THE PRESS MONDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1985. No retrial by jury

Press, 9 December 1985, Page 16

THE PRESS MONDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1985. No retrial by jury

Mr Bob Jones’s impromptu party for a Wellington High Court jury was doubtless an innocent occasion — one of those unexpected, eccentric, and somewhat outrageous things that Mr Jones can come up with: all very jolly, and probably an interesting end to a testing trial for everyone concerned. Serious, long service on a jury can be an exhausting business; the words of thanks at the end of it from the trial judge and the knowledge that a contribution has been made to the judicial system may not compare with some festivity arranged by a rich litigant, or some successful and pleased defendant. Provided that juries do an honest, unbiased job in trials, what on earth is wrong with getting together afterwards and chewing the fat with the successful party? Or commiserating with the accused who is about to be sentenced? Just about everthing is wrong. No-one need suggest that Mr Jones interfered with the trial or had any thought of influencing any other court action. Yet if Mr Jones, or another potentially good host, is in court again, enthusiasm to serve on the jury may be greatly heightened; but not for a good or judicially sound reason. The error in the post-trial party is more obvious if it is imagined that, after a judge-alone trial, one of the parties would entertain the judge and discuss the manner in which the verdict had been reached. Apart from considerations of an appeal against the trial verdict or sentence, the principle that a judge shall not discuss proceedings outside the court is so well established and so well understood that it is never questioned. A breach of this principle would raise instant objections and public distrust.

Neither judges nor juries must be exposed to pressure before, during, or after a trial,

either by way of threat or the prospect of reward. Reward need not be material reward; it may .be no more than personal approval, just as pressure may be abuse or the threat of personal abuse. If a successful litigant is seen to consort with a jury, an unsuccessful litigant may feel just as entitled to have access to members of the jury after a trial. Clearly, no prudent person on a jury will want to feel that, after a trial, the proceedings still have to be debated, or even discussed. When the jury is discharged, their job is done. Further, no jury is authorised, under the rules of the court, to disclose discussion in the jury room. There is no reason to assume that the Wellington jurors broke this rule. The trouble is that the distinction between this and discussion about the proceedings in the court is very slight. If members of a jury believe that what they have said will be disclosed by others, the chances of free and open deliberation in the jury room will be diminished. This is the greatest danger of all in the post-trial party. If members of a jury expect that even one of their number will yield to an approach from a party to the case — litigant, defendant, prosecutor, court officials, the news media, the friends of the prisoner, or any pressure group — the work of juries will be compromised. The mistake in Wellington was initiated by Mr Jones. The greater error was that of the members of the jury who accepted his invitation. This mistake must not be allowed to be the forerunner of similar mistakes that imperil the jury system and may expose individual jurors to public or private pressures. The privacy and independence of juries must be preserved and jurors themselves must support the principle by observing the rules.