THE PRESS TUESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1984. Missing: Yuri Andropov

Press, 24 January 1984, Page 16

THE PRESS TUESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1984. Missing: Yuri Andropov

If the head of a Western Government had not been publicly seen for more than five months, if reports about his condition were few and contradictory, if no deputy or successor had been appointed or elected, the business of government would be grinding to a halt amid public disquiet and demands for explanations. Supporters of the Soviet Union might argue that the resilience of their system is demonstrated when it continues to function without Mr Yuri Andropov, Secretary-General of the Communist Party and President of the Supreme Soviet.

The rest of the world can only view with curiosity the absence of conspicuous, personal leadership in a super-Power, and wonder whether this implies a great change in the workings of the Kremlin. When Mr Andropov makes not even a fleeting public appearance, it must be suspected that he is playing little or no part in government. Either his role has changed, or, for the time being, the top-most committees of government do not need the hand that has usually been needed to steer them. Perhaps the final authority already, by consent, lies elsewhere. Mr Andropov’s absence is an engaging puzzle for those who want to analyse the workings of the Soviet Government. Mr Andropov took office, after the death of Leonid Brezhnev, in November, 1982. He has not been seen since August last year and he has been variously reported as suffering from a cold, a stroke, a virus infection, and diabetes. The crowds in Moscow last November for the anniversary of the Russian Revolution had to be content with cardboard placards of Mr Andropov. In the last week of December he was absent from the sessions of the party’s central committee and from the Supreme Soviet. A summit meeting of Comecon, the Soviet trade bloc, was to have been held in February, but has been postponed. The next test of Mr Andropov’s condition will be the Russian elections for the Supreme Soviet early in March. Mr Andropov has been nominated again. In the meantime, the Soviet Union is being governed by members of the Politburo, the party’s top policy-making body. In recent months, most of the important public statements have come from the Minister of Defence, Marshal Ustinov, but at 75 the Marshal is probably too old to be considered as a successor for Mr Andropov. Talk of a successor may turn out to be premature. At 69 Mr Andropov, by Soviet standards, is not old to. be holding the highest political office. Uncertainty about Mr Andropov’s condition means uncertainty about the direction of Soviet policy towards the country’s own people and towards the rest of the world. Mr Andropov had not held office long enough, before he vanished, for him to do much more than express his intentions about changing the rigid bureaucracy he inherited from Mr Brezhnev. Last July he announced important experiments in economic management, designed to give factory managers more freedom to make decisions on production and profits. Those reforms are being introduced this month in selected factories. They are unlikely to go far enough towards shaking up an inflexible and inefficient system unless Mr Andropov is on hand to impose his ideas.

Mr Andropov had not held office long enough to secure his own supreme position in the party and Government, nor to ensure that his supporters would be in a position to take over after his death. Russian leaders since the Revolution have not been able to guarantee

their successors. Stalin was not Lenin’s choice; Mr Andropov was not Mr Brezhnev’s choice. Mr Andropov had begun the process of pushing his rivals sideways, and of promoting his supporters. While uncertainty remains about his condition, it appears that Marshal Ustinov is keeping an uneasy balance between the main factions of Soviet society — the military, the police, and the party.

Mr Brezhnev left to his successor a Soviet Union vastly more powerful than in the past, perhaps deploying more military power than any other country, including the United States. To maintain and enhance that power, at the expense of the rest of Soviet society, the country’s military leaders will insist on retaining a power of veto over economic reforms and over high political appointments. Mr Andropov also inherited the war in Afghanistan, a war the generals have shown they cannot win after four years. In spite of the privileged position enjoyed by the military in Soviet society, challenges to their behaviour can be expected from the high ranks of the party and the State. The longer that Mr Andropov remains out of sight, and away from the top counsels of the party and Government, the more divisions are likely to emerge. In the last few months, the Soviet Union has shown caution, even inertia, in its dealings with the West. In the Middle East, in the Caribbean, in southern Africa, where Soviet interests have been sharply challenged by the West, the response from Moscow has been restrained.

Such restraint will not necessarily continue if a battle is going on in the Kremlin for a successor to Mr Andropov. Uncertainty about where authority lies in Moscow, or where it may fall in the next few months, makes for bad decisions. This uncertainty must be increased by the prospect of a Presidential election in the United States. If President Reagan (aged 73 next month) stands down, important changes would be likely in American policies. If he stands, he will almost certainly be re-elected. The President has been blamed for the deterioration in relations between East and West. This blame might equally be placed on the uncertainties about leadership in the Soviet Union during Mr Brezhnev’s final illness, Mr Andropov’s emergence, and now the silence about his condition.

American voters will have an opportunity late this year to pass judgment on President Reagan and other candidates for the presidency. No formal procedure exists for the popular choice of a leader in the Soviet Union and there are no provisions for early retirement. Lenin, Stalin and Brezhnev died in office. Mr Khrushchev, the only other leader in more than 60 years, was pushed out. If Mr Andropov is seriously ill, his formal resignation would spur rivalries among potential successors. If he is forced to resign, his resignation in itself would be a new source of friction among potential successors. Either way, the Soviet Union is likely to face further uncertainties in policies and in its relations with the rest of the world. The most important business of the Soviet leadership is to direct the Soviet Union’s affairs at home. The Soviet people, having been given a glimpse of a new style of leadership, and new policies, must be even more profoundly interested in how the system is working at the Politburo level when the man who appeared to direct the changes is apparently not in charge.