Soviet influence builds in Gulf

Press, 11 June 1982, Page 16

Soviet influence builds in Gulf

By

PATRICK SEALE

in London

Events in the Arabian Gulf prompted the comment from the United States Secretary of State (Mr Alexander Haig) recently that now is “America’s moment in the Middle East.” In fact, it looks more likely to be Russia’s. Mr Haig's long-awaited Middle East policy speech has filled moderate Arabs with dismay. They see it as a wholly inadequate response to the crisis threatening them. The most he could promise was some diplomatic activity "in the weeks ahead” — while they . see peril in the next days, if not hours. ’ Such patent evidence of American caution, or indecision, can only reinforce the new tendency to look East. Gulf sources report that Arab feelers have been put out both directly to Moscow and indirectly through the Soviet Union’s principal Arab ally, Syria. It is reliably reported that, as the tide turned in-the war, Saudi representatives held discreet talks with Soviet officials in Kuwait - the one Arab Gulf country to have diplomatic relations with Moscow, and one which has long advised its neighbours to follow its ex-, ample. In addition, the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud, hurried to Damascus. for six hours of intensive talks with President Assad in a bid to secure Syrian good offices in containing Iran. Other envoys from the Gulf have made the same journey in the same cause. Saudi and Kuwaiti subsidies to Syria are being resumed. Security issues — and where to look for help — topped the agenda at the emergency meeting in Riyadh of the Gulf Co-operation -Council two weeks ago. f The anxiety of Saudi Arabia and its neighbours is understandable. If Iran marches across the Iraqi frontier, the move could have awesome and unpredictable political conse-

quences for the power balance in the region. .Iran’s stated war aim is to overthrow President Saddam Hussein. The mullahs may well calculate that to bring this about it will be necessary to conquer a major Iraqi city such as the big southern Iraqi port of Basra. It could even be that if the Iraqi Army collapses — as it appears to have done at Khorramshahr — Iranian forces would • be sucked into the vacuum. Military considerations apart, it seems that those factions in Iran who want to export the Islamic revolution are winning out against those who would prefer to consolidate the home base. So the Arabs of the Gulf have 1 good cause to worry. They realise that their traditional protectors in the West have no leverage on the decision makers in Teheran, and Mr Haig's statement did nothing to reassure them. He even acknowledged that the .conflict offered the Soviet Union an opportunity to enlarge its. influence. It has not escaped the Gulf rulers, .who are used to surviving amid conflicting pressures, that the countries to which they are now turning do have leverage on Iran. These are first of all Iran’s Arab friends like Syria and Algeria (which the. Saudi Foreign Minister also visited) and second the Soviet Union. Teheran has little more love for Moscow than it has for the “Great Satan,” America, but the presence of scores of Soviet divisions on Iran’s northern frontier and in Afghanistan gives Moscow the sort of leverage which Washington conspicuously lacks. If Moscow were to put its weight behind a. political settlement of the war,, the mullahs might be given pause.

A political settlement is precisely what the Gulf States are after. With Iraq’s defeat, they recognise that no Arab military, intervention could now succeed — neither Egypt

nor Jordan could tilt the balance even if they were prepared to commit troops. Undoubtedly the Soviet Union has been trying to build up goodwill in Iran. It has allowed North Korea, Libya, and Syria to re-export Soviet armaments to Iran, while going slow on fulfilling Iraqi arms contracts. This shift of emphasis is part of a wider Soviet bid to get back into the Middle East heartlands from which American diplomacy has long excluded it. As the chief vehicle for its interests, Moscow is pinning its hopes on the “Steadfastness Front” (Syria, Algeria, Libya, South Yemen and the Palestine Liberation Organisation) which it wants to link firmly to its own diplomacy. When President Assad goes to Moscow this month, Soviet plans to strengthen the front as an anti-American instrument will be at the centre of discussions. Evidence of the new Soviet assertiveness may also be seen in the security guarantees and advanced weaponry Russia is giving Syria in its confrontation with Israel in Lebanon. On the other front, Syria is cast by the Soviets as the spearhead of their “Gulf offensive”: they see Syria as the bridge which will carry their influence into the vulnerable and now frightened Gulf States. So there is every reason to suppose that the present tentative Gulf overtures will be more than welcome in Moscow. For all that Syria supports these Soviet moves, it is not acting primarily on the Soviet Union’s behalf. President Assad wants to affirm Syria’s prime importance in the region. He believes that every Iranian advance, every Iraqi defeat, increases the Gulf States’ need for his mediation. $ If the Soviet Union and Syria get their way, the West's long virtual monopoly of influence, trade, and access to oil in the Gulf may soon be broken. Copyright, London Observer Service.,' .. '