THE PRESS MONDAY, AUGUST 5, 1985. To print or not to print

Press, 5 August 1985, Page 12

THE PRESS MONDAY, AUGUST 5, 1985. To print or not to print

The police on one side and newspapers, radio and television on the other, exist to promote the well-being of the community. That is the justification for the considerable power or influence that each enjoys in its special field. Amid the excitement of dramatic events, however, the police and the media do not always agree about one another’s behaviour. In the very last resort, the final authority must rest with the police as the representatives of the Crown and the State; but any police power to interfere with the media needs to be carefully circumscribed and almost never invoked. Anything else would smack of censorship, and would be unacceptable in a free society. Day-to-day, differences between the police and the media are generally resolved on an informal basis as they arise. How they are resolved often depends as much on the personalities involved as it does on the dispute. As communities grow, and as media outlets multiply, the old, informal, and generally friendly relations between police and journalists have become less easy to sustain. Informal agreements can still work. The media were silent, by request, during the critical period of investigation into a kidnapping in Oamaru two years ago. A similar silence was not achieved, however, on what may turn out to be vital pieces of information in the search for those who planted bombs on the ship Rainbow Warrior in Auckland. The police say harm may have been done to their inquiries. The Acting Prime Minister, Mr Palmer, says a report is being prepared for the Cabinet as part of a wider inquiry into the Government’s powers to deal with acts of terrorism.

To have expected voluntary silence about the Rainbow Warrior bombing would have been impossible. In simpler times, however, the police might well have persuaded the media to silence about details where secrecy seemed essential to the investigations that followed. To claim that the public interest is being served by publication or broadcast of as many details as possible in an inquiry, as soon as they are uncovered by journalists, may be difficult to sustain if police activity is hampered as a result. But to invoke a form of censorship — something not normally possible at present — may be even more damaging. British experience may be useful when the Cabinet comes to consider the matter, and if Parliament eventually seeks to legislate on control of the media after such events as a terrorist bombing. The British system of D

notices (the D standing for Defence) has operated for many years with a degree of success. Where vital security interests are concerned, editors may be issued with a D notice asking them to refrain from publication. Notices are prepared by a committee on which newspapers and broadcasters are represented. Like the Press Council, the committee therefore enjoys a degree of co-operation from the media. Journalists become their own censors and regulators, which helps to achieve compliance without a formal threat of penalties.

A British D notice is not binding, and may be ignored, as it has been on occasions by some sections of the British press. What Mr Palmer appears to have in mind is some more formal machinery that might be invoked in extreme situations. The last time such machinery was used in New Zealand was during the waterfront strike of 1951. Regulations prepared under the authority of the Public Safety Conservation Act of 1932 were used to impose a degree of censorship, after a State of Emergency had been declared. The Labour Government is committed to repealing that act, and with it the possibility of such regulation of the media. The Auckland bombing has brought reconsideration, at least on the point of responses to terrorist actions.

No fair and obvious resolution presents itself when the interests of police and media — both acting for the community — conflict. Any system of voluntary restraint will be only as strong as its weakest link. Once any section of the media breaches an informal agreement, or seems likely to do so, others will hurry to follow. Some situations may be so clear-cut that universal, informal agreement is easy, most, like the detail of the Rainbow Warrior inquiry, will be open to disagreement about the need for secrecy.

Any formal machinery to restrain the media would need to be swift in its operation, or it would be ineffective when it was needed most. Much more important, it would need to be invoked only in those cases where there was almost universal agreement about its justification. Otherwise, the possibility of misuse would remain strong — whether to hide police ineptitude, to silence critics of the Government of the day, or whatever. Mr Palmer’s • concern is reasonable enough; on balance, however, he and his colleagues may decide that the widest public interest is best served by leaving relations between police and journalists as they are.