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Kampuchea-in-exile carries on

Until now there have been two territories calling themselves Kampuchea. There has been the Kampuchea controlled by Vietnam, and a Government recognised only by Russia and its friends. And there has been a mini-Kampuchea, consisting of a string of camps near the Thai border, whose Government is recognised in the West and has a seat in the United Nations.

As recently as February 9, the President of this Kampuchea, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, was in one of his camps, Phum Thmey, throwing a champagne party for four new ambassadors accredited to his Government, from Senegal, North Korea, Bangladesh and Mauritania.

Phum Thmey and its champagne are now in Vietnamese hands, as are almost all the camps along the 600-kilometre border. After three months of often ferocious fighting the Vietnamese can now say that there is no Government but theirs on Kampuchean soil. Have the Vietnamese then at last won the war in Kampuchea, which they invaded more than six years ago? Certainly not, according to the coalition over which Prince Sihanouk presides. Most of the 30,000 guerrillas that ran the border camps are thought to have got away into Thailand determined to continue harassing the Vietnamese. They are already claiming attacks on two Kampuchean towns, Battambang and Siem Reap. But they cannot disguise the set-back they have received by the loss of

what they regarded as permanent bases in Kampuchea. The mountain stronghold of Phnom Malai, for example, held by the Khmers Rouges, one of the elements of the Sihanouk coalition, was believed by its inhabitants to be impregnable. It fell on February 15 after a few days’ fighting. The Vietnamese, who some said had gone soft, are now again acknowledged to be superb soldiers. Not only has the fighting ability of the resistance been wanting, but many guerrillas now feel they are exiles. They talk of working in small groups behind Vietnamese lines, but probably only the Khmers Rouges would be ready to take on such an operation, in which they are already experienced. The other large group in the coalition, the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front, run by Mr Son Sann, a former prime minister of Kampuchea, is less mobile. Its bases, among them the long-established Amphil, which were lost in January, were run as little towns, where many guerrillas were raising families. The third group in the coalition, Prince Sihanouk’s own men, is small, and has taken little part in the fighting, although Prince Sihanouk himself has been vocal with speeches and interviews. On February 16 he appealed to China to help by invading Vietnam, as it had done briefly in early 1979. China moved some troops towards the Vietnamese border, but did little more, even though Prince Sihanouk as good as accused it of

ratting on a promise to help, made when he was in Peking in October. The retreat has also posed a problem for Thailand and its fellow members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). It will now be more difficult for them to justify support for a “free” Kampuchea which holds no territory. Thailand’s relationship with Vietnam has also become more tricky. Until now it was able to claim that attacks on the Vietnamese and on troops of the Phnom Penh Government were coming from within Kampuchea, and were beyond the Thais’ control. If the guerrillas now operate from within Thailand itself — and they will have to unless they can win back some of their lost territory — that argument will be unavailable. It is likely that Vietnam will refuse to allow back into Kampuchea the 240,000 civilians who fled into Thailand from the fighting, adding to Thailand’s already considerable refugee problem.

Vietnam to this extent has gained an advantage which amounts to more than just a few scraps of land. It needed a success. Diplomatically, not much had been going for it. At the United Nations general assembly last year the support for the Sihanouk resistance seemed to be intact, and, if anything, growing. Vietnam also looked nervously at moves by its protector Russia and its enemy China to patch up their longrunning quarrel. One of Vietnam’s nightmares is that the two communist overlords might agree to

tell Vietnam to call it a day in Kampuchea and withdraw to its own border. The Vietnamese have indicated that they would consider a withdrawal only if Kampuchea were left in friendly hands. They invaded the country to get rid of Pol Pot’s murderous Khmer Rouge Government, and are unlikely to sit down at a conference table with ASEAN countries or anybody else until the west refuses to have any dealings with Pol Pot and his men. The Vietnamese may now be hoping that the Thais at any rate

may be ready to meet this condition, supported perhaps by Prince Sihanouk, some of whose close relatives were murdered by the Khmer Rouge Government. The resistance will presumably try to persuade the Thais that they will return to Kampuchea in force when the Vietnam operation is suspended at the end of the dryseason. The Thais will need a lot of convincing. The story of the “two Kampucheas” looks increasingly like fiction. — Copyright, Economist.”

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19850312.2.102

Bibliographic details

Press, 12 March 1985, Page 18

Word Count
861

Kampuchea-in-exile carries on Press, 12 March 1985, Page 18

Kampuchea-in-exile carries on Press, 12 March 1985, Page 18

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