Soviet technology: can Politburo match Stalin?

Press, 31 May 1985, Page 18

Soviet technology: can Politburo match Stalin?

From

MARK FRANKLAND,

in Moscow

It’s probable that not many Soviet citizens recognised the name of Alexander Mikulin when his death was announced in Moscow this month. Abroad, the recognition must have been even slighter.

But Alexander Mikulin, member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and designer of engines for tanks, airplanes and, towards the end of his life, cars, was a great figure in Soviet science. Not many men can have made a greater single contribution to the Soviet victory over Hitler’s invading armies. His career has particular interest at a moment when Soviet scientific and economic resources may be stretched more fully than ever before by’ America’s temptation to seek security in space weapons. Mikulin put the engines into some of the best-known Soviet airplanes. His engine-powered Tupolev ANT-25 in 1936 made the world record-breaking flight from Russia to America across the North Pole. He made engines for a series of successful wartime planes, above all the effective ground attack Ilyushin-2, which Germans called the “Black Death.” After the war. Mikulin engines went into the MiG-19 and 21 fighters and the TU-104, the first Soviet civil jet airliner. Shortly before his death Mikulin

told the story of how he made the engine for the IL-2. It evokes themes that are relevant for today: the ingenuity of Soviet scientists and the inspiration they draw from a tradition going back far beyond the Russian revolution and the sometimes strange conditions under which they work. Mikulin was born 90 years ago into the Russian scientific intelligentsia. His uncle was Nikolai Zhukovsky, the prophet of Russian aviation, just as his contemporary. Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, was of Russia's adventure into space. One wonders whether the IL-2 would ever have been built without this inborn talent and tradition, and the self-confidence they engendered. Mikulin made the engine for Ilyushin's first attempt at a ground attack plane in 1939. The soldiers rejected it. The performance did not satisfy them. Mikulin believed he could' give the engine more thrust, from 1350 to 1600 horsepower. He was told that the plan had no room for the project. With some colleagues, Mikulin set about making the engine secretly. They?;, did not tell their

factory's director. They used what materials they could find. Mikulin had just had his apartment redecorated and the backing of leftover pieces of wallpaper served for the rough draughtsman’s drawings. Two motors were assembled in complete secrecy, tested, and in early 1940 (not a moment too soon) given to Ilyushin. Everything worked. The IL-2 was 50 miles an hour faster than the military’s specifications. Delighted, Ilyushin reported the success to Stalin. At two o'clock one morning — Stalin's working day began in the evening — Mikulin was summoned to the Kremlin. He found Stalin surrounded by the leading lights of the aviation industry. It was an uncomfortable situation, to put it mildly. Mikulin was about to be congratulated on an engine he was never meant to have built, that none of his seniors knew about, and for which — as Stalin soon discovered — he did not even have proper production drawings. Stalin cut off Mikulin’s explanations: "It's all clear. I give you three months to put the engine into production.' v,-

A senior official protested that it needed a year and a half to get a new engine on to the assembly line. Stalin yielded . . . they had four months. And that was that.

Much has changed since Stalin but the Soviet system remains highly centralised. How many scientists today could get round an obstructive plan in the way Mikulin did? And though the Politburo, like Stalin, has the power to break through the bureaucracy with quick decisions, they are dealing with far more complex matters. Stalin knew, without Mikulin prompting him. that the new engine had an additional 250 horsepower. One doubts whether the Politburo of 1985 is as familiar with the specifications of new laser and computer control systems. On the other hand, the Mikulin story draw’s attention to the richness of Russian scientific traditions (the Academy of Sciences was. after all. founded over 250 years ago) and the results that can be achieved once resources are directed towards an end. The speed with which the Soviet Union matched the American atom and hydrogen bombs was just the first of post-war examples.

Copyright - London Observer Service.