Waiting for a Salt-3 agreement

Press, 2 July 1985, Page 20

Waiting for a Salt-3 agreement

From “The Economist,” London

President Reagan has pleased the arms controllers, at the cost of putting off an answer to the biggest problem facing those who believe in the arms-control idea. Mr Reagan’s European allies, and his own State Department, welcome the decision he announced on June 10: for the time being, the United States will go on respecting the six-year-old but never-ratified Salt-2 treaty. When the new American missile submarine, Alaska, starts its sea trials in the northern autumn, its 24 missile tubes would, under Salt rules, give the Americans 14 more launchers than the permitted total of 1200 for missiles with independently targetable warheads. To avoid that, Mr Reagan has ordered the dismantling of an old 16missile submarine.

Honour, and Salt, preserved; and the day of reckoning merely put off.

It is clear enough why any other decision would have been unpopular. Most people would be shocked to see America breaking a treaty it has signed with Russia, even an unratified one. The West European Governments do not want another cause for anti-American indignation when the star-wars issue is still bubbling away. The problem, nevertheless, remains. The Russians, though few people have brought themselves to look at the facts, have already bent the Salt-2 rules in rather a grand way. No organisation exists to enforce the rules.

There is no court of appeal to which complaints can be taken. So what do the Americans do? The Russians have failed to cut their missile-and-bomber total to 2250, as Salt-2 requires; they still have about 2500, compared with the Americans’ 1850. The Russians have tested two new long-range

land-based missiles, the SSX-24 and the SSX-25, whereas the treaty allows only one; and they have repeatedly “encrypted” so much of the information transmitted by their test missiles that they have prevented the Americans from knowing what the tests have achieved, which is forbidden. None of these complaints against Russia is seriously doubted by impartial observers; but nothing has been done about them.

Mr Reagan’s reply is to say that, if Russia goes on bending Salt-2, America will too; but not yet. He has asked his Defence Secretary, Mr Caspar Weinberger, to tell him by mid-November what the United States can do by way of restoring the balance.

In the short run, the answer is “not much.” The Americans can speed up development of the new single-warhead Midgetman missile, a highly accurate weapon which can be deployed on mobile

launchers. Like the Russians’ SSX-25, this would break the treaty, because America too is allowed only one new land-based missile, and is already making the MX. But Midgetman cannot be tested before mid-1986 at the earliest.

, Before that, another new missile submarine will be ready for its sea trials. If it goes to sea without a compensatory withdrawal of some older missiles, the Americans will have stepped outside the Salt numbers. Another possibility is to give up the idea of dismantling the submarine that will be taken out of commission this year by way of compensation for the Alaska, and convert it to carry cruise missiles. This would put a bit of pressure on the Russians, and would not contravene Salt.

There are two problems with this tit-for-tat retaliation. The first is that it is important no to create the impression that the Americans want to preserve Salt-2, give or take a puncture or two, as the

basis of their nuclear relationship with Russia. The United States has proposed a radically new agreement — Start-1, or Salt-3, or whatever you like to all it — which will cut warhead numbers far below the Salt-2 level. That is a much better idea. Salt-2, which was never a very good treaty, runs out at the end of this year anyway. It should not be given an air of permanence it does not deserve. The second problem is that, for the next few years at any rate, the Russians are in a position to deploy a lot more new missiles, with a lot more warheads, than the Americans can. How is this possible, after four years of Reagan rearmament? For three reasons: the Russians seem to have put even more money into missiles than America has; they do not have parliamentary problems; and their missiles are bigger.

The Soviet Union’s missile factories are tooled up to produce the new SSX-24 and SSX-25 land-based missiles, plus a new submarine one (and another group of even newer missiles is well along in development). The Americans have only MX and Trident-2 anywhere close. The Supreme Soviet is not going to cut back Mr Gorbechev’ss missile plans, as Congress' has cut back Mr Reagan’s requests for the MX. Most Russian missiles are big enough to carry many more warheads than they are now fitted with. The SS-18 is limited by Salt-2 to 10 warheads, but it could take 20/30.

In the face of such problems, can Mr Reagan persuade the Russians to comply with existing agreements and negotiate seriously about new ones? Well, possibly. To judge by the concern Mr Gorbachev expressed this week about the Soviet economy, he does not need the expense of another nuclear arms race. He can buy his country’s nuclear security more cheaply by negotiating a Salt-3 agreement, and an amended A.B.M. treaty to regulate antimissile deployment, than by tearing up Salt-2.

Do not count too much on Russia’s rational pursuit of economic self-interest, however. Mr Reagan has just been made to extend his compliance with a Salt--2 treaty which he never liked, which his country never ratified, and which the Russians have in some important ways failed to respect. This has been done with no great effort on Russia’s part. The Russians may now decide to see what else they can get by such easy methods. They may have to be convinced that Mr Reagan can make good his threat to deploy new weapons before they will negotiate any of their own away; and the only way of convincing them may be to deploy some.

Copyright, “The Economist.”