THE PRESS THURSDAY, AUGUST 12, 1982. The P.L.O. after Beirut

Press, 12 August 1982, Page 20

THE PRESS THURSDAY, AUGUST 12, 1982. The P.L.O. after Beirut

Israel’s acceptance of the American plan to allow Palestine Liberation Organisation guerrillas to leave Beirut allays fears that Israel planned to kill the guerrillas. It does not end the, fears for good. On the face of it. however, the acceptance means that attention can be given to the details, rather than to the general principle. The main elements of the plan lie in the timing of the withdrawal; in how many guerrillas should leave or remain as an international force enters Beirut; and in the agreement of various countries to take the P.L.O. guerrillas. The American envoy, Mr Philip Habib, should be able to settle these points, which are technical and negotiable. Finding the countries to which the guerrillas will be allowed to go has proved to be one of the most difficult problems. The search has brought to light one of the half-truths of the Middle East, which abounds in political half-truths and selfdeceptions. While a number of Arab countries lamented that the Palestinians were forced to live in Lebanon, Arabs countries also felt some relief that the Palestinians were in Lebanon and not elsewhere. Palestinians are spread through the Gulf and the Middle East generally, but the majority live in Lebanon and the P.L.O. had its main forces in Lebanon. Now that the Israelis have forced the issue, the reluctance of other countries to take the P.L.O. has become evident. The reluctance is understandable. The circumstances under which the P.L.O. will be permitted to live in countries other than Lebanon are not clear. Will they keep their arms? The police of the new host country or countries will be interested in the answer. Will the Palestinians retain a special identity? Will they be allowed to work? To raid Israel? Will there be work for them in countries where unemployment is already high? The Palestinians in many Gulf countries have distinguished themselves by their industry and ability. In several countries this has caused a sense of

resentment, particularly among sections of the population who have not had the same education as the Palestinians.

Beside these problems, various factions of the P.L.O. engage in feuding. At times this feuding has resulted in bystanders getting hurt or killed. Few countries want to import such a security problem. The fact that Syria seems willing to accept P.L.O. factions who are known to be militant must bring relief to other countries. Any country that is host to the P.L.O. forces knows that it might be subjected to an attack on those forces by Israel. This is a strong disincentive to play the host.

The P.L.O. guerrillas have to be moved now for humanitarian reasons, and especially to protect Lebanese in Beirut. ' The long-term outcome cannot be foreseen. The effect of the dispersal of the P.L.O. forces to various countries might mean the end of the P.L.O. as an effective and cohesive force. One of the worst effects might be that the groups in the various countries will become more and more extreme as they seek to draw attention to their vanishing dream of a Palestinian homeland. Egypt has already abandoned the sections of the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt that were intended to help the Palestinians return to their lost territory in Israel. The Israelis may not only have eliminated the P.L.O. as a political and military force, but may also have destroyed the hope of a Palestinian homeland for those who were made homeless, or whose families were made homeless, in the founding of Israel. This dislocation has been at the heart of the Middle East problem. Israel cannot know whether it is breaking up its P.L.O. problem into manageable fragments,. or by seeing the P.L.O. dispersed, is compounding its problem for the long term-