Nuclear capability ‘could not be predicted’

Press, 24 December 1985, Page 5

Nuclear capability ‘could not be predicted’

PA Wellington An External Intelligence Bureau report made just before the United States request for a port visit from the U.S.S. Buchanan shows that the Government could not have predicted with any certainty if it was carrying nuclear arms.

The report, “Factors Affecting the Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in the South Pacific,” was completed on December 24 last year. It concludes: “While it would not be possible to give an absolute assurance that a particular nuclear capable surface vessel visiting New Zealand was not nuclear armed, the considerations outlined above point to the conclusion that such vessels do not all carry their nuclear weapons at all times and in all circumstances.” The report said experiended service personnel,

considering in particular such objective factors as the class of the vessel and its probable role in operational situations, its route to and from New Zealand and the alert statiis of U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region, would be able to reach a reasoned judgment on the probability that a particular nuclear capable surface vessel or group of such vessels was, in fact, carrying nuclear weapons. The report acknowledged that while its conclusions were all based oh publicly available knowledge, the United States nuclear weapons loading.policy was' secret It assessed the chances of the South Pacific being used by either the United States or the Soviet Union to de- , ploy their; underwater strategic weapons, the ballistic missile submarines. The conclusion was that the requirement for eijher ..

super-Power to deploy ballistic missile submarines in the region was low. The submarines of the Soviet Union, the report, said, were likely to be deployed either in Soviet home waters in the North Pacific or near the United States coast. ' * United States submarines', wete more widely deployed but there was no evidence ,yet that the South Pacific , had become a “deployment zone” or was likely to become one, the report said. The lack of submarine activity in the region was -, an illustration of its relative stategic importance. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had tried to establish base facilities in the region. This assessment of' the strategic importance of the South Pacific is a key one. From it flow many, of the judgments of the rest of the ; ,report .•

, For example, during the discussion on the probable presence or absence of tactical nuclear weapons in the region the report said: “A. situation in which resort to tactical nuclear weapons was thought necessary is more likely to develop in the strategically important North Pacific than in the - South Pacific which is an area of considerably lower strategic priority.” .’/ . i The 'report did not rule out their presence. “Nevertheless, .from time to time, nuclear capable vessels do . enter the area,” it said. : . : The report picked out seven factors that would; favour the carriage of tactical nuclear warheads by nuclear capable vessels in the South Pacific. . Carrying ; such weapons, would give the vessel concerned a complete range of responses to crises. This would give United States, comgguiders a. wider range,;

of options. As the United States Navy had gone down in size and the combat fleet decreased, the pressure to carry all available options had increased. The United States Pacific Command had such a huge area to look . after that “vessels in the Pacific fleet may be expected to have on board a level of weaponry which would permit a rapid deployment- when required to areas of crisis.”; As a result, the route a ship took to and from New Zealand would be of some importance in making a judgment about whether it was carrying nuclear weapons, the report said. .:. “There would clearly be less requirement for a ship making a special visit to New Zealand from, say, Hawaii, and then returning there to carry . nuclear weapons.. In the past, however, the vessels calling at-

New Zealand have usually been proceeding to or returning from .other theatres.” .. Also, the less accessible the vessel’s normal base the more likely it would carry nuclear weapons. To. give nuclear forces a chance of . survival in case of an unexpected attack the Weapons might be stored on : board ships rather than at shore-based storage depots. ■ Improvements in Weapons control and weapons safety in - the recent past also /' might permit a gr ea ter dispersal of weapons. The last of the. seven factors favouring the carriage of nuclear weapons by United States ships visiting New Zealand was that, unlike in Europe,,-the basic American defensive response, 'was ‘ sea-based, tactical nuclear weapons on . naval vessels. - ; Finally, the report identified several factors which

might favour nuclear weapons not being deployed on ships visiting New Zealand. - . The first, mentioned earlier, was that New Zealand is part of a region that currently was a low strategic priority; v Second, while, one reason for nuclear deployment in . Europe was "the vast superiority of numbers and .• amount of equipment available to the/Warsaw: Pact compared' - with N.A.T.0., this was not the case in the South Pacific: In NAT.O.,-mdst nuclear. weapons were stored, other ‘ than those carried by Quick Reaction: Alert /forces. >. It was unlikely, the report said, that , a vessel with a Quick Reaction'role would be sent to an. area like New Zealand, distant from a pos-. sible crisis. . ; , ? Rigorous security procedures fornuclear weapons meandi that most., were

stored separately from their delivery systems. ■ “By analogy, it is not unreasonable to suppose that in times of low; tension not all nuclear-capable combatant vessels in the South Pacific could cany the - warheads for their nuclear delivery systems.” ; ; The report rioted that in , an. earlier report from thebureau, Which is part of the ; Prime Minister’s *> Depart-' meht, “we noted that ; there was a high probability : that vessels ’air? eraft-carriers and' ! mariy . submarines would routinely carry nuclear weapons.” ' There were grounds for believing that-.,! nuclear weapons were not necessar,iiy carried on all nuclearcapable surface vessels as a matter, of routine,-'particu-larly when, as in . the South Pacific, there might be little opperational justification ■for doing so. ; ...