Moscow may be pulling out of regional conflicts

Press, 5 March 1988, Page 33

Moscow may be pulling out of regional conflicts

NZPA-Reuter London

The days when the Soviet Union and its allies fought wars on behalf of revolutionary regimes in the Third World may be drawing gradually | towards a close. ’ .

This is the ! view of many Western diplomats and experts. They see the ending of direct involvements in regional conflicts as a key element (of a main foreign policy rethink that has: accompanied Mikhail Gorbachev’s domestic i reform programme since he) took power three years) ago. The most obvious signs of movement (are ) in Afghanistan, where) the quickening pace of efforts to wind up the; eighLyearold Soviet (presence has led some diplomats to talk cautiously : of an “endgame" now in sight.

Mr Gorbachev) said this month that he could start pulling out Soviet (forces — estimated by) the West at 115,000 men — on May 15 if negotiations between Afghanistan; and) Pakistan on the withdrawal timetable ended successfully two montlis before.; then. Recently there' have also been’ hints of progress on the withdrawal of about 35,0b0 ( Cuban troops from ' Apgoia, and of more than 100,000 Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea, although solutions in both countries sj'till look well down (the (road. Regional) conflicts have become a main (item in Soviet-United (states relations and, according to ; n i ■

Seweryn Bialer of New York’s Columbia University, the Russians’ main interest is to have stable relations with Washington.

"They will probably in the future be sufficiently interested in such a stability ... not to start new adventures in the Third World and to reach some compromise agreement ■ ... in those regions where there is a conflict,” he said on a British radio programrpe. ( ; The moves into Afghanistan, Angola and) Kampuchea all date from the latter half of the:' 19705, the declining years of the (Soviet leader; Leonid Brezhnev, and the United States Presidency of Jimmy Carter, who critics say may have been seen in the Kremlin as a weakling. But while the interventions have kept pro-Soviet Governments in power, they have resulted ; in costly, protracted and apparently unwinnable wars against well-entrenched insurgents, and inflicted ruinous ’damage on the countries concerned. ’ I In the case of Afghanistan and (Kampuchea they have also led to diplomatic isolation for i the Soviet Union and Vietnam, which have repeatedly been told by the bulk of United Nations members to ( take their troops home. I ( ■ In Angola, the rebel U.jN.I.T.A. movement fighting! the Marxist M.PtL.A, Government has lost much internatidnal

sympathy due to its backing by South Africa, but many African leaders are privately worried by the Cuban presence there, analysts say. One Western diplomat specialising in Soviet affairs said some articles in the Soviet press suggested Moscow may be worried that “the Soviet Union has taken on the white man's burden in the Third World.” “Instead of Britain or France shoring up tottering regimes that are ripe for the revolution, the Soviet Union is shoring up tottering regimes that are ripe for counter-revolu-tion,” he said. Moscow has most freedom of action in Afghanis- ) tan, since only its own ; forces are involved. With 1 the Russians apparently) bent on leaving, the main problem is now how to ( form a Government to\ unite the conflicting; Afghan factions.

Technically, this is not) a subject covered by the; Afghan-Pakistani negotia-. tions in Geneva, but) Islamabad, which backs the Muslim guerrillas in Afghanistan, says it will not sign a deal until a neutral interim Government is in place. Diplomats said it was significant that Mr Gorbachev, in a speech, said an end to the Afghan war could have a positive knock-on effect in southern Africa and Kampuchea, as well as on the Gulf, Middle East arid Central American conflicts.

i “Implementing political settlement in Afghanistan will be ah important rupture in the chain of regional conflicts,” he said. The 13-year-old civil (war in Angola appeared (to take (a step towards j resolution when the l United States announced I that (Luanda had agreed I for the first time that all ( Cuban troops should leave (the couritry as part of a peace settlement. Diplomats acknowledge that Cuba has its own : interests) in Angola, including President Castro’s- . personal) sense of mission to free Africa from white domination. But Moscow can exert strong economic leverage over Havana and its own involvement is considerable, with 1500 Soviet military) experts in Angola and arms supplies reckoned by Western analysts to total at least SUS4.S billion j(SNZ6.7OB) since 1975. | Angola’s ability to pay i for military aid may have been hit by declining oil prices, | and the war is 1 getting nowhere. ' U.N.1.T1A., with substan- 1 tial South African help, 1 last (northern) autumn 1 beat back a main offen- 1 sive bj> Angolan and Cu- l ban troops. < The : elements of a settlement being sought i by Washington would in- . elude, )in addition to a I Cuban (pull-out, the grant- ; ing by South Africa of 1 independence to neighbouring Namibia. But there is no agree-3' ment on the timing of

such an arrangement and peace efforts have so far largely focused on periodic trips to the region by the State Department’s top Africa official, Chester Crocker. In Kampuchea, Vietnarri has promised to withdraw by 1990 the troops which went in a decade ago to overthrow the Khmer Rouge regime, whose remnants have since been fighting a guerrilla war alongside two other opposition groups. Economically even more tied than Cuba to the Soviet Union, Vietnam, which underwent a dhange of leadership in 1986, has its own strong motives for ending its involvement in Kampuchea to improve ties with its Asian neighbours and with the West. But, as with Afghanistan and Angola, it is proving easier to talk of withdrawing foreign troops than to settle internal conflicts. Peace talks in France between the Vietnamesebacked Phnom Penh Government and opposition leader. Prince Norodom Sihanouk,) made modest headway last month but problems remain over the transition to a new Government. An end to the conflicts in Kampuchea and Afghanistan would enable the Soviet Union to pursue a rapprochement with China and a general opening towards Asia that has been a main aim of Kremlin policy Gorbachev.