THE PRESS MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1987. Four new Frigates

Press, 14 September 1987, Page 20

THE PRESS MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1987. Four new Frigates

Political questions loom at least as large as defence issues in New Zealand's search for new warships. The intention to seek a common design with the Australian Navy implies more than a useful compatibility of ships and weapons systems. It is a signal that both Australia and New Zealand expect close defence co-operation to continue for at least another decade, in spite of the break-up of the A.N.Z.U.S. Treaty, and in spite of a small but vocal section of New Zealanders who would prefer that their country had no allies and little defence of any kind. Continuing co-operation imposes greater strains on Australia than it does on New Zealand. By continuing to associate with New Zealand in defence matters, Australia is required to perform an awkward balancing act between New Zealand and the United Ststes« For New Zealand, the Australian connection remains crucial. A lingering sentiment may give New Zealand occasional defence connections with such countries as Canada, Malaysia, and Britain. In a crisis, only Australia has the means and the incentive to act on New Zealand’s behalf. New Zealanders, smug in their anti-nuclear sentiments, sometimes fail to appreciate just how isolated and insignificant their country has become. The choice of a design for the frigates gives New Zealand, as well as Australia, an opportunity to earn respect somewhere in Western Europe. An order for 12 middle-size warships is not insignificant by any shipbuilder’s standards and a third of those ships are intended for New Zealand. The short list at present includes naval designers in Britain, West Germany, and the Netherlands. All three have clout in the European Community; all might be prepared to consider other trade arrangements on behalf of Australia and New Zealand out of regard for the order for warships. The opportunity should not be treated lightly; New Zealand should not allow Itself to be pushed by the Australians to make a decision that does not extract the maximum benefits for this country. The fundamental question of whether

New Zealand needs four new warships of up to 3000 tons each appears to be settled by the Government, although many voices are still raised in protest The answer should be selfevident Hardly any country in the world depends more on the sea for its survival than New Zealand. No other country is so remote from all its neighbours; none has such a long coastline in relation to its size and population; few countries have more turbulent waters to contend with. For the Navy to be stripped of sizeable fighting ships as the present frigates are retired would be ridiculous. Even these must be regarded as an element within a larger defence force that might be needed. In spite of the startling improvements in the power and importance of aircraft and missiles, warships remain the most effective and most versatile means of projecting power over distance — the power to do good as well as harm. Had New Zealand decided to intervene in Fiji after the military coup, for instance, just to protect New Zealanders, its present warships would have been essential. Navies are built and maintained not only to cope with foreseeable dangers and problems, but to be ready to deal with the unexpected and the unpredictable. When warships are needed for such an unforeseen task, there is no time to build them or buy them. The British reaction to the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982 demonstrated the point. Only the fleet in being could intervene. If New Zealand hopes to continue to be of some importance among the small South Pacific States it needs a credible means to exert a significant presence there — whether for disaster relief, or to exert a political influence against belligerent interference. If New Zealand intends to continue to maintain a defence connection with Australia it must be seen as ready to make a worth-while contribution to any joint activities. If New Zealand is to drift into an even lonelier isolation, the need for all-weather patrolling of the country’s 200-mile limits at sea will be even more important. Four frigates, even at a cost of at least $l2OO million, are cheap enough, and little enough, as insurance against the unforeseen.