Violence in southern Africa

Press, 28 May 1983, Page 14

Violence in southern Africa

South Africa’s clumsy reaction to a bomb attack in Pretoria last week suggests that the country has poor intelligence about the activities of anti-Government terrorists and no clear ideas about how best to respond to them. The air attack on a suburb of Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, may have killed members of the African National Congress, the group that claimed responsibility for the Pretoria bomb. The attack is unlikely to deter further A.N.C. attacks; nor is it likely to convince Mozambique that it should not provide a refuge for members of the A.N.C. South Africa is showing increasing readiness to respond to terrorism by attacks on what it believes to be bases beyond its borders. Black nationalists have increased their attacks and this year they have turned to using explosions designed to kill civilians, rather than concentrating on military and economic targets. Both sides may claim to be responding to provocation from the other. Both can plead justification: the black guerrillas claiming that all other activities short of terrorism have failed to modify South Africa’s racial policies; the Government asserting that precise information on clandestine terrorist groups is hard to find and targets must be attacked, wherever they may be, to demonstrate the Government’s resolution.

South African commandos raided a guerrilla base in Mozambique in January, 1981; they also attacked an A.N.C. refuge at Maseru, in Lesotho, last December. Both raids were condemned by the international community. The Organisation of African Unity proposed a joint force be set up to defend South Africa’s

neighbours. That proposal has received a new impetus this week. Although Mozambique cannot prevent South African raids on its territory, it has an added incentive to seek further military help from the Soviet Union and other States in the Eastern Bloc. While the South Africans might welcome an opportunity to demonstrate that they are defending themselves against communist-inspired subversion, their security problems will increase rapidly if Mozambique feels forced to accept help wherever it can be found.

The military responses have generally had overwhelming support from white South Africans. Blacks, however, have generally been critical. Soweto’s black daily newspaper, the “Sowetan,” for instance, called the raid on Maseru, “indefensible” and “obnoxious.” Although the military response looks tempting for South Africa, it also indicates the rising influence of the South African Defence Forces in the Government’s decision-making. Yet the terrorism, however horrible its results may be, is the result of a political problem in South Africa. Only a political response can offer any. hope of a settlement. Instead, both sides seem intent on increasing the level of violence. Most white South Africans still oppose fundamental reforms in their country’s race relations. However vigorous and efficient their military forces may be, the incidence of terrorism is likely to increase with no assurance that, in the end, South Africa’s military responses will manage to preserve the society and the way of life they are attempting to defend.