Hurtful N.Z. in allergy affair

Press, 17 May 1989, Page 17

Hurtful N.Z. in allergy affair

By

CHRISTOPHER MOORE

COUNTRIES, says that old diplomatic maxim, do not have friends. They have interests. According to American foreign affairs and defence analyst, Jed Snyder, countries can have both — and survive the cold hard realities of super power politics. “We don’t have many allies on whom we can depend — so New Zealand’s attitude came as a great surprise,” Snyder said in Christchurch. The Prime Minister’s recent Yale speech reflected a deepseated New Zealand disillusionment with the policy of nuclear deterrents and an equally deep seated reluctance to be part of these policies. "The categorical nature of his statements shocked many Americans. He was arguing that the nuclear issue in itself was forcing New Zealand to leave the alliance. There should be no misunderstanding that Washington has ever urged this step. To my knowledge, we have never suggested that New Zealand must leave A.N.Z.U.S. because of the nuclear issue. This was your Prime Minister’s construction, not the American one.” Jed Snyder has emerged as one of America’s leading conservative commentators on foreign and defence affairs. He has served as senior special assistant to the director of the State Department’s Bureau of political-military affairs, worked as a’ consultant to the Rand Corporation, and was DeputyDirector of National Security Studies at New York’s Hudson Institute. In 1988, he was appointed as civilian consultant to the United States Secretary of Defence, a position which gives him access to the highest policy-making circles in the Bush Administration. The man who describes himself as an internationalist was in New Zealand to present a paper to the Otago Foreign Policy School. He soon found himself in the middle of a debate over alliances, Pacific policies and relationships between nations, in a time of radical shifts in power and spheres of interest.

At a time when the Bush Administration appears to be adopting a more flexible approach to New Zealand attitudes, the Prime Minister’s speech appeared to close a partly open door leading to the solution. “Relationships between the United States and New Zealand will be negatively affected — and this is ridiculous. The basis of our relationship has never been simply nuclear guaranteed. We also share an affinity of Western democratic values which are important to preserve,” he says. Snyder rejects any simplistic classification of anti-nuclear policies as "the New Zealand disease.” The policies and attitudes did not originate here, but elsewhere 30 to 40 years ago.

“We have not been able to inoculate the majority of our allies against the anti-nuclear virus. We are simply reacting to one more case of the nuclear allergy. We are familia with the issue — we’ve faced it in Denmark and Spain. We are currently facing it in Germany. It is the character of New Zealand’s approach to the issue which concerns us,” he says. For 40 years, A.N.Z.U.S. had been viewed as a triangular partnership between friends and allies. One side of the structure had now been broken and there appeared little to replace it.

“I don’t think that the United States would be happy to see the development of a closer Aus-tralia-New Zealand defence relationship at the expense of its own relationship with New Zealand. I dare say that Australia would also prefer A.N.Z.U.S. to remain a triangular partnership,” Snyder says. Closer American-Australian defence links could be developed “but not at the expense of New Zealand.”

The United States could hope that Australia would influence the future direction of New Zealand policies. “The responsibility is for Australia to decide. To date, it has

been very diplomatic. Bob Hawke would probably like to be more supportive but he has a political agenda of his own at home.” The United States faced its own urgent issues over the question of the future of its Philippines bases. Snyder doubts whether American forces will remain in the Philippines at the same levels.

“The Philippines Senate has determined that we will go. The question is how we will leave and how long it will take us to depart. There is no single substitute which could be as strategically useful as a base to us. Guam is too far away. We might have to look at the island states, the Micronesian alternatives. There is also the question of nuclear access.”

The disagreement between New Zealand and the United States was also affecting domestic American policies, fueling an isolationist case to pack up bags and go home. “There is a tendency for isolationists to say that where the United States is not welcome it should go. That’s a superficial

approach but one which attracts a number of Americans. Strategists may run policy but the man or woman in lowa or Nebraska decides the outcome of elections.

“They are not terribly impressed with the argument that we must be careful with New Zealand because it doesn’t like our nuclear policies but we have to be there because of regional interests. Internationalists argue that we have to avoid leaving vacuums for others to fill. Americans are not enthusiastic internationalists. They have to be carried kicking and screaming into commitments — World Wars I and II were cases in point.” “The Pacific Century” was a term heard increasingly among the American foreign affairs community. The Eurocentric policies and attitudes of the past four decades which saw Europe as the front line of the East-West policies were changing.

“Not because the Soviets will become less interested in Europe but because other regions will begin to take up more of our time,” Snyder adds. “The assumption of an EastWest context of international affairs is becoming less central to our thinking. The emergence of new powers in Asia means that both the Soviet Union and the United States could look towards the regions with new opportunities and challenges.”

Despite a wartime romance with the region, the United States continued to possess a largely superficial knowledge of Pacific regional issues (“most Americans would have trouble in finding the Cook Islands on a map”). “Europe has always been central to our thinking. This is changing and we are being forced to recognise that economic power in this region will be tied to political influences. Japan is an example. Americans are alarmed that an economically viable Japan may not be the classic ally of the United States — and we are already seeing an adversarial economic relationship,” says Snyder.

“This is not Japan-bashing. It reflects a concern that there is a will in Japan to take on larger responsibilities in terms of economic influence. It is not clear whether this could also be translated to military power.” Alongside the conundrums lay shifts in Soviet attitudes towards the Pacific region. The Soviet Union had watched the effects of a post-Vietnam syndrome in the United States and seen the apparent reluctance to get involved in the region politically, economically or militarily. "The fact is that the United States has never left the region — the Seventh Fleet is still here. We have bases in the Philippines, Guam, Japan and South Korea. The Soviets do perceive correctly, I believe, a reluctance by the United States to become a Pacific Power in a sense of being a European power. It is a reluctance which could be exploited. A supporter of the Nixon Doctrine (not to commit American forces to a theatre but commit American power to alliances of Western nations believing in collective security) he sees the development of support for the doctrine of collective security in Asia as a means of allowing the United States to step back. “The isolationist impulse in the United States will restrict our flexibility in regions other than Europe. There is a strong sentiment in the American Congress supported by public opinion that the United States is finding itself less welcome internationally.” These attitudes would make it increasingly difficult for American policymakers to sustain status quo policies. “While I’m suspicious of the Soviets’ ultimate intentions, it is well within its rights to expect super power status through the size of its political influence, and economic and military strength. The Pacific is, I suspect, an area where it would like to test just how far it can push this influence. But it will come up against American interests wherever it goes. The issue is how the United States maintains its own access and keeps the Soviets in check. “That will be much more difficult ...”