THE PRESS FRIDAY, JULY 16, 1982. Iran on the offensive

Press, 16 July 1982, Page 12

THE PRESS FRIDAY, JULY 16, 1982. Iran on the offensive

Other things being equal, when an aggressor who has picked a fight ends up being knocked about himself the onlookers are inclined to cheer. Unfortunately, other things are not equal in the Middle East war between Iran and Iraq. There is a rough justice in the sight this week of Iraq, the aggressor nearly two years ago, being invaded by Iran. The renewal of the fighting, with a fair chance that the Iranians will make good some of their extravagant intentions for revenge against Iraq, brings increased instability to the Middle East and increased uncertainty about the world’s supply of oil. The Iranians had been making small gains against Iraq for more than a year. Almost all the territory captured by the Iraqis in 1980 had been regained when, last month, the Iranian Government of Ayatollah Khomeiny announced there would be a “great victory for Islam” in the holy month of Ramadan. This year the holy month runs from June 23 to July 21. With just a week to go, this great victory is being sought in the Iranian advance on the vital port of Basra, the second"largest city in Iraq. Basra is about 30 kilometres from the Iranian border. Iraq’s capital, Bagdad, is about 150 kilometres from the border. Both must be vulnerable when their defence depends on a depleted Iraqi Army that has been at war for nearly two years. The Iranians do not need to capture the cities. It may be sufficient to surround them and lay siege while pro-Iranian mullahs of the Shi’ite sect of Islam stir the population to revolt. Iran’s propaganda claims that the war has become a contest of the “forces of Islam” (from Iran) against the “atheists” (of Iraq). It is certainly a new round in a very old religious quarrel between the Iranian Shi’ite Muslims and the Sunni version of Islam professed by. Iraq’s rulers. A little over half the population of Iraq belongs to the Shi’ite sect. As the Iranians come knocking on the gates, many of them must, have their loyalty divided between their country and the religion of the invaders.

The division of Sunnis and Shi’ites is not confined to Iran and Iraq. With apprehension the Iranian advance is watched by other Middle East States, not least the conservative Gulf oil producers such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Both are close to the fighting; both have helped the Iraqis, as a kind of insurance that Iran would not attempt to export its revolution to their own territories. The revolution is now drawing closer. In spite .of the intermittent war between Iran and Iraq, much of the West’s oil is still drawn from the region. The United States has said that it remains neutral and supports the “independence and territorial integrity of Iran and Iraq.” It has also said that it “supports the security of friendly States in the region.” The extent of that support may well be tested very soon. Nothing is ever quite as it seems in the

Middle East. The Iranians give as one of their war aims a desire to find a way through Iraq so that they can help drive the Israelis from Lebanon and recapture Jerusalem for Islam. This serves to emphasise the religious fervour that colours political events in the Middle East, but the Iranians need hardly be taken seriously. Should Iraq collapse, and there are few signs yet that it will, the way to Israel is still blocked by Syria and Jordan. Neither would welcome an Iranian army, whatever the intentions of that army might be.

There is also strong evidence that Iran has had military help from Israel in the last two years, while much of the Arab world has turned its back on the curious revolutionary regime of Ayatollah Khomeiny. The renewed fighting may be helping Israel by deflecting attention from Lebanon. Even an Iranian victory would be unlikely to cause the Israelis harm at present.

Among the curious mixture of religious motives and determination for revenge that the Iranian rulers are using to explain their attacks, the practical desire to keep the Iranian Anny busy should not be overlooked. Little love is lost between 'the army officer corps, men who value modern technology, and the religious fundamentalists around Khomeiny. Much of the rank and file of the Army is believed to be sympathetic to the Left-wing Mujahedin movement in Iran, guerrillas who would prefer to see Iran’s revolution guided by political ideology rather than religious intensity. Protracted war may be the best way to keep Iran’s Army from attempting a political coup.

Although the fighting may well interrupt the flow of oil to the rest of the world, the impact is likely to be less serious than earlier restraints on oil supplies. A small oil surplus at present provides a cushion against fluctuations in supply. Some oil producers, for reasons of their own, are attempting to increase their output and might be glad to have new markets. Many oil importers have become more adept, in the last decade, at regulating demand, especially during the height of summer in the northern hemisphere.

That happy state of affairs will change rapidly if the fighting spreads to other Gulf oil producers. The Iraqis miscalculated in September, 1980, when they thought an invasion’Of Iran might be sufficient to overthrow the regime. of Ayatollah Khomeiny. The Iranians may well have made a similar miscalculation if they expect a quick collapse from the regime of President Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The longer the fighting lasts, the greater is the risk that others will be drawn in as one side or the other looks for a decisive advantage. Then the West is likely to face as great a threat to its oil supplies as any so far in the last, difficult decade.