House * and possibly even at the same time, or shortly afterwards,' made Ministers, even our rulers, not upon account of their public services or claims upon the favor of the Crown, or of their fel-low-colonists, but appointed as the mere nominees of the Premier, as men ready to do his bidding and take his rewards so that all customs and traditions of the proud British race being* departed from, we shall have a mere dependent Upper House, and one which, perhaps, may be so made dependent or nominated by those whom mere fortuitous circumstances, or perchance the unconstitutional act of a temporary Governor may have placed in office, or retained there ? Yet it is by the assistance of an Upper House so constituted, and which will remain a permanent institution of the country, that it is now proposed that every germ of real freedom in New Zealand should be crushed out.