THE PRESS WEDNESDAY, JULY 2, 1986. Uncertainties about sanctions

Press, 2 July 1986, Page 18

THE PRESS WEDNESDAY, JULY 2, 1986. Uncertainties about sanctions

Few matters of international concern have commanded such widespread support as the proposal that something must be done by the outside world to hasten the end of white racial domination in South Africa. Equally, few matters have brought such widespread uncertainty and Confusion about what might be done, beyond the measures already taken to restrain the supply of armaments and energy to South Africa. For some, the decision is easy. Countries that have little or no trade with South Africa have no difficulty in expressing their sense of moral outrage by demanding full economic sanctions — in practice, a virtual total ban on exports and imports to and from South Africa. For them to act would be easy. The results would be virtually nil. Other States — including some of South Africa’s closest black-ruled neighbours — are outspoken in their demand for sanctions. They are less ready to concede that they would themselves honour any agreement to restrain trade. Some, such as Lesotho and Botswana, depend almost 100 per cent on South Africa for their own trade with the rest of the world.

Others, such as Zimbabwe and Zambia, send and receive more than half their exports and imports through South Africa. Their economies are fragile enough now. Without South Africa’s transport system and without imports of food from South Africa, they could collapse. However vigorously they might demand that others break trading links with South Africa, if that was to happen, they might well plead for special exemptions for themselves and attempt to continue with trade as usual. If South Africa responded with trade or transport bans of its own towards its neighbours — as well it might — half a dozen of its critical neighbours could suffer severely.

Caught in the middle are those Western countries that have substantial trade with South Africa, and whose citizens may have substantial investments there. Prominent among them are the United States and Japan, and several members of the European Economic Community including Britain, West Germany, France, and Italy. All could survive a total ban on trade with South Africa. All would suffer from reduced access to the West’s principal supplier of such industrially essential materials as platinum. As experience with trade bans round the world in the last 50 years has shown, sanctions are seldom watertight. They almost never work. International organisations such as the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and the E.E.C., all have proposals before them to apply sanctions. Even if suitably stiff measures are eventually imposed, which is unlikely, and even if they are honoured by the organisations’ members, which is much more unlikely, gaps would exist. States such as Switzerland and Taiwan, which have substantial links with South Africa, are members of none of these groups. They need not be bound by any decision for collective action.

In the Commonwealth, Britain almost alone has held out against the application of further trade bans. Without whole-hearted British agreement, any Commonwealth ban would be no more than an irritation to a South Africa that has already developed something close to a siege economy. In the E.E.C., Britain has been joined by West Germany and Portugal in opposing trade bans, at least for the time being. Again,

without the British and the Germans, a ban would be unenforceable.

This is not to suggest that Britain and West Germany, or for that matter Switzerland and Taiwan, have any enthusiasm for South Africa’s unjust political and economic system. But countries that have important economic links with South Africa tend to be more aware than others of the realities of conditions there, and of the implications of a partial or total ban on trade. They can argue, with a good deal of justification, that sanctions would hurt those who impose them — and who actually apply them — without any clear assurance that they would have the desired effect in South Africa. Nor can there be any assurance that other less scrupulous States will not reap the benefits of evading sanctions.

The best guess, and it can be no more than that, is that South Africa could survive for years with the degree of trading bans that the rest of the world is likely to achieve. Those who would be hurt most would be the poorest, non-white South Africans. Much is being said by sections of black South African opinion in favour of sanctions. Less attention is given to the black voices raised opposing the idea of trade bans. As far as opinion can be determined, hon-white South Africans are equally divided on the issue. Many white South Africans are alarmed; many are not. Much of the South African economy is already controlled by a kind of State socialism. Its political managers would welcome the opportunity to develop further at the expense of foreign firms that might be forced to withdraw or curtail their activities. At least a quarter of white South Africans, politically of the far Right, are not impressed by foreign interventions in their affairs. They seem to be ready to accept a lower standard of living, and the need for almost total selfsufficiency, if this were to give them more prospect of running their country in their own way. That way would not be to the liking of much of the rest of the world.

There lies the final question posed by the advocates of trade bans against South Africa; a question to which they seldom provide an answer. What do they expect to happen? The Government’s ability to maintain its dominance would not be much impaired, at least in the short run. Declining black living standards might intensify hostility between rival black groups. Some of South Africa’s loudest critics outside would welcome a slow slide into black anarchy. But for those who believe widespread violence is not the path to fair economic and political change in South Africa, support for sanctions is misplaced.

The Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group made little progress in its recent attempt to stimulate peaceful change. The mission by the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, may have prospects that are little better. Both have served as delaying actions. Both give time for more thoughtful examination of the implications of sanctions. Both are also evidence of a quite amazing readiness on the part of the South African Government to permit outsiders to poke about in the country’s affairs. Such missions have been accepted, even if on the surface they may do little to bring swift changes of official hearts in Pretoria. This suggests the path of negotiation and of gradual change, developed hesitatingly by the South African Government in the last two years, has not yet been exhausted. It should be encouraged by all practicable means.