A case for staying in A.N.Z.U.S.

Press, 7 February 1985, Page 20

A case for staying in A.N.Z.U.S.

By

Stuart McMillan

The traditional grounds for support of the A.N.Z.U.S. Treaty are that it provides New Zealand with a powerful ally on which New Zealand can call if the country is under a military threat. This traditional view accepts that the obligation of the treaty parties to act if the treaty is invoked is not binding, but points out that defence treaties rarely are binding and that, all in all, A.N.Z.U.S. may be considered a sound security treaty. The preservation of A.N.Z.U.S. appears to be justifiable on grounds other than those usually cited. There are foreign policy reasons and domestic political reasons for keeping New Zealand as a member of the treaty.

New Zealand’s soundest defence policy is the doctrine of strategic denial, which New Zealand has pursued throughout the South Pacific. Under this doctrine, efforts are made to co-operate with countries of the South Pacific in development and technical matters; the level of military activity is kept very low; and the conflicts of the Great Powers are excluded as far as possible. The development aid and technical co-operation help the stability of the Pacific. They also assist in fostering a sense of community in the Pacific. The low level of military activity, brought about by attempts to resolve matters before they come to armed conflict, pre-

vents military rivalry and the interference of outside Powers in arming rival factions.

The attempted exclusion of the conflicts of the Great Powers has generally meant that, in most of the islands of the South Pacific, there is little rivalry between China and the Soviet Union, or between the United States and the Soviet Union.

On the whole, the policy has worked very well. The countries of the South Pacific generally reached independence without the conflicts that marked the emergence of independence in, say, parts of Africa. The island of Espiritu Santo, in Vanuatu, sought to secede from Vanuatu and a rebellion was quashed, partly by troops from Papua New Guinea, but this was over quickly. New Caledonia may be the only country in the South Pacific in which violence will play a significant part in internal politics.

The doctrine of strategic denial has meant efforts have been made at various times to keep the Soviet Union out of the area. A Soviet offer to Tonga caused alarm in the mid-1970s and there was considerable consultation to prevent a Soviet presence in Tonga. The Soviet Union has not established diplomatic missions in any of the smaller island countries. China has, but its interest was more in countering Taiwan’s interest than to pursue Great Power considerations. As a method of keeping the Pacific peaceful the policy seems

to have worked rather well. New Zealand and Australia have not needed to convince the island countries, which are well disposed to the West in any case. A.N.Z.U.S. is important to the doctrine for two reasons. One is that it is almost impossible to put the doctrine into practice without the co-operation of the .Australians and the Americans. The Australians and the Americans might want to continue the policy, even if A.N.Z.U.S. did not exist, but the level of co-operation seems likely to be less.

The United States has tended to rely fairly heavily on the assessments of New Zealand and Australia about the South Pacific. It has, for example, no bilateral aid programmes in the South Pacific. Part of its thinking is that too great a presence of American staff might provoke the Soviet Union to have similar representation.

The continuation of A.N.Z.U.S. should also prevent a possible over-reaction if A.N.Z.U.S. were seen to collapse. Australia, as the present Government has had to learn, and as the public of New Zealand are now learning, has a different view of defence from New Zealand.

There are historical and geographical reasons for this as well as the more often cited presence of American defence installations and the sale of uranium. Darwin and Broome were bombed during the Second World War and there has been a tendency for many Australians to see their country as

vast and thinly populated, at the edge of an overcrowded Asia. The establishment of another defence treaty between the United States and Australia is improbable, but it is probable that Australia would seek some assurance that the United States cared about Australia despite any collapse of A.N.Z.U.S. Such comfort might take the form of extensive military exercises between Australia and the United States.

This might provoke a reaction from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is not an aggressive country so much as an opportunist one. It does not like threats to its influence in the Eastern European countries, but it generally tries to take advantage of opportunites as they occur, rather than blatantly pursue military offensive behaviour.

From time to time it feels the need, however, to show the flag or to respond to what the United States is doing. The risk from a large show of American military forces in the South Pacific is that it would attract Soviet action to the area. All of this would undermine the policy of strategic denial and might well make the South Pacific an area of confrontation, as is much of the rest of the world. To abandon A.N.Z.U.S. could raise three problems inside New Zealand.

While pacifism has not been absent in New Zealand, it has not been dominant. Historically, New Zealand has been more than ready to take part in wars. Immediately after any disbanding of A.N.Z.U.S.

there could be a swing to pacifism or some form of unarmed neutrality. Such a period would be unlikely to last long and there would soon be agitation for a citizen’s army.

This could lead to all young people being required to take part in military training, learning to shoot, what weapons the country could afford, studying how to blow up bridges, and so on. This would all be uncomfortable, probably thoroughly dangerous and, considering the fearsome weapons which could be ranged against such a guerrilla army, thoroughly ludicrous. Soldiering in a technical age is best left in the hands of the professional. A sec° n( i domestic reason for staying in A.N.Z.U.S. is that there might ;be a strong electoral swing to the'Right and a party come to power ready to support the United States I right or wrong. This would be a tragedy for the development of any sense of New Zealand national identity.

A third domestic reason for staying in A.N.Z.U.S. relates to the international links that it brings. New Zealand, geographically, is isolated. Intellectually and culturally, it has long had links with the rest of the world. For various economic reasons some of these are going to be difficult to maintain over the next few years. If New Zealand became insular in outlook, in a way that it has not been generally, the ground would be fertile for an insular, populist politician to dominate the country.