THE PRESS WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1983. Civil war in the P.L.O.

Press, 9 November 1983, Page 20

THE PRESS WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1983. Civil war in the P.L.O.

Troops loyal to the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Mr Yasser Arafat, are on the defensive against rebel P.L.O. forces who enjoy backing from Syria. The P.L.O. factions show an appalling disregard for civilian casualties among Palestinian refugees and among the Lebanese in whose country the fighting is taking place. Mr Arafat is surviving from day to day. The possibility cannot be ruled out that he and his troops will perish in the fighting, but this is not the only possible outcome of the P.L.O.’s civil war.

Those opposed to Mr Arafat have superior military power, but Mr Arafat cannot be considered a spent political force. He has widespread backing from Arabs living in the West Bank and from Arabs in many countries. Besides being the leader of the Fatah group, the largest group within the P.L.0., he is chairman of the P.L.O. He is widely regarded as having the greatest authority within the P.L.O. He might be killed accidentally while his forces are under attack. Even that would cause an enormous row within the Palestinian organisations and throughout the Arab world. He is unlikely to be killed, deliberately. The reason why Mr Arafat is under attack has much to do with Syria’s plans for Lebanon. From time to time ideas about a “Greater Syria” which would encompass Lebanon are heard, but the most consistent Syrian policy towards Lebanon appears to be a desire to establish a balance of power between Muslim and Christian factions there. At the moment Syria is concerned to get Israeli troops out of southern Lebanon, and to get back the Golan Heights which Israel has formally annexed. Mr Arafat shows an independence of spirit that threatens to thwart Syria’s hopes. Mr Arafat was prepared to talk to King Hussein of Jordan, to President Mubarak of Egypt, and even to entertain American plans for the Middle East..

The Syrian Government wants a P.L.O. that is beholden to Syria. When Mr Arafat criticised Syria for the rebellion in the P.L.O. ranks, he was expelled from Syria. Within the P.L.0., and within some Arab countries, Mr Arafat has been criticised for being too moderate. It seems probable that Syria used such disaffection as existed and helped to split the P.L.O. and to encourage fighting within its ranks. Mr Arafat,

some time ago, also made a military appointment of someone loyal to himself, but who did not have the confidence of the troops he commanded.

Countries with an important interest in seeing Mr Arafat survive have been curiously silent while he founders. Saudi Arabia and Jordan, in particular, do not want to see the P.L.O. come under the leadership of radical elements who might take such a hard line against Israel that renewed war would be the outcome. As two of the conservative kingdoms left in the Arab world, neither Jordan nor Saudi Arabia wants to see a further shift to the Left in any Arab organisation. There might be little that they can do to help Yasser Arafat materially in his hour of greatest need, but the influence of Saudi Arabia, at least, is strong because of the support Saudi Arabia has given to the Palestinian cause. If events take their course without intervention from Saudi Arabia, the P.L.O. stands a strong chance of becoming merely an instrument of Syrian policy. The most outrageous element of this civil war in the ranks of the P.L.O. is that it is being fought inside a foreign country. Lebanon has provided a home for Palestinian refugees and is now helpless to prevent its guests from destroying their hosts, and themselves, by their squabbles. Syria’s support for the dissidents in the P.L.O. is helping to wreck a large part of northern Lebanon. Syria has lost any claim to be accepted as a voice of moderation in the settlement of Lebanon’s internal disputes. The readiness of the Syrians, and of factions within the P.L.0., to resort to war to settle political disputes is a grim indication of what might be expected if either gains further control in Lebanon.

The Western peace-keeping force round Beirut is not directly affected by the P.L.O. fighting further north. But as fighting continues, and as more and more civilians are killed, an attempt may have to be made to stop the rampage by the P.L.O. No country would want to contribute to a force that faced the thankless task of preventing Palestinians from killing one another. As the fighting affects more and more innocent people, many of them Lebanese with no part in the quarrel, there must be compelling humanitarian reasons for others to intervene.