THE PRESS THURSDAY, MAY 9, 1985. Defence policy fumblings

Press, 9 May 1985, Page 12

THE PRESS THURSDAY, MAY 9, 1985. Defence policy fumblings

The Minister of Defence, Mr O’Flynn, said a number of things on Tuesday that he ought not to have said. This should not obscure the point that he also attempted to make a major statement on defence policy. Mr O’Flynn ought not to have speculated about transferring the New Zealand troops in Singapore to Australia. Even if the proposal makes sense — and in the long term it might not be dismissed entirely — it would have been sound to have discussed the proposal with the Singapore and other SouthEast Asian Governments, and with the Australian Government before advancing it. The Prime Minister, Mr Lange, was right to squash the idea for the immediate future. Mr O’Flynn’s comments were off the cuff. In his speech he had said: “New Zealand will also continue to play its part in the Five-Power Defence Arrangements that assist the defence of Malaysia and Singapore, and the maintenance of regional security in South-East Asia. The New Zealand force in Singapore has been a substantial contribution to this endeavour for many years. Though it cannot stay indefinitely, the Prime Minister has made it clear that we have no immediate plans to withdraw it.” Because of Mr O’Flynn’s later remarks the Prime Minister had to make it clear again. Mr O’Flynn’s speech is still the most considered statement on defence policy to come out of the Government so far. Clearly Mr O’Flynn regarded it as important, though because there had been some confusion about what the speech would contain — it was thought likely to give details of increased defence spending — the comments may have appeared to be more general than was expected. Nevertheless, it represented one of the first attempts by the Government to put its own stamp on defence policy. Like the speech made by the Australian Minister of Defence, Mr Kim Beazley, to the New Zealand Institute of Internationa! Affairs in Wellington in April, which grappled with some of the assumptions made about defence in Australia, Mr O’Flynn began to review some of the underlying assumptions of traditional New Zealand defence thinking.

He tackled, for instance, one implication of New Zealand’s commitment to collective defence. “To a large degree,” he said, “our commitment to the collective approach to security inhibited us from thinking for ourselves about our own defence and our strategic situation and its needs.” He exonerated the United States and Australia for any blame over this, arguing that as long ago as 1969 Mr Richard Nixon, then the American President, had enunciated the Guam Doctrine that sought more self-reliance from America’s allies. He said that the point had been taken in Australia.

Mr O’Flynn said that the regional interests of the South Pacific were more clearly defined in the 1978 and 1983 Defence Reviews in New Zealand, but that “the Government of the day simply failed to provide the resources needed to secure these interests, or at any rate to secure them with any real show of independence." To

some extent the attitude of greater independence espoused by Mr O’Flynn has been forced on the Government because the United States refuses to take part in defence exercises with New Zealand since American warships were denied access to New Zealand ports. But defence thinking had already been turning in that direction. The dispute with the United States, foolish as it may be, has served as a catalyst. To prove its seriousness, the Government will eventually have to find more money for the armed forces, perhaps a great deal more. Mr O’Flynn asserted that New Zealand did not intend to “militarise” the South Pacific. He said that the object would be to have flexible, highly trained, professional Armed Forces capable of operating in New Zealand’s own region. He listed some of the equipment that would be required by such a force.

The force itself is, in concept, the same as the 1983 Defence Review’s Ready Reaction Force, though Mr O’Flynn has taken a dislike to that name. It would be nonsense to regard such a force as a threat to anyone in the region. The 1983 Defence Review defined one defence aim as: “to deter any low-scale threat by demonstrating a self-reliant ability to detect the approach of danger and to hit any hostile force before it arrives.”

Mr O’Flynn’s speech will not be the Government’s last word on defence matters. However, he has expressed a number of important ideas, most of them far from original. These include the view that any threat to New Zealand is likely to come from somewhere north of Australia. This led him to the conclusion that New Zealand must be prepared to play a part in defending the mainland of Australia.

Mr O’Flynn’s speech provides material for a debate about New Zealand’s defence, and its military requirements, that both political parties may welcome. The Minister has done little, however, to reassure those, including senior officers in the services, who are uneasy about his grasp of an important portfolio. Discussion of defence issues is all very well; the pressing need is for action. The world has become a lonely and less friendly place for New Zealand in the last year. Without the close, traditional relationship with the United States, New Zealand faces a very large increase in defence spending if the country is to restore any credible capability. At the same time, by leaving the United States less sure that it has reliable allies in the South Pacific, the New Zealand Government has opened the way to increasing rivalry between major naval powers in waters that were once largely the preserve of New Zealanders. This is exactly the opposite outcome to that sought by Mr Lange, Mr O’Flynn, and their colleagues. Nothing in Mr O’Flynn’s remarks this week, or in Mr Lange’s correction of those remarks, suggests that the Government has managed to evolve a sensible or credible alternative to New Zealand’s traditional policy of whole-hearted support for the A.N.Z.U.S. alliance.