U.S. action in the Gulf

Press, 21 October 1987, Page 20

U.S. action in the Gulf

The destruction by American forces of an Iranian oil platform in the Gulf is likely to intensify the conflict there. That is not the intention of the United States, which was responding to attacks on an oil tanker bearing the United States flag and on an American-owned super-tanker. A reasonable case can be made that the action by the United States was measured, avoided the provocation of attacking Iran itself or Iranian forces in Iraqi territory, and that it was humane because a warning was given to those on the platform that an attack was to be launched. Given that the United States decided that it had to make a military response, the destruction of the oil platform seems to be as limited an action as can be envisaged. The United States also let Iran and other countries know of the attack and that it would end there. “We consider this matter closed,” the United States Secretary of Defence, Mr Weinberger, said afterwards. He is almost certainly being too optimistic. Iran will not consider the matter closed. In the first place, Iran apparently makes a distinction between those actions for which it claims responsibility and those which it does not acknowledge. It did not admit that it had attacked the Kuwaiti tanker bearing an American flag and therefore is clearly not prepared to accept the destruction of the platform as acceptable punishment. This is reminiscent of the first days of the mining in the Gulf. Iran not only refused to acknowledge that it had placed the mines, but in an outlandish offer it suggested that its minesweepers could help clear the Gulf of mines. The United States is understandably more interested in whether Iran laid the mines or attacked a ship than it is in whether Iran acknowledges that it has done so. Both the United States and Kuwait identified Iran as the source of the attack.

Iran will find more than this argument, %hich is based on semantics, to reject the notion that the destruction of the oil platform should bring to an end the pattern of retaliation. Many of Iran’s actions in the Gulf have been in response to earlier Iraqi actions. Iraq has refused to renounce attacks on shipping in the Gulf, believing accurately enough that Iran finances the continuation of the war between them by sales of oil. Iraq similarly finances its war expenditure by selling oil, but its oil has pipeline outlets

through neighbouring territories and the outlets are therefore much less vulnerable. Many of the Arab countries, inluding Kuwait, are openly supportive of Iraq. While it may be true that Iran would like to strike at the United States as a gesture of defiance, the more rational basis for its action is to disrupt the oil outlets of countries supportive of Iraq. A further rational explanation is that if it can create enough disruption for demands to be made for international action, pressure may be put on Iraq to end the attacks on Gulf shipping. The destruction of the oil platform is thus not going to be seen simply as the United States protecting its own ships (even if it acquired the ships in a funny way at the head of the Gulf by lending an American flag to them) but as a partisan action in the war between Iran and Iraq.

This Iranian perception has some accuracy in it. One of the motives for the United States presence in the Gulf is to prevent an Iranian victory. But in terms of population, military and economic power, Iran stands a good chance of becoming the victor in that war. The result of such a victory would be that Iran would attempt to dominate the other countries of the region and might even become expansionist. The idea of dominating the Gulf did not originate with the Khomeiny regime. In the days of the Shah, Iran took actions that enabled it to have a dominating role in the Gulf, not very heavily disguised as an offer to become the policeman of the region. The United States certainly wants to ensure that oil supplies for the Western world can get out of the Gulf and it also wants to prevent undue Soviet influence in the Gulf, but the other motive of preventing Iran from winning the war is playing a significant part in its calculations. Iran understands this and is consequently unlikely to forget or forgive the attack on the oil platform. The one restraining influence on Iran is the summit meeting of Arab leaders next month. Although it is not an Arab nation itself, Iran is tied to the Arab world geographically, through religion and through oil. It does not want to be estranged from Arab countries permanently or to allow the Arab country of Iraq to get undivided Arab backing. These considerations, more than retaliatory actions by the United States, are likely to help restrain Iran.