Spain deploys into N.A.T.O.

Press, 3 December 1985, Page 20

Spain deploys into N.A.T.O.

From “The Economist,” London

While the Spanish Prime Minister, Mr Felipe Gonzalez, tries to persuade his countrymen that they should stay in the North Altantic Treaty Organisation his Defence Minister, Mr Narcis Serra, is busy reshaping Spain’s armed forces in a way which suggests that the country will remain in the alliance.

the old music-hall image of the Spanish army - an untidy mass of reluctant conscripts, led by couphappy officers, keener on policing their fellow-Spaniards than on defencing them against thejr foes - is a thing of the past. After two years of firm prodding from the civilian Mr Serra, the army is looking trimmer, more professional and better organised and equipped to do its N.A.T.O. job of helping to defend Europe’s southern flank from the Canaries

to Turkey. Although the alliance is not mentioned publicly in Mr Serra’s schemes, it has helped to shape the recently approved plan which sets out Spain’s defence priorities for the next eight years. By shortening the length of military service, Mr Serra will by next year have slimmed down the armed services to 237,000 men, a reduction of 6 per cent. The army takes the biggest cut as Spain puts more of its defence energies into its navy and air force. By 1990 the number of officers and N.C.O.S will be cut from 66,500 to 58,200, with the highest casualty rate among generals and colonels (prime coupmakers in the past). Next year’s defence budget is expected to expand by a real 1.9 per cent over this year’s, to 630 billion pesetas ($3.9 billion). Even so, there is going to be a lot of new money (at least 2300 billion pesetas for 1982-

90) for weapons and other equipment. The chiefs of staff have been reorganised and brought under the Government’s direct control. Promotion in future is to be on merit, not simply by length of service. Officers are to be better educated, to bring them up to the standard of most of their European col-

leagues. A reform of the military code means stiffer sentences for rebellion and allows soldiers to be tried in civilian courts. Their reforms are not attributed to the needs of N.A.T.O. lest conservative-minded Spaniards be stung into voting against membership of a referendum. Luckily, the changes dovetail neatly with Mr Serra’s second aim. The reshaping of the army is also designed to bring it under tighter political control.

Although it is well on the way to breaking the power of the generals, the Government continues to handle the armed services with care. Mr Serra wants to break down the territorial structure that in the past enabled Spain’s regional commanders to strut about their patches as virtual warlords. The special units stationed in or near Spain’s most important cities, and trained to fight “insurgents,” have been dismantled. The number of military regions is being reduced from nine to six (see map), and the army’s command structure, which used to be based on geographical region, is now to be organised by divisions (although old habits die hard: each region has been allowed to keep one brigade). As a result of this reorganisation, which will make the structure of Spain’s army more like that of its N.A.T.O. partners, half of the Ist Armoured Division - which

Franco stationed just outside Madrid, ready to crush any insurrection - has been moved to Badajoz on the Portuguese frontier.

Two mountain divisions guard the Pyrenees and an air-transport-able brigade is stationed at La Coruna, on the Atlantic. In the south, a mechanised division is responsible for the area between Seville and Almeria, and another for the Mediterranean coast north of Valencia.

Another 19,000 men, including three foreign legion regiments, are stationed in the two enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, on the coast of Morocco, and another 16,000 in the The spread of troops along the Mediterranean coast, and in Ceuta

and Melilla, is a sign that the Socialist Government, like the oldstyle army commanders, considers North Africa the likeliest source of a military threat to Spain. Last yearns curious treaty between Libya and Morocco made the Defence Ministry think hard about its new plan, and delayed its completion. Mr Serra’s plan assumes that, in the event of a clash with a North African state, Spanish forces should not expect help from their N.A.T.O. allies.

By way of self-help, the Government approved the purchase of the Aspide anti-aircraft missile, which is intended to reinforce the de-, fence of Ceuta and Melilla. This follows the purchase of 500 Roland anti-aircraft missiles in April.

The Defence Ministry is also said to be planning a rapid deployment force, to consist of the airtransportable brigade, a parachute brigade and a tough-sounding corps consisting of 12,500 marines and members of the foreign legion. Yet there are still doubts in both political and military circles as to Spain’s ability to defend itself against a Moroccan assault or an attack by the Libyan air force. Spain’s preoccupation with the threat from the south suits N.A.T.O. The alliance is interested in Spain’s new rapid deployment force. It is also cocking an attentive eye at the Spaniash air force, which is to get 72 American F-18A aircraft, and at a future naval task force which will include a 14,500 ton American-designed aircraft carrier, the Principe de Asturias. This is being built under licence with the help of a SISOM loan and is due to be launched in two years time. The carrier will be equipped with AV 8b jump-jets and antisubmarine helicopters, and escorted by four new frigates. The Spanish high command is

divided on the question of whether this new task force should concentrate on the Mediterranean or .on defending the sea lanes from (he Canaries to the Strait of Gibraltar. N.A.T.O. would like Spain to f do both, and has suggested that its navy could acquire a second aircraft carrier cheaply by converting a merchant ship to take jun’ipjets. 1 Although N.A.T.O. is happy that Spain’s reorganisation is shifting its centre of military gravity to the south, and that the Government is spending more money tin its navy and air force, a problem has arisen over who is to control the sea lanes through the Strait of Gibraltar.

The British believe they should \ continue to do it: their foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, is \ expected to say so when he visits, Madrid in December. The Por-k tuguese, who have been members 1 of the alliance since its foundation, I are anxious to retain the Iberlant command, which watches over the Atlantic sea lanes off south-west Europe. Now Spain is earning the v right to assert its interest. Mr Serra is going ahead with plans to expand the joint SpanishAmerican naval base at Rota, in the bay of Cadiz. This will eventually replace El Ferrol, on the north-west coast of Galicia, as the navy’s main base. Spain has made it clear that it sees the expansion of Rota as a step towards giving the base a N.A.T.O. command-and-control task iitthe seas around the Strait of Gibraltar.

Over the year?, the alliance has acquired much ’skill in designing its command structure to suit political lf Spain stays in the alliance, finding elegant names for things for Spanish admirals and generals to do should present no difficulty. \

Copyright, “The Economist.”