SALT talks: have the Russians been cheating over nuclear weapons?

Press, 12 July 1985, Page 11

SALT talks: have the Russians been cheating over nuclear weapons?

Can the Russians be trusted? It is an article of faith among American (and other) Right-wingers that the Russians lie and cheat on arms control agreements.

President Reagan gave it as a reason why he had considered formally breaching SALT 11, the agreement limiting strategic nuclear weapons signed in 1979. In the end, after a lot of pressure from Europe, Reagan did the right thing. He announced that the United States would dismantle one older submarine as a new Trident submarine came into service and so would remain within the SALT numbers limit on this type of nuclear warhead. But he did so grudgingly, arguing that he reserved the right to “augment the United States strategic modernisation programme” because, as he put it, “they (the Russians) have failed to comply with several provisions of SALT 11, and we have serious concerns regarding their compliance with the provisions of other accords.” The evidence for the so-called Soviet violations over 25 years is contained in a report by the General Advisory Committee, a subcommittee of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In Moscow, the Committee’s 300-page catalogue of arms control “crimes” was dismissed as “inventions.” Detailed examination of the accusations suggests that Soviet perfidy is far from proven. In some instances the American committee seems to have gone to great lengths to find dirt to sling at the Russians.

It alleges that they violated the SALT I protocol by deploying more than 740 submariht-launched ballistic missile launchers without dis-

By

IAN MATHER,

mantling some others in compensation.

The protocol required the Russians to dismantle 51 launchers by early 1976. Realising that the dismantling would not occur in time, the Russians reported that their dismantling programme was behind schedule. The Americans agreed to allow them until June 1, a deadline which the Russians honoured. Yet this does not prevent the Reagan Administration from listing this as a Soviet violation. The Russians are also accused of sending aircraft carriers through the Turkish Straits in violation of the 1936 Montreux Convention. This relates to the movements of the Soviet warship Kiev, which carries 20 to 30 helicopters and some vertical take-off aircraft. Article II of the convention authorised the passage of “capital ships” of Black Sea powers and defined these ships as “battleships and cruisers.” There was no mention of aircraft carriers. The Americans say the Kiev is an aircraft carrier and so is not allowed out of the Black Sea. The Russians classify it as an “antisubmarine cruiser.”

The Kiev has been passing backwards and forwards through the Straits for eight years without any question being raised by Turkey, which has to give permission, or by any of the other signatories to the Montreux Convention, Australia, France, Britain, and other Western countries. The United States is not a signatory. The Russians are also accused of stationing “offensive” weapons in

defence correspondent

London “Observer”

Cuba, particularly nuclear submarines, in defiance of agreements between the United States and Soviet Union in 1962 and 1970. This allegation refers to port calls by Russian submarines. All previous United States administrations accepted explicitly that port calls, as opposed to servicing of submarines, were permitted by the agreements. The Reagan Administration has unilaterally reinterpreted the agreements. Charges such as these poison the atmosphere for arms control and detract from genuine concerns about Soviet compliance.

One of these relates to the testing of new intercontinental ballistic missiles. SALT II says that neither superpower is allowed to test more than one new type of lightweight ICBM. In October, 1982, the Russians tested a new ICBM and told the Americans that this was to be their permitted new missile.

In February, 1983, the Russians tested another ICBM which they said was an existing type, an SS-13, slightly modified. The Americans say it is too heavy to be an SS-13 and is a new missile. This second missile, known as Plesetsk 5, after the location of the Soviet missile launch site, was tested four times in 1983. A spy ship called Observation Island is the Americans’ platform for observing Soviet ballistic missile test flights, out of the Pacific. This ship was not on station for either of the first two tests. It ; momitored the third, and the evi- x dence suggested that the throw

weight of the missile was 200 per cent greater than that of of an SS--13. The permitted variation to an existing missile under SALT II is up to 5 per cent. So this could be a clear breach of SALT 11, but the United States does not have unambiguous evidence. The C.I.A. was not impressed and asked for a re-evalua-tion of the data. Moreover, United States officials say that it normally takes the monitoring of 10 to 12 tests to get a confident estimate of a missile’s throw weight. The Reagan Administration also asserts that a Soviet radar system, being constructed at Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia, is a breach of the treaty which limits anti-ballis-tic missiles. The Russians say the Krasnoyarsk radar is for space-tracking. Finally, there is a clear Soviet violation involved in their encrypting or encoding the information sent back by their missiles while undergoing tests. This is prohibited by SALT 11, and the Americans say it prevents them verifying that agreement. One reason, though not an excuse, is obsessive Soviet secrecy. Another reason is the atmosphere of profound mutual mistrust that now exists.

The United States itself is much to blame. Where previous administrations sought to enhance the SALT process, leading figures in the present Administration have sought to vilify it and have made no secret of their desire to break out of it. The Russians are liars and cheats in their book. Therefore the worst interpretation must always be placed on ambiguous evidence. Copyright — London Observer Service.

Moves to create a national park in the Punakaiki-Paparoa region of the West Coast are in recognition of its variety of landforms, forests, and birdlife that differ from any other national park in New Zealand.

The Minister of Lands, Mr Wetere, has to keep this in mind as he weighs up all the interests by different groups in the proposed park. He has been presented with a recommendation by the National Parks and Reserves Authority to create a 30,000 ha park for which he may seek Cabinet approval. It would be the South Island’s first park in 21 years covering existing reserves, Crown land, and State forests.

Punakaiki National Park would contain landforms largely coastal and lowland in character. According to a Lands and Survey report, the landscape is in five major forms. On the coast, high vertical headlands alternate with steeply graded beaches in contrast with the enclosed river gorges. These are confined by forest-crowned limestone cliffs and interspersed with river-valley flats. To the west, a limestone plateau includes a range of caves, sinkholes, waterfalls, and mesas. A limestone syncline is topped inparts by an eroded mudstone and siltstone, distinguishing it from the more rugged western limestone edge.

Coastal forests in the area include groves of nikau palms, tree ferns, and a tangle of kielde, supplejack, and other broadleaf species, producing a subtropical appearance. Unmodified lowland forest grows on the syncline area, and east of this syncline the montane forests are predominantly of silver beech.

In the higher altitudes, the silver beech merges into mountain beech and pink pine with leatherwood as the predominant plant of the subalpine zone. On the alpine tops, alpine meadows and herbfields make up the vegetation including mountain daisies, foxgloves, and gentians.

The mosaic of forest types in the syncline area contain the highest number and densities of forest birds so far recorded in the South Island, according to the report. Common bird species abound and species restricted to limited areas such as the kaka, robin, and parakeet can also be viewed. At least one species of kiwi inhabits the proposed park, along with the only known breeding colony of the Westland black petrel.

The blue shag is another marine species nesting in the area, while the pakihi and small ponds harbour several wetland and scrubland species, the most notable being the fernbird.

An increase in visitors to the proposed park could generate 19 new permanent jobs and 29 parttime jobs, according to the Stephens and Wells socio-economic report on the proposal. These people would be employed in the accommodation, garage, and store, services.

The report also predicts the employment of four more rangers to manage the park with the help of about another five assistants.

Jobs at the Tauranga Bay Sawmill were likely to be cut back with the introduction of a park if the native timber in the Fox Basin was withdrawn from milling, the Lands and Survey report concludes.