Jordan and the P.L.O. bury the hatchet

Press, 25 October 1982, Page 12

Jordan and the P.L.O. bury the hatchet

Acts of union between Arab states, and there have been lots of them, have not endured because they were based on vague sentiment.

The prolonged and intensive talks going on in Amman since Saturday, October 9. which could result in a Jordan-West Bank federation, are more substantive because they are built on the solid basis 'of shared fear.

Both Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organisation have changed their order of priorities since the war in Lebanon. Before the War. the West Bank and Gaza were to be freed from Israeli occupation first and then, perhaps, were to be linked to Jordan in some sort of federation.

Now. under pressure of both fear and time, the details of the federation are to be worked out and approved beforehand, and then implemented when the territories are no, longer occupied. Jor-danian-Palestinian agreement has thus become a lever to dislodge the occupation.

This is not in accordance with the Arab summit declaration at Fez last month. But Jordan feels threatened both by Israel — particularly by the flow of statements from the minister of defence, Mr Ariel Sharon. threatening the Hashemite regime — and by Syria.

The Palestinians also feel threatened by Israel and by Syria, which is trying to impose total control on a P.L.O. which no longer has its base in Lebanon. The West Bankers and Jordanians are more alive than the P.L.O. has been to the need for urgent action to counter Israel’s galloping expropriation and settlement of occupied territory. Thus both sides have taken

the difficult decision to bury their past hostility and to join hands. This basic decision could be taken only by King Hussein and Mr Yasser Arafat and it did not come easily. It took three days of private talks before they agreed on the framework and gave the signal for the detailed discussions to begin. Remembering September. 1970, the Jordanians suspected that the P.L.O. might still harbour revolutionary designs on the Hashemite monarchy. The P.L.O. also remembering 1970 as well as the king’s suggestion of a United Arab Kingdom two years later, suspected that Jordan was once again trying to bring the West Bank under its full control.

With this background, both sides are faintly incredulous that they should be talking to each other, and in friendly and serious fashion.

The Jordanians have gone out of their way to be hospitable to the Palestinians and the P.L.O. has been very correct: Mr Arafat’s car flies both the Jordanian and Palestinian flags. Jordan has opened its doors to P.L.O. men coming from Lebanon, and a number of senior officials of the Popular Front and Democratic Front, once bitterly antl-Jordanian, are now settled here with their families. The Jordanian amnesty granted last week to more than 700 people involved in the Jordanian-P.L.O. fighting in 1970 confirmed that bygones were bygones. The Jordanians and the P.L.O. are agreed that the fine words of the Fez agreements are just fine words. The West bankers, represented at the Amman talks by the expelled mayors and other dignitaries, are particularly weary of fine words. It is also agreed that

American action alone can bring change. ■ President Reagan’s initiative is considered unsatisfactory, but a joint counter-proposal has to be put forward. It will have to be prsented to Mr Reagan by King Hussein since American officials will not talk to the P.L.O. so the tricky question of giving the king a mandate from the P.L.O. is under discussion.

The king tried and failed to get an Arab mandate at Fez: the effort was spiked by Algeria and Saudi Arabia. This time the Jordanians are not pushing their claim but waiting for the mandate to be given them.

The problem for the Palestinians is not in giving the king a mandate but in deciding what this should be: a federation between Jordan and an independent West Bank-Gaza state, which is not likely to move the peace process forward, or, as a first step, something on the lines of Mr Reagan's proposal for an association between Jordan and a less than independent West Bank-Gaza entity.

It is extremely difficult for the P.L.O. to pull back from the idea of an independent state. But there are many in Amman, especially among the West Bankers, who say it must be done if there is to be any forward movement through the United States. A Palestinian mandate to the king to talk about either federation or asociation is anathema to the Syrians. They have gone over to the attack, denouncing Mr Arafat and saying that he does not speak for the P.L.O. (they were particularly angry when he moved his headquarters to Tunis rather than Damascus). The Syrians claim that the P.L.O. executive committee, which is lending its authority to the talks, does not have a

quorum, but there they are wrong.

Eight of its 15 members are in Amman; two more who are abroad are pro-Arafat; one missing member is under medical treatment in Scandinavia and another is underground somewhere in Lebanon. This means that only three members of the executive committee have refused to come to Amman and they represent Saiqa, the Popular Front and the Democratic Front, the bulk of whose forces are in Syria and who therefore have no freedom of action.

Once the major decision that Jordan and the P.L.O. should work together had been taken, the committees dealing with

specific issues have so much to discuss that their meetings will continue for several days. Apart from the overriding issue of the federal or association structure, these committees have to decide on such immediate problems as what to do about a possible exodus of refugees from Lebanon. They are also talking about the future boundaries of the West Bank entity, the custodianship of the holy places and the status of the Jewish settlements.

What is happening in Aamman is that the two Arab parties most directly concerned with the Palestine problem have got together to carve out their own programme.

This independent approach is hated by Syria and treated coolly by some other Arab countries' including Saudi Arabia. For the Palestinians it is a drastic policy realignment, and the support of their main body, the Palestine national council has yet to be obtained.

The council is supposed to meet in two or three weeks’ time: the earlier it meets, the more disputatious its discussions are likely to be. It was generallj’ understood that it would meet in Damascus. Not now. The alternative site would be Tunis, or even Amman. If it does meet in Amman, this would set the seal on Jor-danian-Palestinian reconciliation.

From “The Economist,” London