THE PRESS MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1989. More advice for the P.M.

Press, 11 September 1989, Page 20

THE PRESS MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1989. More advice for the P.M.

The case for increasing the research resources of the Prime Minister is undeniable. Mr Palmer was right in deciding to implement the recommendations of the report he received on the subject. The Prime Minister is called on to make a huge number of decisions and modern government even in small States has acquired a complexity which requires the attention of a number of highly informed people with a variety of skills. For a long time, in this country, there has also been a great need for an alternative source of economic advice to that offered by the Treasury. Besides the increase in the size of the Prime Minister’s staff, the office will be divided between political and executive functions. That is a sensible division. Prime Ministers need political minders, people who advise on how they believe a policy or speech will be received by the public, how the party organisation is likely to react to a Government policy or speech, and people who poll or otherwise measure how well the Government is satisfying the electors. That function can be reasonably divided, and should be divided from the work of analysts who look at the implications and effects of policies. It may be expected that the political advisers will generally be identified with the party in Government and go when the Government changes; the policy analysts may generally be expected to be public servants capable of serving the Government whatever party is in power. The boosting of the strength of the office will undoubtedly increase the power of the Prime Minister. Although the new office is to be called the Office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, it may be expected that it will increase the power of the Prime Minister more than of any other Minister. It could become another step towards an executivetype Prime Minister. It will certainly make the Prime Minister more powerful in relation to other Ministers.

The Prime Minister will be able to call on a fairly substantial staff to evaluate the policies put forward by departments and Ministers. Thus the power of the Prime Minister will be increased over both departments and Ministerial colleagues. Just how this will affect the power of the Cabinet remains to be seen. It is possible that the balance of power will be tipped away from the Cabinet towards the Prime Minister. In Britain, the concentration of power in the hands of Mrs Thatcher has brought demands to give the Cabinet more power to make decisions in the collective way that was accepted by Prime Ministers before Mrs Thatcher.

Whatever the structure may be at Ministerial and Prime Ministerial level, much depends upon the personal strengths and authority of those holding office. The Labour Party’s rules in New Zealand are somewhat exceptional in that they require the Parliamentary party as a whole to select members of the Cabinet. This, in theory, reduces the power of the leader. Another restraint, or lack of it, lies in Parliament itself and in the assertiveness of the Government party’s caucus in checking the Cabinet.

The caucus has another vital function, and one that is being supplemented by the Prime Minister’s staff. This is in bringing the messages from the electorate to the centre of power. One problem in New Zealand is that, whatever party is in office, a high proportion of members of Parliament are in the Cabinet itself, all of them, because of their work, less able than others to communicate with their electorates. The success of reorganisation will depend

greatly on the senior executive officer, who will have to be someone able to attract very able staff to the revamped office and who will command respect among the departments. The Office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet will need grist for its mill and this will be provided by the departments and Cabinet Ministers. If the chief executive is not a person who can persuade the departments to consult and provide information, the office will fail in its function. A reasonable case may surely be made that the chief executive should also be Secretary to the Cabinet. This would give the chief executive a more substantial standing within the bureaucracy and the Ministry. One of the dangers in the new attitudes among some public servants is that the old tradition of public servants serving the public interest is being eroded and replaced by loyalties to particular Ministers or even to the chief executives of departments. It is far from clear whether the new. culture will destroy much of the co-operation and consultation that has traditionally existed among senior public servants. This cart lead to an identification with the political fortunes of the particular Minister, rather than a concern for the broad public interest. How these attitudes develop will certainly determine how effective the new office will be. The office will need, and will no doubt have, access to Cabinet papers before they go to the Cabinet. That is another reason for combining the office of chief executive and Secretary to the Cabinet.

Any accumulation of power brings dangers with it. One of the biggest dangers will lie in the possibility of cocooning the Prime Minister. Recent world history is replete with examples of such dangers of isolation. The small group of advisers who surrounded President Nixon and prevented outside advice from reaching him is perhaps best known. This happened even though the United States Congress, large in numbers and richly endowed with the support of advisers and other staff for its members, is a much more powerful influence on the executive arm of government than is the New Zealand House of Representatives.

A particular danger exists in New Zealand over the accumulation of power because, in the absence of a written constitution, much depends on the proper observance of tradition and practices. In the United States checks and balances are written into the Constitution. The problem of checking and balancing power needs constant attention in New Zealand. One of the checks lies in the Ombudsman who can request information under the Official Information Act. The division of the new office between the political and executive functions will make it easier to determine what information should be released under the Official Information Act. Previously, political and policy work was sometimes performed by the same people. The Leader of the Opposition, Mr Bolger, has suggested that all the offices of the Opposition, not just the main Opposition party, should be given better resources. This suggestion is sound and should be viewed in the light of the need to provide necessary checks and balances. Parliamentary research over all needs boosting; but more resources should certainly be made available to the Opposition parties because it is their proper function to grapple quickly, intensively, and thoroughly with the issues and the legislation of the day. The result of better researched Government policies, and better researched Opposition comment, must improve the quality of policy-making and legislation for the whole country.